University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Studies

Student Work

2022

Sometimes, the House Loses: Caesars in Chapter 11
Mitchell Gladstein
Christian Wilkinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utk_studlawbankruptcy
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gladstein, Mitchell and Wilkinson, Christian, "Sometimes, the House Loses: Caesars in Chapter 11"
(2022). Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Studies. 67.
https://ir.law.utk.edu/utk_studlawbankruptcy/67

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Legal Scholarship Repository: A
Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Studies
by an authorized administrator of Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. For more
information, please contact eliza.boles@utk.edu.

Sometimes, the House Loses:
Caesars in Chapter 11
by

Mitchell Gladstein & Christian Wilkinson

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cast of Characters

1

Part I: Place Your Bets – Introduction

3

Part II: The Deck of Cards – Background of the Case

4

A. The Beginning of Harrah’s Entertainment

4

B. Expansions and Acquisitions

4

C. The Rewards Program and Birth of CEC

5

D. Apollo and TPG Take CEC Private

5

Part III: The Shuffle – Events Leading to Caesars’ Chapter 11

7

A. Economic Challenges

7

B. Controversial Transactions

8

1. Caesars’ Corporate Structure Over Times and Its Eventual
Involuntary Chapter 11
C. Prepetition RSA and Involuntary Chapter 11 in Delaware

8
13

Part IV: Dealing the Cards – First Day Motions

14

A. First Day Motions to Stabilize Operations

14

1. The Wages Motion

14

2. The Cash Management Motion

16

3. The Lienholders, 503(b)(9), and Foreign Vendors Motions

18

4. The PACA Motion

21

5. The Critical Vendors Motion

22

6. The Customer Program Motion

22

7. The Taxes Motion

23

8. The Insurance Motion

24

9. The Surety Bond Motion

25

10. The Cash Collateral Motion.

25

11. The Utilities Motion

28

i

B. Procedural and Administrative First Day Motions

30

1. The Joint Administration Motion

30

2. The Case Management Motion

31

3. The Schedules and Statements Extension Motion

32

Part V: The Aces Up Caesars’ Sleeve – Its Retention of Professionals

32

A. Prime Clerk LLC

33

B. Kirkland & Ellis LLP

34

C. AP Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”)

35

D. Millstein & Co., L.P.

37

E. DLA Piper LLP

37

F. Paul Hastings LLP

38

G. KPMG LLP

39

H. The Unsuccessful Retention of Mesirow Financial Consulting, LLC and
Baker Tilly Virchow Krause LLP

40

Part VI: The Pit Bosses – Appointment of the Official Creditors’
Committees

41

A. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC”)

42

B. The Second Priority Noteholders Committee (the “Noteholder Committee”)

42

C. The Fee Committee

45

Part VII: The Gaming Commission – The Special Governance Committee
Investigation
A. Mesirow’s Role in the SGC Investigation

Part VIII: The Martingale – CEC, Apollo, and TPG Double Down on
Caesars’ Controversial Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions

45
47

48

A. How CEC Viewed the Transactions

49

B. How Apollo and TPG Viewed the Transactions

49

C. How the Noteholder Committee Viewed the Transactions

49

D. How the Ad Hoc Group of 5.75% and 6.50% Noteholders Viewed the
Transaction

50

ii

Part IX: The Buy-In – What Should the Value of CEC’s Contributions
under the Proposed Plan Be?

52

Part X: Fighting for a Seat at the Table – The Second Lien Standing
Motion

53

Part XI: Table Talk – Negotiating Restructuring Support Agreements

56

A. The First Lien Noteholders

57

B. Certain Holders of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims

58

C. Certain Holders of Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims

59

D. CEC and Caesars Acquisition Company (“CAC”)

60

E. Holders of Second Lien Notes Claims

60

F. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC”)

61

Part XII: Fighting for a Seat at the Table II – More Lien Standing
Challenges

62

A. Motion by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC Lien Standing
Motion”)

62

B. Motion by the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Indenture Trustee (the
“Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Standing Motion”)

65

C. Resolution of the Motions

67

Part XIII: The Overcard – Section 1111(b) Claim Objections

69

Part XIV: Side Bets – Adversary Proceedings

72

A. The Section 105 Adversary

72

B. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (“UCC”) Lien Challenge Adversary
Proceeding

83

C. The National Retirement Fund (the “NRF”) Adversary Proceeding and
Related Litigation in the Southern District of New York

90

1. The NRF Adversary Proceeding

90

2. Related Litigation in the Southern District of New York

94

D. Second Lien RSA Adversary Proceeding

95

iii

Part XV: To Fold or to Call, That is the Question – The Rejection and
Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases

96

Part XVI: Dealing in Texas Hold’em – The Evolution of Caesars’ Plan of
Reorganization

98

A. Caesars’ Debt Entering Chapter 11

99

B. The Plan in Very Rough Form

101

C. How Caesars’ New Capital Structure Would Eventually Look under the
Final Plan of Reorganization

102

D. The Road to Caesars’ Final Plan

104

1. Objections: Developing an “Adequate” Disclosure Statement
2. The Examiner’s Report: A Shift in Negotiating Dynamics
3. The June 2016 Plan

104
108
110

a. Proposed Recovery for Class D—Holders of Prepetition
Credit Agreement Claims—under the June 2016 Plan

112

b. Proposed Recovery for Class E—Holders of Secured First
Lien Notes Claims—under the June 2016 Plan

115

c. Proposed Recovery for Class F—Holders of Second Lien
Notes Claims—under the June 2016 Plan

117

d. Proposed Recovery for Class G—Holders of SubsidiaryGuaranteed Notes Claims—under the June 2016 Plan

118

e. Summary of the Estimated Creditor Recoveries under the
June 2016 Plan

119

4. The Evolution of the Plan from June through September 0f 2016

120

5. Caesars’ Final Plan of Reorganization

122

a. Class D’s Recovery under the Final Plan as Compared to
the June 2016 Plan

123

b. Class E’s Recovery under the Final Plan as Compared to
the June 2016 Plan

125

c. Class F’s Recovery under the Final Plan as Compared to
the June 2016 Plan

128

d. Class G’s Recovery under the Final Plan as Compared to
the June 2016 Plan

129

e. Analysis: The Final Plan vs. The June 2016 Plan

130

i.

How Class D Fared

130

iv

f.

ii.

How Class E Fared

131

iii.

How Class F Fared

131

iv.

How Class G Fared

132

Implementation of the Plan

132

i.

Settlements with Creditor Groups and Releases
from Liability

133

Caesars’ New Corporate Governance

135

ii.

Part XVII: The Texas Hold’em Showdown – Confirmation of Caesars’
Final Plan of Reorganization and the Occurrence of the Plan’s Effective
Date

136

A. Confirmation of the Final Plan

136

B. The Occurrence of the Final Plan’s Effective Date

137

Part XVIII: Cashing in their Chips – The Final Fee Applications of the
Professionals Retained by Caesars

139

A. Kirkland & Ellis LLP

140

B. AP Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”)

142

C. Millstein & Co., L.P.

142

D. DLA Piper LLP

144

E. Paul Hastings LLP

145

F. KPMG LLP

146

Part XIX: Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas? – Caesars’
Emergence from Chapter 11 and Where the Company is Now

147

Epilogue – It Still Isn’t Over

150

v

CAST OF CHARACTERS
Our Debtor. Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc. (“CEOC”)
•

For the purposes of this paper, CEOC, a subsidiary of Caesars Entertainment Corporation
(“CEC”) that was the gambling titan’s largest unit, will be referred to simply as Caesars.

Other Debtors. The chapter 11 cases discussed in this paper was jointly administered. Caesars, as
well as numerous other CEC subsidiaries, filed for bankruptcy. A complete list of these debtors is
available here.
•

For the purposes of this paper, we will simply refer to the bankruptcy as Caesars’ chapter 11.

The Judge. Chief Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar.
•

Presiding over the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, Judge Goldgar was the judge assigned to Caesars’ chapter 11.

Caesars’ Non-Debtor Affiliates. The non-debtor affiliates listed below were key players in
Caesars’ chapter 11, not for participating in the actual proceedings, but because of the controversial
transactions they engaged in with CEC leading up to Caesars’ bankruptcy.
•

Caesars Acquisition Corporation (“CAC”)

•

Caesars Enterprise Services, LLC (“CES”)

•

Caesars Entertainment Resort Properties (“CERP”)

•

Caesars Growth Partners (“CGP”)

•

Caesars Interactive Entertainment (“CIE”)

Caesars’ Private Equity Sponsors. The private equity firms listed below acquired what would
become CEC, the parent company of this paper’s Caesars, in a 2008 leveraged buyout. Under the
direction of these firms, Caesars engaged in controversial transactions leading up to Caesars’ chapter 11
filing. Much of the drama in this paper comes from the outrage with which Caesars’ creditors viewed the
transactions these sponsors spearheaded. The individuals listed below each firm personally played major
roles in those transactions and Caesars’ chapter 11.
•

•

Apollo Global Management
▪

Marc Rowan, Co-Founder and CEO

▪

David Sambur, Co-Head of Private Equity

TPG Capital
▪

David Bonderman, Founding Partner
1

CEC’s CEO and Board Member of Caesars. Gary Loveman.
•

Prior to being appointed CEO of what would become CEC, Gary Loveman was a professor in
Harvard’s business school. Loveman also served as a member of Caesars’ board of directors. It
was under his stewardship that Caesars at first prospered but eventually found itself filing for
chapter 11.

The Professionals Retained by Caesars. To assist it with its reorganization, Caesars hired the
following professional firms.
•

Prime Clerk LLC was hired to serve as the Caesars’ notice and claims agent.

•

Kirkland & Ellis LLP was hired to serve as Caesars’ lead counsel.

•

AP Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”) was hired to serve as a restructuring and financial advisor
for Caesars, a role which entailed appointing a Chief Restructuring Officer.

•

Millstein & Co, L.P. was hired to serve as a financial advisor and investment banker for Caesars.

•

DLA Piper LLP was hired as a special conflicts counsel to Caesars.

•

Paul Hastings LLP was also hired as a special conflicts counsel to Caesars.

•

KPMG LLP was hired to serve as Caesars’ tax consultant.

Creditors’ Committees. The following creditors’ committees were appointed to represent the
interests of Caesars’ creditors in the company’s chapter 11.
•

The Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC”) was appointed to represent
Caesars’ unsecured creditors.

•

The Official Committee of Second Priority Noteholders (the “Noteholder Committee”)
was appointed to represent the junior bondholders of Caesars, the group of creditors who
provided Caesars the most resistance throughout its chapter 11.

•

The Fee Committee was appointed to review, and supervise the payment of, fee applications
filed by the professionals retained by Caesars to assist with its reorganization.

Caesars’ Junior Bondholders. The following firms were junior bondholders of Caesars, holding
second priority notes, and they fought valiantly against Caesars throughout its chapter 11. The individuals
listed below each firm played major roles in combating Caesars, Apollo, and TPG.
•

Oaktree Capital
o

•

Kenneth Liang, Managing Director & Head of Restructurings

Appaloosa Management
o

Jim Bolin, Lead Negotiator

2

Sometimes, the House Loses:
Caesars in Chapter 11
by

Mitchell Gladstein & Christian Wilkinson
Part I: Place Your Bets – Introduction
An Irish Proverb says, “Hoping to recoup is what ruins the gambler.”1 When private equity
firms, Apollo and TPG, spearheaded “the seventh biggest leveraged buyout deal” in history to
acquire what would become Caesars Entertainment Corporation (“CEC”),2 you could say they
took a gamble. It likely seemed like a safe bet at the time; CEC, then-Harrah’s Entertainment, was
and still is a “gambling empire.”3 The company has global reach, “operating dozens of casinos and
hotels around the world.”4 However, CEC and its private equity sponsors, Apollo and TPG, would
soon discover the house does not always win in the gaming industry. This paper first examines
how Apollo and TPG spent the years leading up to the bankruptcy of CEC’s “largest unit,” Caesars
Entertainment Operating Company (“CEOC” and our “Caesars” for the purposes of this paper),
trying to recoup on their prior losses.5 And, while the recoupment efforts of these private equity
titans certainly did not ruin them,6 it certainly cannot be said that their gamble paid off. The rest
of this paper provides an in-depth examination of Caesars’ reorganization. In the end, you will
likely find the following quote from Charles Lamb to be apt: “Cards are war, in disguise of a
sport.”7 Except, in this instance, for a company whose very name may conjure up mental images
of Vegas high-rollers playing cards or shooting craps, it was war, in disguise of a chapter 11
bankruptcy.

1

50 of the Best Quotes about Luck, Gambling and Casinos, BETMGM (Oct. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/7ZCZ6JAN.
2
John Kreisher, Harrah’s Accepts $17.1B Buyout Bid, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19, 2006), https://perma.cc/7PAZ-4JYN.
3
Marie Beaudette, From Harrah’s to Caesars: A Timeline, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/NT3VRF8S.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Miriam Gottfried, Apollo, KKR, TPG Among Private Equity Giants Backing Employee Ownership Drive, FIN.
NEWS (Apr. 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/HS85-7FZN (demonstrating that Apollo and TPG are still leading major
investments today).
7
Charles Lamb Quotes, ALLGREATQUOTES, https://perma.cc/P7F8-9AAM (last visited Apr. 16, 2022).
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Part II: The Deck of Cards – Background of the Case
Gamblers cannot play cards without a deck. Therefore, in this Part, before diving into
Caesars’ reorganization, we provide some background information on Caesars, CEC, Apollo, and
TPG. This background represents the proverbial deck of cards from which Caesars eventually
played its “game” of chapter 11.
A. The Beginning: Harrah’s Entertainment
CEC is an American hotel and casino entertainment company. CEC was incorporated in
Delaware and operates heavily, obviously, in Nevada where its well-known Las Vegas properties
are located.8 Long before becoming CEC, Bill Harrah opened Harrah’s Bingo Club in 1937 in
Reno, Nevada as a small, local establishment for gaming.9 This same establishment, unbeknownst
to Mr. Harrah, would turn into one of the largest companies the United States has ever seen.
Described as a “spotlessly clean, glass-fronted, plush-carpeted casino,” Harrah’s Bingo Club was
a stark contrast to the usual “rough frontier-type betting parlor.”10 Soon enough, the success
showed, and by 1948, Harrah’s gross annual revenue exceeded $1.5 million.11 In response to this
quick growth, Mr. Harrah expanded his operation to Lake Tahoe in 1955, where Harrah’s truly
“took off” from a business standpoint.12 The presence of Harrah’s truly became apparent in 1973
when it became the first casino company to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.13
B. Expansions and Acquisitions
Harrah’s had some operating troubles toward the end of the 1970s and eventually became
a wholly owned subsidiary of Holiday Inn in the 1980s when Michael Rose, Holiday Inn’s
executive, bought Harrah’s, Inc. for around $300 million.14 Sadly, right before this, Bill Harrah
died in 1978 at the age of 67 after surgery in Rochester, Minnesota.15 In the 80s, Holiday Inns
became Holiday Corp. and quickly became known as Promus Companies, Inc. in 1989.16 Michael
Rose sold the Holiday Inns the very next year to Bass PLC in Great Britain for $2.2 billion
dollars.17 The deal operated as follows: “Holiday gave Promus the Harrah's casino operations as
well as the Embassy Suites, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inns then merged into a subsidiary
Caesar’s Entertainment, Inc. Search Results, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N EDGAR (Mar. 26, 2022),
https://perma.cc/U8W3-B9M4.
9
CAESAR’S ENTERTAINMENT, https://perma.cc/BQK3-WC2M.
10
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, https://perma.cc/3XZZ-ZUET (last visited Apr. 18,
2022).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
CAESAR’S ENTERTAINMENT, supra note 9.
14
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. History, supra note 10.
15
William F. Harrah, 67, Is Dead; Was a Casino Pioneer in Nevada, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 2, 1978),
https://perma.cc/N47B-CXG8.
16
Daniel Heneghan, Inn Sale Completed, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Feb. 8, 1990), https://perma.cc/H226-LVAW.
17
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. History, supra note 10.
8
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of Bass. Holiday stockholders received one share of Promus for each Holiday share they owned as
well as a quarter of a share of Bass stock.”18 After this deal, the legalization of gambling became
prominent in other states and Harrah’s took advantage, opening riverboat casinos in states such as
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Missouri.19 The riverboat expansion turned out to be profitable for
Harrah’s as it accounted for “43 percent of its $354 million operating profit” in 1995. 20 Also, in
1995, Promus separated its hotel business from gaming and created Promus Hotel Corp., holding
Embassy Suites, Hampton Inn and Homewood Suites, while the gaming division, comprised of 16
casinos at the time, was renamed Harrah’s Entertainment.21
C. The Rewards Program and Birth of CEC
In 1997, Harrah’s launched its “Total Gold” loyalty program at a cost of around $20
million.22 This was a major milestone for Harrah’s as this was the first loyalty program that enabled
customers to redeem their points for goods and services systemwide or, in other words, at any
Harrah’s location.23 The Total Gold program certainly helped with the expansion of Harrah’s. As
one author put it, “A program such as Total Rewards works better when there are more properties
and more players. So the next natural step was to expand Harrah’s reach.”24 As such, Harrah’s
began acquiring more properties “at a rate of about one a year.”25
A significant change in leadership for Harrah’s arrived in 2003 when Gary Loveman,
Harvard Business School professor and Chief Operating Officer of Harrah’s, became CEO of the
company.26 Loveman wasted no time in his efforts to make Harrah’s an even bigger operation than
it already was by striking a deal in 2004 to buy Caesars Entertainment Inc. for a little over $9
billion, creating the largest gambling operation in the world. 27 This acquisition, without a doubt,
gave Harrah’s a much larger presence on the Las Vegas strip and allowed them to continue their
pervasive growth in the United States.

18

Heneghan, supra note 16.
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. History, supra note 10.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Rick Alm, Harrah's Total Gold Card Broadens Players' Options It Redeems Points Earned in Chain's Casinos
Systemwide, KANSAS CITY STAR (Sept. 9, 1997), https://perma.cc/Z3MF-ML83.
23
Id.
24
David Schwartz, The Legacy of Gary Loveman and Caesars Entertainment, GREEN FELT J.,
https://perma.cc/6GM4-UJ9S.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Harrah’s agrees to buy Caesar’s for $5.2 billion, NBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/592N-F54T.
19
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D. Apollo and TPG Take CEC Private
Two major players in Caesars’ eventual bankruptcy arrived on the scene shortly after
Loveman was named CEO of Harrah’s Entertainment in January of 2003.28 In a transaction that
closed in 2008, David Bonderman of TPG Capital and Marc Rowan of Apollo Global Management
acquired Harrah’s “in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $27.8 billion, including the
assumption of approximately $10.7 billion of debt.”29 The agreement gave stockholders of
Harrah’s $90 for each outstanding share, an almost 36% premium from Harrah’s closing share
price on September 29, 2006.30 Things went fairly well from there. Business continued to grow
after the leveraged buyout, more properties were acquired, and, in 2010, a name change from
Harrah’s to Caesars Entertainment Corporation (our “CEC”) occurred.31 However, the financial
recession of 2008, among other factors,32 created issues that stuck with CEC and eventually forced
their subsidiary operating company, our Caesars (aka “CEOC”), into chapter 11 bankruptcy in
2015. One article provided the following description, an exceptional overview of how Apollo,
alongside its partner in TPG, operated CEC and Caesars:
“Over its twenty-five-year existence, Apollo’s hallmark had become
discerning opportunity where no one else dare tread and then striking deals
everyone else was too timid to make. Apollo also liked to play by its own
rules, forcing its adversaries to think twice about confrontation. As Apollo’s
success compounded over the years, only a few ever stood in its way. Apollo
had become, unquestionably, the most feared private equity firm in the
world.
In the lean years after the financial crisis, Apollo’s clever deal making had,
against all odds, kept [CEC] alive in the hope that its fortunes would
eventually snap back. Apollo’s [CEC] investment was led by Marc Rowan,
regarded by many as the canniest investor at Apollo and perhaps on all of
Wall Street. Rowan’s apprentice was a young fireball, David Sambur,
whose intellectual horsepower and doggedness left him basically running
the casino behemoth while in only his early 30s. Rowan’s calm and charm
belied his ruthlessness. Sambur, on the other hand, was a pit bull constantly
in attack mode.
Together, their gifts kept [CEC] afloat longer than any other private equity
firm could—or even should—have. Caesars filed for bankruptcy in early
2015 under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, leading to a courtsupervised free-for-all to determine who would have the right to take control
of the revitalized company: Apollo and its partner TPG Capital, or the
28

Schwartz, supra note 24.
Harrah’s Agrees to be Acquired by Apollo and TPG, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://perma.cc/RE77-SNP3.
30
Id.
31
Schwartz, supra note 24.
32
See infra Part III.
29
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vulture distressed-debt investors, who happened to be the world’s biggest,
baddest hedge funds.” 33
Indeed, the bankruptcy did get unpleasant rather quickly. Another author described
it as “one of the nastiest corporate brawls in recent memory. Caesars debtholders — led by
Elliott Management, Appaloosa Management and Oaktree Capital — accused the private
equity firms of ‘unimaginably brazen looting’ in the years after the 2008 buyout.”34 In other
words, CEC, controlled by Apollo and TPG, faced lawsuits alleging that assets were
fraudulently conveyed from Caesars to CEC, leaving Caesars with a mountain of debt and
none of their best assets on hand.35 Put concisely, “the lawsuits in general contend[ed] that
the net effect of these transactions had been to strip [Caesars] of assets that could have been
otherwise used to pay creditors, leaving the best assets under the control of newly formed
subsidiaries of CEC—what the second-lien lenders have called ‘good Caesars,’ in contrast
to CEOC [our “Caesars”], or ‘bad Caesars’—with the ‘good Caesars’ controlled by and
benefiting TPG and Apollo.”36

Part III: The Shuffle – Events Leading to Caesars’ Chapter 11
“Shuffling is the procedure used to randomize a deck of playing cards and provide the right
element of chance in card games.”37 Because chapter 11 is “for businesses that want to keep
operating but need time to restructure their finances in order to pay [their] bills[,]” a businessdebtor almost always provides the bankruptcy court with a litany of reasons why its current state
of financial distress is not its fault.38 Caesars did so in this case, as you are about to see. However,
in this Part, we will discuss both events out of the control of Caesars’ private equity sponsors—
where Caesars was a victim of the shuffle—as well as events that were within the control of those
sponsors—where Apollo and TPG tried to stack the deck in favor of themselves and CEC, bringing
harm to Caesars and its creditors.

Sujeet Indap & Max Frumes, Apollo, Caesars, and Wall Street’s ‘Billionaire Brawl’ for Control of a Gaming
Empire, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/2W5L-BAJK.
34
Sujeet Indap, What Happens in Vegas . . . The Messy Bankruptcy of Caesars Entertainment, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2017), https://perma.cc/ADJ4-ZG2D.
35
Alan Zimmerman, Caesars Bankruptcy Examiner: Fraudulent Conveyance Damages Could Reach $5.1B, FORBES
(May 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/C4GB-2F3D (“The transactions under challenge include the company’s 2013
transfer of certain significant Las Vegas properties, Project Linq and the Octavius Tower, to a newly created entity
known as Caesars Entertainment Resort Properties. . .”).
36
Id.
37
Shuffling & Randomization, SHUFFLE TECH (Aug. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/9NXE-Q6YF.
38
Bill Fay, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, DEBT, https://perma.cc/ES9Y-SLNH (last visited Apr. 17, 2022).
33

7

A. Economic Challenges
Intuitively, leading up to and after 2008, many businesses struggled and/or shut down as
part of the widespread economic recession. CEC (at the time Harrah’s) was no exception. Just one
year after the recession, CEC’s net revenues before promotional allowances fell “from $12.7
billion in 2007 to $10.3 billion in 2009.”39 CEC tried to reduce or flat-out eliminate many
operational costs in response to their struggles but to no avail: “CEC’s adjusted EBITDA dropped
from $2.1 billion in 2007 to $1.7 billion in 2009, and . . . continued to decline thereafter.”40 Second,
consumer preferences became drastically different leading up to the bankruptcy. Apparently, the
“Millennial” generation that frequented Las Vegas was much less willing to gamble: “According
to the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Bureau, 47 percent of Las Vegas visitors in 2012
indicated that their primary reasons to visit was for vacation or pleasure instead of gambling, which
is up from 39 percent in 2008.”41 Business was further harmed by increased competition in the
form of more states legalizing gambling as well as new developments on the Las Vegas Strip from
MGM, Wynn, and the Cosmopolitan Las Vegas.42 Challenges were also presented in the Atlantic
City Market where CEC owned Caesars Atlantic City and Bally’s Atlantic City.43
B. Controversial Transactions
According to Caesars’ first disclosure statement from the bankruptcy, a number of
transactions sparked tension among creditor groups while also requiring the investigation of a
Special Governance Committee (the “SGC”).44 Many transactions are listed at length, but a few
stand out above the others. These include Caesars’ sale of its World Series of Poker trademark to
Caesars Interactive Entertainment (“CIE,” a CEC subsidiary), selling the equity of Octavius Linq
Intermediate Hold Co., and the sale of Planet Hollywood Resort & Casino, The Quad, Bally’s Las
Vegas, The Cromwell, and Harrah’s New Orleans.45 As mentioned, Caesars’ board of directors
formed the SGC to investigate “potential claims [Caesars and other CEC subsidiaries] and/or their
creditors may have [had] against CEC or its affiliates, including the claims asserted in certain of
the then recently filed complaints.”46

Notice of Filing of the Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code [556.pdf], In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc., et al., No. 15-01145
(ABG) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Filed Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter First Disclosure Statement].
40
Id. at 29.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 30.
43
Id. (“These challenges are the result of, among other things, the effects of Hurricanes Irene and Sandy on the local
economy, an oversaturated local market, and increased competition from casinos on the East Coast.”)
44
Id. at 31.
45
Id. at 31-32.
46
Id. at 35.
39
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1. Caesars’ Corporate Structure Over Time and its
Eventual Involuntary Chapter 11
To clearly outline the above transactions, visuals showing how Caesars’ corporate
structure changed over the course of some of these transactions may be of aid. This first image
depicts how, immediately after the LBO by TPG and Apollo, Caesars was split into OpCo and
PropCo in an effort to create “a new Caesars vehicle, free and clear of its legacy problems.”47

Then, in November 2012, Gary Loveman proposed the idea of Caesars Growth Partners
(“CGP”) to the board, which he described as a “deal [that] could efficiently raise cash to invest in
properties while also creating liquidity to keep creditors satisfied.”48 The goal was to have CGP
be owned by CEC and a new entity named Caesars Acquisition Corporation (“CAC”), as seen
below.49

47

MAX FRUMES & SUJEET INDAP, THE CAESARS PALACE COUP: HOW A BILLIONAIRE BRAWL OVER THE FAMOUS
CASINO EXPOSED THE POWER AND GREED OF WALL STREET 63–65 (2021).
48
Id. at 66.
49
Id. at 64.
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The Growth Transaction closed in 2013, and Apollo gave an estimate of what they thought
the assets sold to CGP would be worth in three years: “CIE would be worth $820 million up from
the just-paid $525 million; Planet Hollywood would be worth $579 million up from the current
$280 million; and the Horseshoe Baltimore $260 million up from $80 million.”50
With fear of foreclosure on PropCo’s six properties, Apollo proposed “sending properties
that OpCo owned to PropCo” to plug an “equity gap” that resulted from the decline in the value
of the PropCo casinos.51 Specifically, “Apollo wanted to sell the Linq and the Octavius from OpCo
to the new PropCo vehicle called Caesars Entertainment Resort Properties [(“CERP”)]. The rub:
no cash or stock was to exchange hands.”52 As can be seen below, “between the Growth
Transaction and CERP, three prime Las Vegas assets — Planet Hollywood, Linq, and Octavius —
had left OpCo.”53

50

Id. at 75.
Id. at 78.
52
Id. at 80.
53
Id. at 79, 83. (“And while Apollo insisted that all Caesars creditors had benefited from the deal, the OpCo
creditors owning nearly $20 billion in debt had no voice in those two transactions.”)
51
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Then, after realizing Caesars OpCo was still going to run out of money, it was decided that
the Cromwell, Bally’s, the Quad, and Harrah’s New Orleans would be sold to CGP in an effort to
generate around $2 billion in cash for OpCo.54 This transaction, called the Four Properties
Transaction (shown below), actually made Caesars worse off and only increased the suspicions of
others that fraudulent conveyances were taking place.55

54
55

Id. at 86.
Id. at 85, 90.
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In 2014, Caesars was about to borrow their seventh bank loan (“B-7”) since the 2008
leveraged buyout. David Sambur, from Apollo, felt more money was needed and “was desperate
to amend the underlying legal document known as the credit agreement so that the parent guarantee
on the bank loans was severed.”56 The parent guarantee described in the previous sentence was
essentially a “guarantee” by the parent Caesars of the repayment of OpCo loans and bonds. 57 The
guarantee, once “ceremonial”, became a “constant, nagging dilemma” for Apollo and TPG.58 “In
a hypothetical bankruptcy, the guarantee was likely to be invoked and the parent assets were going
to be seized by the creditors including the casinos and [intellectual property] that had been shifted
out of OpCo.”59 Being worried that the guarantee could be invoked in bankruptcy with creditors
seizing assets, Sambur got the “B-7 transaction” (pictured below) to work.60 However, the
“guarantee on the bank loans could not be fully severed. Rather, it could only be watered down to
something called a ‘guarantee of collection,’ which forced creditors to spend years in court trying
to enforce it, unlike the traditional ‘guarantee of payment’ which was enforceable immediately
after a default.”61

56

Id. at 93.
Id. (“The guarantee allowed Caesars to borrow more cheaply because creditors knew another entity . . . was like
an umbrella protecting OpCo debt underneath it.”)
58
Id.
59
Id.
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Id. at 91–93.
61
Id. at 94.
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C. Prepetition RSA and Involuntary Chapter 11 in Delaware
Shortly thereafter, though, a number of lawsuits were filed against Caesars, mainly
asserting that “assets were transferred at below-market prices as part of a scheme by CEC and
[Apollo and TPG] to transfer valuable assets from [Caesars] to CEC and its affiliates to remove
them from the reach of [Caesars’] creditors.”62 Some of the first actions in the fall of 2014 were
commenced by the Second Lien Agent, the First Lien Notes Indenture Trustee, and other certain
Senior Unsecured Noteholders.63 Prior to the suits being filed, negotiations took place regarding a
possible restructuring of Caesars, which turned out to be anything but simple. Complications arose
regarding some of the creditors holding credit default swap positions, ongoing litigation, and the
possible tax consequences of the Debtors separating from CEC.64 After much discussion, the
parties finally agreed to a prepetition restructuring support agreement (RSA), under which Caesars
would be reorganized as a REIT in an effort to “enhance the value of the Debtors’ real estate and
allow the Debtors to provide their creditors with improved recoveries, including a 100 percent
recovery for Holders of Allowed Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims.”65
Unfortunately, even after compromising on some of the restructuring plan, “certain of the
Holders of First Lien Notes and each of the First Lien Lenders” withdrew their support of the plan
on December 11, 2014.66 A month later, certain holders of Second Lien Notes filed an involuntary
bankruptcy petition against Caesars alone, only three days before the actual anticipated filing date
for the joint chapter 11 of Caesars and many other CEC subsidiaries.67 Indeed, on January 15,
2015, the Debtor’s press release confirmed the commencement of a joint voluntary chapter 11
Reorganization.68 The plan announced in the press release, claimed to be agreed to by more than
80% of First-Lien Noteholders, was “intended to significantly reduce long-term debt and annual
interest payments, while providing for significant recoveries for creditors and ensuring no
interruption of operations across the company’s network of properties.”69
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First Disclosure Statement [556.pdf], at Ex. 1 at 35.
Id at Ex. 1 at 36.
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Id at Ex. 1 at 36–37.
65
Id at Ex. 1 at 37.
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Id.
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Id at Ex. 1 at 39.
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Caesars’ Press Release].
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Id.
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Part IV: Dealing the Cards – First Day Motions
Dealing a deck of the cards “is the process of disseminating the cards, in proper turn, to
each active player in the game in a specific, orderly manner.”70 In this Part, we turn to the beginning
of Caesars’ bankruptcy, discussing the motions filed by Caesars on the very first day of
proceedings to ensure both an orderly reorganization and an orderly continuation of its business
during it. Once Caesars dealt these “cards,” it would be ready to play the “game” of chapter 11
bankruptcy.
A. First Day Motions to Stabilize Operations
Chapter 11 debtors often find themselves “in a vulnerable position early in the case[,]” as
their “employees, customers, suppliers, and lenders . . . have [likely] lost confidence in the
enterprise.”71 Therefore, “[f]irst-day relief . . . [is] essential to the debtor’s maintaining its
operations for long enough for it to . . . reorganize in chapter 11.”72 Caesars found itself in this
position despite devoting substantial prepetition efforts “to quickly and efficiently stabiliz[ing]
their operations and preserv[ing] and restor[ing] their relationships with vendors, customers,
employees, landlords, and utility providers[.]”73 Consequently, on the petition date, Caesars filed,
and the “bankruptcy judge approved[,] several routine first day motions to keep the company
operating normally during its bankruptcy[.]”74 The requested relief, according to Caesars, “was
necessary to enable the Debtors to preserve value and efficiently implement their proposed
restructuring process with minimal disruption and delay” because “even a brief interruption . . .
[in] operations would adversely affect customer and supplier relationships, revenues, and
profits[.]”75 Thus, as chapter 11 debtors typically do, Caesars entered bankruptcy and immediately
sought orders it believed “necessary to provide . . . critically important relief designed to . . .
stabilize operations.”76
1. The Wages Motions
“[T]o ensure the uninterrupted operation of [its] business,” with its 32,000 employees and
1,700 additional temporary workers and independent contractors, Caesars moved for authorization
70

Dealing the Cards, CATS AT CARDS, https://perma.cc/3VC6-66ZW (last visited Apr. 17, 2022).
Bruce Grohsgal, Absolute Priority Redux: First-Day Orders and Pre-Plan Settlements in Chapter 11 Post-Jevic,
10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 61, 109 (2018), https://perma.cc/Q929-N466.
72
Id.
73
Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code [4220.pdf], Ex. 1 at 36, In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr.
D. N.D. Ill. Filed Jun. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Final Disclosure Statement].
74
Peg Brickley et al., Caesars Unit Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2015),
https://perma.cc/V79A-LQWT.
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Final Disclosure Statement [4220.pdf], Ex. 1 at 36.
76
Sally McDonald Henry, The $1.5 Billion General Motors Recalls at the Dangerous Intersection of Chapter 11,
Article 9, and TARP, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 131, 150 (2017) [https://perma.cc/7CKQ-U27G].
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“to pay in the ordinary course of business certain prepetition (a) wages, salaries, and other
compensation . . . , (b) reimbursable employee expenses, and (c) obligations relating to medical
and other benefits programs[.]”77 Pursuant to sections 363(c) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Caesars asserted its statutory right to “honor Employee Compensation and Benefits postpetition in
the ordinary course of business.”78 Respectively, the sections of the Code which Caesars relied
upon provide that:
“If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section . . .
1108 . . . of this title and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may
enter into transactions . . . in the ordinary course of business, without notice
or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of
business without notice or a hearing.”79
And
“Unless the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor’s business.”80
Thus, because the Debtors were “manag[ing] their properties as debtors in
possession[,]” and “[n]o party ha[d] requested the appointment of a trustee or examiner[,]”
Caesars believed it possessed a statutory right, as the debtor in possession, to pay its
employees’ wages in the ordinary course of its business.81 Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar,
presiding over the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
Chicago, agreed and entered an interim order granting the requested relief.82
However, before a final order could be entered, the Official Committee of Second
Priority Noteholders (the “Noteholder Committee”) submitted a “preliminary objection
and reservation of rights to the” Wages Motion.83 The Noteholder Committee objected to
the entry of a final order, essentially seeking further information and reporting regarding
Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors’ to Pay Certain Prepetition (A)
Wages, Salaries, and Other Compensation, (B) Reimbursable Employee Expenses, and (C) Obligations Relating to
Medical and Other Benefits Programs, and (II) Granting Related Relief [7.pdf], at 31, 3–4, 1, In re Caesars
Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter The Wages
Motion].
78
Id. at 31.
79
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) [https://perma.cc/Y7DR-V347].
80
11 U.S.C. § 1108 [https://perma.cc/Q2YJ-7TRW].
81
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(Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Jan. 15, 2015).
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the Motion and to ensure “any reservation of rights included in a proposed final order
reserve[d] rights of the Noteholder Committee and not merely [those of] the Debtors.”84
Moreover, on that same day, the statutory unsecured creditors’ committee (the “UCC”)
also submitted a limited objection to the Wages Motion, citing the fact that “certain
diligence items” had yet to be provided.85
Caesars subsequently engaged in negotiations to resolve these objections.86
Following these negotiations, Judge Goldgar entered a final order that authorized Caesars
to pay prepetition compensation, reimbursable expenses, and benefit program obligations
to its employees in the ordinary course of business, but which also imposed several notice
requirements on Caesars.87 Thus, Caesars obtained the relief requested and was able to
stabilize its operations by ensuring no interruption would result from its employees—a
majority of whom “rel[ied] exclusively on their compensation, benefits, and [the]
reimbursement of their expenses to . . . pay their daily living expenses”—having to “seek
alternate employment at a time when their support [was] crucial.”88
2. The Cash Management Motion
In the ordinary course of its business, Caesars “maintain[ed] and direct[ed] an
integrated Cash Management System” in order “to efficiently collect, transfer, and disburse
funds[.]”89 Caesars, deeming the System “vital to the Debtors’ ability to conduct
business[,]” moved on the petition date for authorization to: (A) continue to operate and
use the System, (B) maintain their existing bank accounts, open new debtor-in-possession
accounts as necessary, and use their business forms without the “debtor in possession”
label, and (C) continue participating in Intercompany Transactions “in their business
judgment and at their sole discretion[.]” As with its Wages Motion, Caesars relied upon
section 361(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in support of its request to maintain its Cash
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Id. at 2.
Limited Omnibus Objection of Statutory Unsecured Claimholders’ Committee of Caesars Entertainment
Operating Company, Inc., et al. to Certain First Day Motions [443.pdf], at 4, In re Caesars Entertainment Operating
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Management System, including the Bank Accounts, asserting that “[b]ankruptcy courts
routinely treat requests for authority to continue utilizing existing cash management
systems as a relatively ‘simple matter.’”90 In support of its request to continue using its
business forms without the “debtor in possession” label, Caesars cited district precedent.91
Lastly, Caesars asserted it should be able to continue Intercompany Transactions because,
“[i]f [they] . . . were to be discontinued, the Cash Management System and related
administrative controls would be disrupted to the Debtors’ and their estates’ detriment.”92
Judge Goldgar granted Caesars’ request, entering an interim order authorizing
Caesars to continue operating its Cash Management System, including the Bank Accounts,
to maintain its existing business forms, and to perform Intercompany Transactions in a
manner consistent with its historical practice.93 However, several groups of creditors took
issue and raised objections or sought to reserve their rights with respect to the Proposed
Final Order.94 Most notably, the Noteholder Committee objected, asserting that the Cash
Management Motion did not simply seek to maintain cash systems but “also [sought]
authority for the Debtors to engage in a broad spectrum of transactions with Debtor and
non-Debtor affiliates.”95 Specifically, the Noteholder Committee cited Intercompany
Transactions wherein Caesars transferred substantial value to CES, and the “Committee
maintain[ed] that those transactions should be investigated, challenged, and avoided.”96
Moreover, Wilmington Trust, N.A., as Successor Indenture Trustee (the “10.75%
Notes Trustee”) for the 10.75% Senior Unsecured Bonds (the “10.75% Notes”) issued by
Caesars also raised a limited objection, seeking “certain modifications to the proposed
order which [it believed] necessary to preserve the substantive rights of the Subsidiary
Guarantors [of the 10.75% Notes] and their creditors.”97 Under the structure of the
Proposed Final Order, the 10.75% Notes Trustee believed “material amounts of
90
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unencumbered cash available to pay unsecured prepetition claims [could] be transferred to
other Debtors solely in exchange for administrative expense claims[,]” which “present[ed]
two potential problems with respect to the Subsidiary Guarantors[:]” (1) their
administrative priority expense claims would be junior to secured and superpriority
administrative expense claims, and Caesars had “made no showing . . . with respect to [its]
ability . . . to satisfy administrative expense claims,” meaning any such “claim obtained by
a Subsidiary Guarantor might fail to protect sufficiently its substantive economic
interests[;]” and (2) cash sweeps could “increase secured recoveries of [Caesars’] creditors
at the expense of unsecured recoveries at the Subsidiary Debtors” if “the Prepetition
Secured Creditors ultimately [sought] remedies against cash which, but for the sweeps,
would reside in unpledged accounts at the Subsidiary Debtors.”98
Caesars entered negotiations with these parties which culminated in “an agreed
final order which established certain notice and reporting requirements regarding the
Debtors [sic] use of their bank accounts and intercompany transactions between Debtors
and between the Debtors and their non-Debtor affiliates.”99 Judge Goldgar entered this
Agreed Final Order on March 25, 2015, “authorizing the Debtors to (a) continue using their
Cash Management System, (B) maintain their existing bank accounts and business forms,
and (C) continue performing Intercompany Transactions in a manner consistent with
historical practice[.]”100
3. The Lienholders, 503(b)(9), and Foreign Vendors
Motion
Furthermore, in another first day motion, Caesars sought authorization to pay: (a)
the prepetition claims of certain Shippers, both domestic and foreign, and related
Warehousemen, as well as those of Third Party Contractors “who may assert mechanics’
and other possessory liens against the Debtors’ property” (collectively, the “Lien
Claimants”), (b) claims entitled to administrative priority under section 503(b)(9) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and (c) the prepetition claims of Foreign Vendors.101
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Caesars cited sections 363(b), 1107(a), and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code as
permitting the payment of the Lien Claims.102 Sections 1107(a) and 1108, taken together,
impose fiduciary status upon a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”), charging the DIP with
“‘holding the bankruptcy estate[s] and operating the business[es] for the benefit of [their]
creditors and (if the value justifies) equity owners.’”103 Caesars asserted that, consistent
with this fiduciary status, bankruptcy courts had previously “authorized payment of
prepetition obligations under section 363(b) . . . where a sound business purpose exists for
doing so[,]” and Caesars urged Judge Goldgar to do the same.104 After all, reasoned
Caesars, section 363(b)(1) permits a DIP to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary
course of business, property of the estate,” and “[f]ailure to pay the Lien Claims—or at
least some portion of them—[would] jeopardize the Debtors’ operations and reliability[,]”
making paying the prepetition Lien Claims a sound business purpose.105
Section 503(b)(9) of the Code provides that “there shall be allowed administrative
expenses . . . including . . . the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days
before the date of commencement of a case under this title in which the goods have been
sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor’s business.”106 Pursuant to section
1129(a)(9)(A), a chapter 11 plan cannot be confirmed unless these claims are paid in full.107
Caesars, relying upon section 363(c)(1) of the Code, “believe[d] they [could] pay
[administrative expense] claims in accordance with their business judgment.” 108 Absent
authorization to pay these claims, Caesars believed it “could be denied access to the
equipment, parts, and other goods necessary to maintain the Debtors’ business operations”
and, thus, requested authority to pay the “claims in the ordinary course of business, while
such payments [could] still induce 503(b)(9) Claimants to adhere to favorable trade terms
and do business with the Debtors on a go-forward basis.”109
As for the payment of Foreign Vendors, Caesars only requested “authority to pay a
de minimis amount of Foreign Vendor Claims[,]” believing the difficulty of enforcing the
bankruptcy’s automatic stay in foreign jurisdictions would likely allow Foreign Vendors
“to exercise remedies, restrict trade terms, or exert other leverage against the Debtors . . .
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to collect the de minimis amount . . . owed to them.”110 Once again, Caesars cited Code
sections 363(b), 1107(a), and 1108 as granting the court authority “to authorize the
payment of prepetition claims to certain foreign vendors where there is a sound business
reason to do so.”111 The benefits of paying a de minimis amount of Foreign Vendor Claims,
according to Caesars, “substantially outweigh[ed] the potential burdens and known risks
associated with nonpayment.”112 Further, to mitigate the risk of any potential future issues
with certain Foreign Vendors, Caesars “proposed . . . condition[ing] payment of the Foreign
Vendor Claims on the Foreign Vendor’s acceptance of the Customary Trade Terms[.]”113
Shortly thereafter, Judge Goldgar entered an interim order authorizing: (1) up to $8
million in Lien Claim payments, provided Caesars was prohibited from paying a Lien
Claimant’s prepetition claim unless the Claimant had already perfected, or, in Caesars
judgment, would or could in the future perfect, one or more liens; (2) payment of 509(b)(3)
claims, provided such payments did not exceed $20.7 million before entry of the final
order; (3) payment of $110,000 in Foreign Vendor Claims; and (4) Caesars’ conditioning
of payment of all three types of claims on the vendors agreeing “to continue supplying
goods and services . . . postpetition on normal and customary trade terms, practices, and
programs . . . most favorable to the Debtors . . . or such other trade terms” Caesars deemed
acceptable.114 Only the UCC raised an objection, and it came in the same omnibus motion
in which the UCC objected to over half of the first-day motions, stating “no firm agreement
on the final form of the proposed orders [had] been reached” and reserving all rights in said
orders.115 Judge Goldgar subsequently entered a final order, granting all of the requested
relief but increasing the aggregate amount of Lien Claims and 503(b)(9) Claims Caesars
could pay to $10 million and $30 million respectively.116 However, Judge Goldgar also
required Caesars to regularly report to the UCC regarding payment of these claims and the
trade terms Caesars had negotiated.117
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4. The PACA Motion
“Congress passed the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) in 1930, hoping
to eliminate . . . unfair practices in the marketing of perishable agricultural products.” 118 Section
499e(c) of PACA “creates a statutory trust which provides protection to the suppliers of perishable
agricultural commodities until full payment has been received[,]” so “[q]uestions concerning the
PACA trust arise frequently in bankruptcy cases.”119 Caesars, in order to offer its guests an array
of dining options at its “38 gaming and resort properties in 14 U.S. states and 5 countries[,] . . .
purchase[d] a variety of consumable goods, including goods that may be deemed ‘perishable
agricultural commodities’ under PACA.”120 Accordingly, in another first day motion, Caesars
moved for authorization to pay all claims arising under PACA to its PACA Vendors. 121 Caesars
believed its supply of necessary fresh produce, deemed “essential to the Debtors’ operations[,]”
would be interrupted absent authorization “to continue . . . pay[ing] PACA vendors in the ordinary
course of business[.]”122 Caesars argued that, because “PACA Trust Assets are not property of a
debtor’s estate[,] . . . the distribution of assets to the holders of PACA Claims [fell] outside the
priority scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, [thus making] such holders . . . entitled to
payment from the PACA Trust ahead of the Debtors’ other creditors.”123
Judge Goldgar, in an interim order, granted the requested relief, authorizing Caesars to pay
all of the PACA Claims.124 No objections were raised to this interim order, so Judge Goldgar
entered a final order and granted the relief on a permanent basis shortly thereafter.125
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5. The Critical Vendors Motion
One of the most common types of first day motions, the Critical Vendor Motion, seeks
authorization to pay prepetition claims of critical vendors and is used by debtors who believe
“these payments are necessary to ensure that their suppliers continue to provide goods to them
while they are in bankruptcy[.]”126 Unsurprisingly, Caesars filed such a motion.127 The motion
sought authority to pay up to $10.7 million in Critical Vendor Claims on an interim basis and up
to $16.3 million—the total sum Caesars believed it owed Critical Vendors —on a final basis,
labeling these limits the “Critical Vendor Cap.”128 Caesars identified the Critical Vendors as being
“comprised of, among others, Service Venders, Operating and Retail Providers, Marketing Support
Vendors, Casino Games Vendors, Gaming Support Vendors, and Alcoholic Beverage Vendors.”129
As with many of its other first day motions, Caesars proffered sections 363(b), 1107(a), and 1108
of the Bankruptcy Code as entitling debtors to make such payments “where the payments are
necessary to protect a debtor’s business operations from substantial disruption.”130
Finding no issue with the proposed order, Judge Goldgar granted the requested relief on an
interim basis.131 And, as with the Lienholders, 503(b)(9), and Foreign Vendors Motion, only the
UCC raised a limited objection, simply reserving the unsecured creditors’ rights “[b]ecause no
firm agreement on the final form of the proposed order[] ha[d] been reached[.]”132 Judge Goldgar
accordingly entered a final order, which granted the requested relief but also imposed upon Caesars
a requirement to regularly report to the UCC regarding payment of these claims and the terms on
which those payments were made.133
6. The Customer Program Motion
In Caesars’ next motion, it sought an order granting the Debtors authority “to maintain and
administer their existing Customer Programs and honor certain prepetition claims thereto,” the
importance of which Caesars said could not be “understated,” for failure to do so would risk losing
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Caesars’ “most valuable intangible assets—customer loyalty and goodwill.”134 And Caesars was
not just tooting its own horn; the Global Gaming Awards just recently awarded Caesars with its
Customer Loyalty Program of the Year Award for Caesars Rewards.135 Citing section 363(b)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code, Caesars asserted “the Court [had] the authority to grant the relief
requested[,]” as the Debtors’ “decision to enter into a transaction outside the ordinary course of
business is governed by the ‘business judgment’ standard.”136 Urging that its “decision to continue
the Customer Programs [was] based on clear business justifications[,]” Caesars claimed
entitlement to deference from the court.137 Judge Goldgar entered an order granting the requested
relief that same day.138
7. The Taxes Motion
Subject to a wide array of tax and fee obligations, Caesars also moved for authority to
“remit and pay (or use tax credits to offset) certain Taxes and Fees in the ordinary course of
business, without regard to whether such obligations accrued or arose before or after the
commencement of the chapter 11[.]”139 Caesars believed that:
“Among other things: (a) certain of the Taxes and Fees [were] not property
of the estate pursuant to section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code;140 (b)
paying the Taxes and Fees [would] avoid distracting and costly audits, liens,
or other enforcement actions while the Debtors focus[ed] on reorganizing
their businesses and obligations; (c) the Debtors’ directors and officers
[might] be held personally liable for the non-payment of certain Taxes; and
(d) certain Authorities [might] take precipitous actions against the Debtors’
directors and officers for unpaid Taxes and Fees, which would distract the
Debtors from their efforts to complete a successful reorganization.”141
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Judge Goldgar granted the requested relief, and, once again, the only objection came from
the UCC in their limited omnibus objection which targeted over half of Caesars’ first day
motions.142 Consequently, after Caesars conducted “negotiations with all relevant parties,” Judge
Goldgar entered a final order authorizing Caesars “to remit and pay the Taxes and Fees” in the
ordinary course of business.143
8. The Insurance Motion
Caesars’ insurance policies (the “Policies”) provided an enormous umbrella of protection,
ranging from general liability to crime, marine, pollution, and workers’ compensation liability,
and so on and so forth.144 Casinos need such insurance coverage, as they routinely face lawsuits
involving, among other things, “‘patron disputes over winnings, slip-and-falls, employee rights,
sexual harassment, premises liability, and casino-related automobile accidents.’”145 Therefore,
Caesars believed it had to “continue the Insurance Policies to preserve the value of their assets and
minimize exposure to risk.”146 Further, Caesars asserted that “paying obligations under the
Insurance Policies and renewing, supplementing, or entering into new coverage, all in the ordinary
course of business, [was] warranted under section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.”147
Judge Goldgar again granted the requested relief, “authorizing the Debtors to (a) continue
prepetition practices regarding their Policies, (b) satisfy payment of prepetition obligations related
. . . [thereto] in the ordinary course of business, (c) renew, supplement, or enter into new coverage
in the ordinary course of business[.]”148 No objections were raised to this interim order, so Judge
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Goldgar subsequently entered a final order, granting the requested relief on a permanent basis.149
Judge Goldgar did, however, impose the conditions that no amount could be paid before becoming
due and payable, Caesars could not accelerate payment of any of the amounts, and Caesars had to
“use commercially reasonable best efforts to provide the” UCC with notice before taking certain
actions related to the Policies.150
9. The Surety Bond Motion
“In the ordinary course of [Caesars’] business, certain third parties—often governmental
units or other public agencies—require [Caesars] to post surety bonds to secure their payment or
performance of certain obligations (the “Surety Bond Program).”151 Caesars had “approximately
$31.1 million in outstanding surety bonds” on the petition date.152 Because Caesars needed to
“retain the ability to provide financial assurances to state governments, regulatory agencies, and
other third parties[,]” the company believed they needed to “maintain the existing Surety Bond
Program, [which entailed] paying any and all premiums as they [came] due, renewing or
potentially acquiring additional bonding capacity as needed in the ordinary course of [its] business,
and execution of other agreements in connection with the Surety Bond Program.”153 Caesars, in
support of this Surety Bond Motion, relied upon section 363(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code as
permitting it to continue the Surety Bond Program in the ordinary course of business, and upon
section 363(b) as permitting it to continue the program as a sound exercise of business judgment.154
The motion faced no objections from Caesars’ creditors, and Judge Goldgar subsequently entered
an order granting the requested relief.155
10.

The Cash Collateral Motion

“An order authorizing the debtor’s use of cash collateral is often the most important order
entered in a chapter 11 case[,]” for “[s]uch an order is essential both to the debtor’s survival as a
going concern and to preserve the value of the secured creditor’s lien on cash collateral.”156 Caesars
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made such a motion, seeking authority to use the approximately $864 million in cash the Debtors
had on hand, for Caesars believed that, in the absence of such authority the Debtors would be
unable to “pay their . . . employees. . . , fund working capital, pay their taxes, maintain their
insurance policies, continue their cash management system, make capital expenditures, or pay the
administrative costs” of Chapter 11.”157 Moreover, Caesars asked the court to grant “adequate
protection to the Prepetition Secured Creditors solely to the extent of any diminution in the value
of their respective interests in the Prepetition First Lien Collateral and Prepetition Second Lien
Collateral, as applicable[.]”158
Prior to filing for chapter 11, Caesars engaged in negotiations regarding the terms of the
restructuring and use of Cash Collateral with ad hoc groups of certain First Lien Lenders and First
Lien Noteholders, but objections from certain relevant stakeholders remained.159 Nevertheless,
Caesars believed its Cash Collateral Motion should be approved because, to the extent such
objections existed, the interests of all relevant stakeholders were adequately protected.160 In
support of this assertion, Caesars offered what it deemed a “robust adequate protection package[,]”
consisting of, among other things, provisions: (1) giving the Prepetition Secured Creditors
“replacement liens on substantially all of the Debtors’ assets to the extent of any diminution in the
value of [their] . . . respective interests in the prepetition collateral[;]” (2) giving the Prepetition
First Lien Creditors superpriority “administrative claims pursuant to section 507(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code[,]” as well as “monthly adequate protection payments at a rate of 1.5% per year
of the aggregate amount of all Prepetition First Lien Obligations as of the Petition Date, and
payment on a pro rata basis to [them] of all remaining Available Cash . . . upon the effective date
of a plan of reorganization[;]” and (3) Caesars’ Restructuring Support Agreement (the “RSA”) had
the support of “holders of approximately 80% of the principal amount outstanding under the First
Lien Notes[.]”161 Lastly, Caesars requested the vacating, or modification, of the automatic stay “to
the extent necessary to implement and effectuate” these requests.162
According to Caesars, section 362(c)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, together with section
363(e), permits a court to authorize a debtor to use cash collateral as long as such use is in
accordance with, among other things, the requirement that “the debtor adequately protect the
secured creditors’ interest in property to be used by [the] debtor against any diminution in value
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of such interest resulting from the debtor’s use of the property during a chapter 11 case.”163 Caesars
asserted that the Debtors’ use of Cash Collateral itself would increase the value of the Prepetition
Secured Creditors’ collateral, thus adequately protecting those creditors.164 After all, “the Debtors’
investment of cash into the business [would] not only improve the value of the business, and
therefore the prepetition collateral, but also create additional Cash Collateral that [would] be
subject to Adequate Protection Liens[,]” argued Caesars.165 To further bolster its argument,
Caesars cited a prior case in the Northern District of Illinois where the court “held that a secured
party’s interest in collateral may be adequately protected when a debtor’s continued use of such
collateral in its operations generates a net positive return.”166
Judge Goldgar subsequently “entered an order approving the Cash Collateral Motion on an
interim basis.”167 However, two objections were raised. The first came from the UCC and raised
four issues, alleging that: (1) “[t]here would [not have been any] cash collateral entitled to adequate
protection [had] the Debtors [carried] out their statutory duties to their estates to consent to the
involuntary chapter 11 [filed against them in Delaware] and to avoid the lien they granted against
cash [to the First Lien Credit Parties] less than 90 days before the involuntary petition[;]” (2) “[t]he
Prepetition Secured Claimholders [were already] adequately protected by the Debtors’ profits and
expenses incurred to preserve and maintain the collateral[;]” (3) Caesars was “handing out extra
adequate protection for ulterior motives[,]” namely “to help the Debtors’ owners get the
‘settlement’ they want[ed] by compensating the Prepetition Secured Creditors who supported their
RSA[;]” and (4) Apollo and TPG made a bad investment purchasing Caesars for approximately
$30.7 billion, transferred “some of the Debtors’ most valuable assets . . . into other entities largely
owned and controlled by Apollo and TPG[,]” and then “coaxed their Prepetition First Lien
Noteholder Parties to agree to an adequate protection package and proposed chapter 11 plan”—
both bundled into the RSA—“to be crammed down on all other creditors.”168
The other objection came from the 10.75% Notes Trustee who also raised four concerns:
(1) there had been “no showing as to the amount of, proposed uses of, or any risk of diminution of
value in the Prepetition Secured Creditors’ cash collateral at any particular Subsidiary Debtor” by
the Subsidiary Debtors; (2) on the petition date, the Subsidiary Debtors’ cash had not been
“collateral of the Prepetition Secured Creditors and thus should not be subjected to the Cash
Collateral Order[;]” (3) adequate protection should only apply to the “Subsidiary Debtors’ cash
163
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generated postpetition unless such cash is the verified and segregated proceeds of preposition
pledged assets[;]” and (4) Caesars had “not made the requisite evidentiary showings to obtain
certain extraordinary aspects of the relief requested[.]”169
Caesars entered negotiations with the relevant parties, and, ultimately, Judge Goldgar
“entered a negotiated final order . . . granting the relief requested.”170 However, the Final Order
limited Caesars to using its Cash Collateral “for working capital and general corporate purposes,
including the renewal, replacement, and extension of existing letters of credit, or issuance of new
letters of credit, in the ordinary course of business, to pay costs associated with the Debtors’
restructuring, in each case, for purposes identified in the Controlling Budget, subject to the terms
of [the] Final Order[.]”171 As for adequate protection, Judge Goldgar permitted Caesars to “grant
. . . to the Prepetition Lien Agents, for the benefit of themselves and the Prepetition First Lien
Creditors, and to the Second Lien Agent, for the benefit of itself and the Second Lien Noteholders
. . . additional . . . automatically perfected postpetition security interests in liens . . . on any and all
assets and properties . . . of each Debtor and each Debtor’s ‘estate[,]’” provided certain assets (the
“Excluded Collateral”) were excluded.172 Caesars, thus, obtained the relief requested and, at least
in its own estimate, “ensur[ed] smooth, continued operations, including procurement of goods and
services from vendors, payment of their employees, and satisfaction of other working capital
needs.”173
11. The Utilities Motion
In its final first day motion seeking to stabilize its operations, Caesars sought an order
determining the Utility Providers had “adequate assurance of payment within the meaning of
section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code[.]”174 In relevant part, section 366 provides:
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“(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a utility
may not alter, refuse, or discontinue service to, or discriminate against, the
trustee or the debtor solely on the basis of the commencement of a case
under this title or that a debt owed by the debtor to such utility for service
rendered before the order for relief was not paid when due.
(b) Such utility may alter, refuse, or discontinue service if neither the trustee
nor the debtor, within 20 days after the date of the order for relief, furnishes
adequate assurance of payment, in the form of a deposit or other security,
for service after such date. On request of a party in interest and after notice
and a hearing, the court may order reasonable modification of the amount
of the deposit or other security necessary to provide adequate assurance of
payment.”175
Caesars identified approximately 140 utility providers as rendering services for the
Debtors; these services included “water, steam, sewer service, electricity, natural gas, telephone
service, data service, [and] waste management[.]”176 Caesars believed “[p]reserving utility services
on an uninterrupted basis [was] essential to the Debtors’ ongoing operations” and that section
366’s requirements were met, even in the absence of an Adequate Assurance Deposit, for their
expected cash flows and cash on hand were “sufficient to pay postpetition obligations related to
their utility services.”177 Nonetheless, as additional assurance, Caesars “propose[d] to deposit
$4,725,00 which represents the average cost for two weeks of utility services during 2014 . . .
within three (3) business days of entry of an order approving” the Utilities Motion.178
Judge Goldgar entered an order granting the relief sought on an interim basis, prohibiting
Caesars’ utility providers from “altering, refusing, or discontinuing service to, or discriminating
against, the Debtors solely on the basis of the commencement of these cases or on account of any
unpaid invoice for services provided before the Petition Date[.]”179 Moreover, Judge Goldgar
conditioned this authorization on Caesars’ paying “of a deposit or other security in connection
with the Utility Providers’ continued provision of utility services[.]”180 Thus, although Caesars
believed its cash flow and cash on hand would be sufficient to meet the section 366 requirements,
Judge Goldgar took the Debtors up on their offer of paying an Adequate Assurance Deposit.
NV Energy, the main energy provider in Las Vegas,181 raised the only formal objection,
reserving its rights in relation to the proposed final order, but “a number of parties” raised informal
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objections as well.182 Caesars addressed these formal and informal complaints through
modifications to the proposed final order, none of which were too substantial, essentially only
making minor changes to the language and imposing certain notice requirements.183 Shortly
thereafter, Judge Goldgar entered a final order granting Caesars’ requested relief on a permanent
basis.184
B. Procedural and Administrative First Day Motions
Aside from seeking to stabilize its operations, Caesars also employed its first day motions
“[t]o facilitate a smooth and efficient administration of the Chapter 11 Cases and . . . reduce the
administrative burdens associated therewith[.]”185
1. The Joint Administration Motion
As previously mentioned, this bankruptcy was a joint chapter 11 wherein the cases of a
vast number of CEC subsidiaries were administered together. Caesars sought entry of an order
directing the cases to be jointly administered, relying on Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) and Local Rule
1015-1.186 Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) permits a bankruptcy court to order the joint administration
of the estates of a debtor and their affiliate if “two or more petitions are pending in the same court
by or against” that debtor and their affiliate.187 Local Rule 1015-1 defines two or more cases as
being related if they involve persons or entities who qualify as affiliates under section 101(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code.188 Pertinently, section 101(2)(A) of the Code defines an affiliate as an
“entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more
of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor[.]”189 Caesars, accordingly, asserted that “[t]he
Debtors are affiliates within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code[,]” thus making the cases related
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and giving the court the authority to grant the requested relief.190 Judge Goldgar found no issue
and directed the joint administration of the Debtors’ cases.191
2. The Case Management Motion
Believing there to be thousands of parties in interest, Caesars sought the implementation
of Case Management Procedures “to effectively manage the case and avoid disputes with respect
to notice periods and issues relating to filing and service.”192 Caesars’ proposed Case Management
Procedures included, for example, provisions which required all matters to be heard at omnibus
hearings and which set filing deadlines for different matters.193 Soon thereafter, Judge Goldgar
entered an order approving the proposed Case Management Procedures on a final basis.194
However, a month later, Caesars cited the already highly contested nature of its Chapter 11
and filed a Case Management Modification Motion, seeking, among other things, to: (1) “allow a
party in interest . . . to notice a Request for Relief in accordance with Local Rule 9013-1 for a NonOmnibus Hearing for presentment purposes only[;]” (2) “allow for Telephonic Appearances [by
attorneys] solely for purposes of administrative, scheduling, and case management issues and only
where an attorney cannot attend in person due to a scheduled, preexisting conflict[;]” (3) modify
“Local Rule 5005-3(D) [which imposes a 15-page limit] . . . to provide parties in interest the
opportunity to fully brief the Court of the legal issues presented and positions taken[;]” and (4)
“expand the ordinary-course notice requirements such that Requests for Relief . . . need to be filed
and served at least 21 days before the Omnibus Hearing.”195 Judge Goldgar reviewed this proposed
modification and decided to approve it in part but also deny it in part.196 For example, these
Amended Case Management Procedures permitted attorneys to make telephonic appearances, but
denied modification of Local Rule 5005-3(D)’s page limit except for where a separate motion is
filed to waive the page limit for a specific court filing.197 Further modifications followed,198
however, and resulted in, among other things, the bankruptcy court “waiving the Local Bankruptcy
190
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Rule 15-page limit for fee applications” and “clarifying that the Case Management Order (as
amended) applies to adversary cases in the Chapter 11 Cases unless the Bankruptcy Court orders
otherwise[.]”199
3. The Schedules and Statements Extension Motion
In the last administrative first day motion, Caesars moved for a 47-day extension to file the
Debtors’ “schedules of assets and liabilities, schedules of current income and expenditures,
schedules of executory contracts and unexpired leases (collectively, the “Schedules”), and
statements of financial affairs (collectively, the “Statements”)[.]”200 While section 521(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) typically imposes a 14-day deadline, Rule 1007(c)
also “provides that a bankruptcy court may extend a debtor’s time within which to file such
schedules and statements for ‘cause.’”201 Thus, because “[s]howing ‘cause’ merely requires that
the debtor ‘demonstrate some justification for the issuance of the order’ and bankruptcy courts . .
. normally grant such extensions ‘in the absence of bad faith or prejudice to the adverse party[,]’”
Caesars reasoned that the relief should be granted.202 After all, Caesars asserted, preparing their
Statements and Schedules required “compil[ing] a voluminous amount of information from books,
records, and documents—not centrally located in the Debtors’ organization—relating to a large
number of claims, assets, and contracts.”203 Agreeing that Caesars had shown cause, Judge Goldgar
subsequently entered an order granting the requested relief on a final basis.204

Part V: The Aces Up Caesars’ Sleeve – Its Retention of Professionals
When one is said to have an ace up their sleeve, they are considered as having “a powerful
and often secret weapon, advantage, etc., that can be used if needed[.]”205 In this Part, we discuss
the powerful and well-respected professionals Caesars hired to assist it in its chapter 11. While the
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hiring of these professionals was by no means a secret, Caesars did believe that having them on its
side would give the company a great advantage in its bankruptcy.
Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor in possession to “employ one or more
. . . professional persons . . . to represent or assist the [debtor in possession] in carrying out” its
bankruptcy duties, provided certain conditions are met.206 However, a bankruptcy court is
constrained to only approving the retention of professionals “who (a) do not hold or represent an
interest adverse to the estate, and (b) are ‘disinterested persons.’”207 Retaining a professional is,
thus, contingent upon the court approving “a retention application . . . accompanied by a sworn
affidavit of the firm being retained[.]”208 Caesars filed such applications and sworn affidavits to
retain various professionals to assist in carrying out its debtor in possession duties.209 Judge
Goldgar approved Caesars’ retention of the following professionals.
A. Prime Clerk LLC
Pursuant to section 156(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts may permit debtors
to hire professionals to manage the claims process, provide noticing services, disseminate
information to the public, and respond to requests for case information, provided the cost of such
services is “paid out of the assets of the estate[.]”210 Caesars hired Prime Clerk LLC to handle
these duties as “Notice and Claims Agent to the Debtors.”211 A Bloomberg company profile
describes “[t]he Company [as] focu[ing] on restructuring and bankruptcy administration services
which includes pre-filing preparation, creditor matrix management, claims processing and
analysis, public securities noticing, solicitation, customizable claim and voting reports, and secure
disbursements services.”212 Caesars believed retaining Prime Clerk in this capacity was “the most
effective and efficient manner of noticing the thousands of creditors and parties in interests[,]” as
“Prime Clerk [was] comprised of leading industry professionals with significant experience in both
the legal and administrative aspects of large, complex chapter 11 cases.”213
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B. Kirkland & Ellis LLP
For a debtor entering chapter 11, “choice of counsel has important implications[.]”214
Caesars elected to go with Kirkland & Ellis LLP (“Kirkland”), citing the firm’s “recognized
expertise and extensive experience and knowledge in the field of debtors’ protections, creditors’
rights, and business reorganizations[.]”215 Indeed, in 2020, out of the 57 publicly traded companies
with more than $330 million in assets in Chapter 11 proceedings, the firm represented 23 of them,
raking in over $200 million in prepetition fees alone.216 And, even back in 2015, Kirkland was
“perhaps the best bankruptcy firm in the world because it had dozens of lawyers in every
conceivable specialty it could throw at cases like Caesars.”217 Aside from this expertise, Kirkland
also already possessed an intimate knowledge of Caesars’ business, having received approximately
$16.25 million in legal fees over the less-than-six-month-period passing between Caesars first
paying the firm’s $500,000 retainer on July 30, 2014, and the petition date on January 15, 2015.218
Hiring the firm provided another strategic advantage as well. Having been founded over onehundred years ago in Chicago, the location of the bankruptcy court adjudicating Caesars’
reorganization, Kirkland could have a quote-un-quote “home-court” advantage.219
Although the Noteholder Committee raised an objection, asserting that Kirkland (a) was
not disinterested, (b) had interests adverse to the estate, and (c) had failed to disclose the firm’s
representation of a party in interest, Judge Goldgar authorized Caesars to retain Kirkland as
counsel, finding the requirements of section 327(c) to be satisfied.220 The basis for the Noteholders
Committee’s objection was (a) that Kirkland had “‘extensive connections’ with Apollo and
TPG[,]” (b) Kirkland had received $7.2 million from Caesars in the two days leading up to its
chapter 11 filing, money which the Noteholder Committee believed was property of the estate, and
(c) that Kirkland had “served not only as counsel to [Caesars] but as counsel to the SGC [discussed
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in Part III.B of this paper], and [that] relationship with the SGC [had] not [been] disclosed.”221
Judge Goldgar ruled against the Noteholder Committee because it had the burden of
“substantiating its objections[,]” and “the evidence failed to support two of [its arguments, while]
the third was not pursued and [therefore] forfeited.”222 Caesars, in its application to retain the firm,
indicated Kirkland intended to apply for compensation to be paid out post-confirmation for
services rendered during the chapter 11, using the following pay scale:223

C. AP Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”)
When a company is in crisis, the existing management is often incapable of turning the
company’s fortunes around alone due to factors such as “time constraints, lack of objectivity[,]
and a lack of specific skills.”224 This “need for additional management support and expertise” can
be addressed via “[t]he appointment of a chief restructuring officer (CRO)” who will give “the
entity access to the specific skills necessary[.]”225 Caesars, recognizing this need, employed AP
Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”) to provide the Debtors with a CRO and certain additional
personnel.226 According to the AlixPartners’ website, the financial advisory and global consulting
firm has more than 40 years of experience “helping businesses respond to challenges when
everything is on the line—from urgent performance improvement to complex restructuring, from
risk mitigation to accelerated transformation.”227 As Caesars put it in its motion seeking authority
to retain the firm, AlixPartners had “assisted, advised, and provided strategic advice to debtors,
creditors, bondholders, investors, and other entities in numerous chapter 11 cases of similar size
and complexity to” Caesars' case.228
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“Randall S. Eisenberg, a Managing Director of Alix Partners . . . [was appointed to] act as
CRO for the Debtors.”229 Eisenberg specialized in the development of financing and operating
strategies for troubled companies like Caesars and had, over the course of 24 years, “been involved
in numerous large and complex restructurings, including” that of Jackson Hewitt, Kmart,
Momentive Performance Materials, and US Airways, to only name a few.230 Interestingly enough,
the aforementioned Momentive was “another Apollo portfolio company, a chemicals maker . . .
the private equity firm acquired for $4 billion in 2006 from General Electric.”231 And, in December
of 2014, David Sambur used what Apollo – one of the two private equity firms who owned Caesars
– and he had done, with the assistance of Eisenberg, in the Momentive reorganization to threaten
“holders of the Caesars OpCo loans.”232
“In the Momentive bankruptcy fight, Sambur had effectively used the Till
v. SCS Credit Corp. precedent to force senior creditors to take replacement
debt with a lower interest rate than the rate that was negotiated when the
loan was first made. This made the lenders worse off. While forcing
unattractive terms on holdout junior creditors was called a ‘cramdown,’
imposing poor terms on senior creditors was known as a ‘cram up.’ Sambur
was . . . threatening to call the same play at Caesars.”233
Thus, because the parties had previously executed sophisticated maneuvers to the chagrin
of creditors together, Sambur—the apprentice to Apollo’s “canniest investor[,]” Marc Rowan—
felt comfortable with Eisenberg and AlixPartners overseeing Caesars’ reorganization
effectively.234 Moreover, this retention by Caesars, as well as its retention of Kirkland & Ellis and
Prime Clerk, highlights the fact that, for bankruptcies on this scale, there is a small “community
of repeat players[,]” comprised of “the handful of professionals [equipped to] deal with mega
cases” such as this one.235 Being amongst this small community, Eisenberg, as CRO, along with
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additional AlixPartners personnel, took on the duty of performing the wide array of “activities and
services [necessary] to oversee[ing] the . . . chapter 11 process[.]”236
D. Millstein & Co., L.P.
Entering chapter 11 with approximately $18 billion in debt, Caesars retained Millstein &
Co., L.P. (“Millstein”) to serve “as the Debtors’ financial advisor and investment banker in
connection with [the] . . . Restructuring.”237 When Guggenheim Securities—the investment
banking and capital markets division of Guggenheim Partners, a global investment and advisory
firm with more than $340 billion in assets under management—acquired Millstein in 2018,
Guggenheim described the firm as “a leading advisor to companies, investors, and sovereigns with
expertise in restructuring, sovereign advisory, and financial institutions.”238 Caesars charged
Millstein with performing a variety of: (1) general advisory and investment banking services, (2)
restructuring services, and (3) litigation services.239 In its application to retain Millstein, Caesars
indicated Millstein would be compensated via a $300,000 advisory fee per month and a $8.75
million restructuring fee “due and payable upon the consummation of a Restructuring[.]”240
E. DLA Piper LLP
As one paper put it:
“There are a number of issues that may result in a debtor in possession . . .
being precluded from employing its counsel of first choice. The larger the
bankruptcy case, the more likely such conflict may arise because it becomes
more likely that proposed counsel has some relationship with parties in
interest unrelated to the bankruptcy case. One method recognized by courts
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to avoid having to disqualify counsel is through the use of separate
‘conflicts counsel.’”241
Caesars, in light of its enormously complex bankruptcy with thousands of potential parties
in interest, “selected DLA Piper to serve as their counsel to represent the Debtors in all matters in
which [Kirkland & Ellis] is actually or potentially conflicted and in other matters the Debtors or
[Kirkland] request be handled by DLA Piper.”242 According to the firm’s website, “DLA Piper is
a global law firm with lawyers located in more than 40 countries throughout the Americas, Europe,
the Middle East, Africa and Asia Pacific,” with “clients rang[ing] from multinational, Global 1000,
and Fortune 500 enterprises to emerging companies developing industry-leading technologies.”243
Thus, Caesars deemed the firm “particularly qualified to serve as the Debtors’ special conflicts
counsel[.]”244
F. Paul Hastings LLP
Caesars did not just appoint one firm as the Debtors’ special conflicts counsel, however.
In addition to DLA Piper, Caesars also appointed Paul Hastings LLP to serve in that role. 245 On
Chambers’ website, “[t]he world’s leading provider of legal research and analysis[,]”246 the Paul
Hastings corporate practice is described as being “globally recognized in virtually every area of
corporate transactions, including . . . bankruptcy, [and] corporate restructurings[.]”247 More
specifically, in its application to retain the firm as special conflicts counsel, Caesars cited the firm’s
restructuring group as providing “an array of services to assist financially distressed businesses
and their creditors in maximizing values and ultimate recoveries in a broad range of challenging
circumstances.”248 As with DLA Piper, Caesars wanted Paul Hastings to fill in and “render
professional services for certain discrete matters that pose actual or potential conflicts to
[Kirkland].”249 According to the declaration of Chris L. Dickerson, a partner in Paul Hastings’
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Chicago office, the following members of the firm were expected to handle the bulk of the work
for Caesars and were to be compensated for such work at the following rates:250

G. KPMG LLP
If you suspected that entering chapter 11 subjects the debtor to a myriad of tax concerns,
you would be correct. One article put it this way:
“Tax issues can present strategic considerations that may arise before filing
the bankruptcy petition or during the bankruptcy process. These
considerations may include the preparation of tax liability schedules,
objections to Internal Revenue Service claims, expedited audits, IRS
Appeals, potential tax liens, and choosing a forum for potential litigation . .
. A debtor taxpayer often has unpaid tax liability from periods prior to filing
bankruptcy as well as the continuing obligation to file federal income tax
returns and pay tax during the administration of the bankruptcy. As with
other types of debt, the treatment of tax liability in bankruptcy depends on
whether the IRS’ tax claims are secured or unsecured and, if unsecured,
whether the claims have priority.”251
With some describing the U.S. tax code as being “a master class in convolution[,]”252 it is
no surprise that Caesars decided to retain KPMG as tax consultants for its chapter 11. 253 KPMG
claims on its website that, “[a]t KPMG, our people bring deep industry and sectoral experience –
creating the right mix of capabilities and specialties to ensure that your unique restructuring
journey achieves its goals.”254 Indeed, Caesars “selected KPMG LLP as . . . tax consultants . . .
because of [KPMG’s] diverse experience, extensive knowledge, and widely recognized reputation
for excellence in the fields of accounting, taxation, and operational controls for large sophisticated
companies both inside and outside of chapter 11.”255 KPMG, according to Caesars’ application to
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retain the firm, was to be compensated for its tax consulting services in accordance with the
following hourly rates:256

H. The Unsuccessful Retention of Mesirow Financial
Consulting, LLC and Baker Tilly Virchow Krause LLP
Caesars also sought to retain Mesirow Financing Consulting, LLC (“Mesirow”) “as
independent financial advisor to the Special Governance Committee and as potential expert
witness[.]”257 Who and what the Special Governance Committee (“SGC”) is shall be addressed
later in this paper,258 but Caesars essentially hoped for Mesirow to “provid[e] investigatory and
testimonial services relat[ed] to [the] complex financial transactions [and] related-party
transactions” under the SGC’s purview, as well as “potential causes of action arising therefrom.”259
However, “[d]ue to certain organizational changes, Mesirow exited the financial restructuring
business and the lead expert responsible for advising the [SPG] on its investigation moved to Baker
Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP (“Baker Tilly”).”260 Caesars subsequently attempted to retain Baker
Tilly to fill the role; however, because a former Mesirow employee worked at Baker Tilly, Judge
Goldgar found that the section 327(a) “disinterested person” requirement was not satisfied and
“indicated that he would deny Mesirow’s final fee application and Baker Tilly’s retention
application.”261 Accordingly, Caesars withdrew both applications.262
More will be discussed regarding Mesirow’s involvement in the SGC investigation later in
this paper,263 but, for now, it should be noted that Caesars’ disclosure statement does not provide
the full picture. A senior managing director at Mesirow, Melissa Kibler Knoll, was originally
charged with advising and assisting the SGC, but it later came to light “that Knoll’s work was
256
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‘tainted’ by the months-long affair she had with a lawyer for Caesars’ parent company — the target
of her investigation.”264 In Judge Goldgar’s words, “[s]he was sleeping with the enemy.”265 Thus,
her investigation was “worthless.”266 Moreover, because “[m]uch of the old team at the . . . defunct
Mesirow unit [had moved to] Baker Tilly[,]” Judge Goldgar was not comfortable with the conflict
of interest.267 Who said bankruptcy couldn’t get hot and steamy?

Part VI: The Pit Bosses – Appointment of the Official Creditors’ Committees
In a casino, “pit bosses” are employees who supervise and manage the “pits” of table
games; their duties include “watch[ing] the dealers for errors and ensur[ing] that proper procedures
are followed[.]”268 Now, in this Part, we will discuss the appointment of Caesars’ official creditors’
committees who were charged with representing the interests of the debtors’ creditors in the
bankruptcy. Like pit bosses at a casino, these committees ensured that no funny business occurred
while the bankruptcy’s players battled over the proverbial pot.269
Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the United States Trustee (the
“Trustee”) to “appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint
additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the . . . trustee deems
appropriate.”270 Pertinently, in chapter 11 cases:
“when a debtor in possession is responsible for the management of the
estate, creditors’ committees perform the vital function of balancing the
debtor’s broad statutory authority by promoting the interests of . . .
creditors generally, investigating the estate’s assets and liabilities, and
negotiating (and, if necessary, proposing) a plan of reorganization.”271
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A. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC”)
On February 5, 2015, the Trustee appointed the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee
(the “UCC”).272 However, the list of unsecured creditors serving as members of the committee
changed slightly, and the Trustee filed an Amended Notice of Appointment of Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Committee.273 Then, on September 25, 2015, the Trustee filed a second amendment,
modifying the UCC’s composition and appointing the following unsecured creditors as committee
members on a final basis:
“(a) the National Retirement Fund, (b) International Game Technology, (c)
US Foods, Inc., (d) Law Debenture Trust Company of New York, solely in
its capacity as Senior Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee, I Relative ValueLong/Short Debt, a Series of Underlying Funds Trust, (f) Wilmington Trust,
N.A., solely in its capacity as Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Indenture
Trustee, (g) Park Hotels & Resorts Inc. f/k/a Hilton Worldwide, Inc., (h)
Earl of Sandwich (Atlantic City) LLC, and (i) PepsiCo, Inc.”274
As you will see later, two of these members played major roles in this reorganization. The
National Retirement Fund (the “NRF”) would launch a major adversary proceeding against
Caesars,275 while Wilmington Trust, N.A. (“Wilmington Trust”), in its capacities as both the
Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Indenture Trustee (the “SGNI Trustee”) and the indenture trustee
for the 10.75% Senior Unsecured Bonds (the “10.75% Notes Trustee”), would fight for standing
to undo stipulations wherein Caesars allowed secured claims against the subsidiaries guaranteeing
the 10.75% Notes.276
B. The Second Priority Noteholders Committee (the “Noteholder
Committee”)
On the same day as the UCC was first appointed, the Trustee also appointed the Official
Committee of Second Priority Noteholders (the “Noteholder Committee”). 277 The following
Second Lien Noteholders were appointed as members of the Noteholder Committee:278
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Of these committee members, Kenneth Liang of Oaktree would present Caesars with the
greatest resistance throughout the bankruptcy process.279 Liang served as Managing Director &
Head of Restructurings at Oaktree Capital Management from March 2001 until April 2018.280 He
had a law degree from Georgetown and “extensive U.S. and international experience as a
significant stakeholder in prominent and complex restructurings of many troubled businesses
inside and outside of Chapter 11 and in court-supervised reorganizations.”281 James Bolin—listed
as representing the Palomino Fund above—would also have a crucial role, serving as the lead
negotiator for another Second Lien Noteholder, Appaloosa, in this bankruptcy.282
On February 19, 2015, Caesars filed a motion, seeking an order disbanding the Noteholder
Committee.283 According to Caesars, “there [was] no reason for them to be granted official
committee status at the expense of the Debtors’ estates and other impaired creditors. The Second
Lien Committee is an unnecessary, burdensome expense whose costs will significantly outweigh
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any benefit to the estate.”284 To further bolster its argument, Caesars urged that, due to severe
limitations imposed on the Noteholder Committee by their intercreditor agreements, the Second
Lien Noteholders could only take “very limited action in their capacity as general unsecured
creditors[,]” with “those acts [being] wholly duplicative of the province of the Creditors’
Committee.”285 Moreover, Caesars asserted that “a Second Lien Committee [would] create
needless additional litigation as multiple parties spend estate resources fighting over the limitations
placed on the Second Lien Committee under the second lien intercreditor agreement.”286
Therefore, Caesars believed the Noteholder Committee should be disbanded or, in the alternative,
be limited in its scope to “acts, investigations, and diligence that (i) do not overlap with those of
the Creditors’ Committee or an anticipated examiner, or (ii) do not relate to positions with respect
to the First Lien Debtholders’ collateral or that otherwise are prohibited by the Second Lien
Intercreditor Agreement.”287
Caesars argued that, while section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the U.S.
Trustee to appoint “additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the . . .
trustee deems appropriate[,]” an additional committee being appointed is “extraordinary” and
should only be done very rarely.288 Thus, while conceding that “no specific section of the
Bankruptcy Code expressly addresses how to disband an official committee that the court believes
is improvident[,]” Caesars asserted a bankruptcy court can, pursuant to section 1102(a)(4), exercise
its “independent authority to determine whether a change in committee composition is
necessary[,]” which taken together with section 105(a), permits the court to disband an additional
committee.289 Judge Goldgar, however, found Caesars’ argument unavailing and ruled that “the
requested relief [was] . . . beyond the Bankruptcy Court’s power to grant.”290 In the memorandum
opinion Judge Goldgar issued, he explained that section 1102(a) of the Code “spells out the powers
left to the bankruptcy court[,]” and that “[t]hose are the only powers over committees the Code
gives the court. There are no others.”291
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C. The Fee Committee
Finally, the U.S. Trustee—with the approval of Caesars, the UCC, and the Noteholder
Committee—asked the court to appoint a Fee Committee "to, among other things, review and
report on, as appropriate, monthly invoices submitted in accordance with the Interim
Compensation Order and all interim and final fee applications for compensation and
reimbursement of expenses filed by professionals paid from the Debtors’ Estates, other than in the
ordinary course.”292 The Fee Committee had five members: (1) an independent member, (2) a
member appointed by an representing the Trustee, (3) a member representing Caesars, (4) a
member representing the UCC, and (5) a member representing the Noteholder Committee.293

Part VII: The Gaming Commission – The Special Governance Committee
Investigation
Gaming commissions, which are “government or authority agencies tasked with various
legal and administrative responsibilities,” such as “[e]stablishing rules of casinos games, issuing
licensing, accounting and auditing, security, and fair play[,]” work to ensure gaming operators
“have integrity and good standing.”294 In this Part, we discuss the committee Caesars appointed
to, like the gaming commission, investigate CEC’s integrity.
Caesars appointed Ronen Stauber and Steven Winograd to its board as “independent
directors” in June 2014.295 “An independent director . . . refers to a member of a board of directors
who does not have a material relationship with a company and is neither part of its executive team
nor involved in the day-to-day operations of the company.”296 Shortly thereafter, the Caesars board
of directors formed the Special Governance Committee (“SGC”), a two-member committee
comprised solely of Stauber and Winograd.297 The SGC launched an independent investigation
(the “SGC Investigation”) to probe “potential claims the Debtors and/or their creditors may have
against CEC or its affiliates related to various prepetition Challenged Transactions involving the
Debtors[.]”298 Thus, the SGC Investigation targeted, amongst others, the controversial transactions
discussed in Part III.B. However, it appears CEC and its private equity sponsors, Apollo and TPG,
slow-rolled the investigation, withholding documents and not conducting interviews with “key
292
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participants in the Challenged Transactions” in a timely manner.299 Even after the petition date—
January 15, 2015—“material requests remained outstanding.”300 Caesars, thus, requested that "the
Court . . . appoint an Examiner in February 2015. The [SGC] and its advisors kept abreast of the
Examiner’s Progress and reviewed the Examiner Report,” but CEC and the Sponsors withheld
“tens of thousands of documents as [for the] Examiner’s Eyes Only on the grounds that they were
privileged[.]”301
Frustrated, Caesars filed a motion to compel CEC to produce: “(1) all documents that CEC
withheld as privileged in the course of the [SGC’s] Investigation, and (2) all documents that CEC
has provided to the Examiner but continues to withhold from the Debtors on the grounds of
privilege.”302 The documents being withheld by CEC were subject to a joint privilege held by both
CEC and Caesars, alleged the motion.303 Because the same firm "jointly represented CEC and
[Caesars] in the Challenged Transactions,” Caesars asserted that it was “entitled to all privileged
documents pre-dating [Caesars’] retention of Kirkland & Ellis relating to the Challenged
Transactions that CEC [was] withholding.”304 Caesars and CEC eventually reached an agreement,
and the court entered a Stipulation and Agreed Protective Order.305 “CEC agreed to turn over all
of the disputed documents subject to certain conditions on [Caesars’] use of the documents.”306
Caesars subsequently “received more than 200,000 documents from CEC, Apollo, and TPG[,]”
and these “documents revealed numerous facts that caused the [SGC] to . . . conclude that
additional material claims relating to the financing transactions existed.”307 Moreover, a filing by
junior creditors claimed the SGC’s investigation of the asset transfers concluded that the
transactions were “problematic” and “constructively fraudulent.”308
The Examiner’s Final Report, discussed in more detail in Part XVI.D.2 of this paper,
backed these findings, concluding that “many of the transactions . . . were structured and
implemented in a manner that removed assets from [Caesars] to the detriment of [Caesars] and its
creditors.”309 As the Examiner put it:
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“The principal question being investigated was whether in structuring and
implementing these transactions assets were removed from [Caesars] to the
detriment of [Caesars] and its creditors.
The simple answer to this question is ‘yes.’ As a result, claims of varying
strength arise out of these transactions for constructive fraudulent transfers,
actual fraudulent transfers (based on intent to hinder or delay creditors) and
breaches of fiduciary duty by [Caesars] directors and officers and CEC.
Aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims, again of varying
strength, exist against the Sponsors and certain of CEC’s directors.”310
Accordingly, the SGC assessed the potential claims Caesars and/or its creditors may have
against CEC or its affiliates and concluded that Caesars’ claims related to the Challenged
Transactions were worth anywhere from $3.2 billion to $5.8 billion.311
A. Mesirow’s Role in the SGC Investigation
However, as previously discussed, Judge Goldgar thought the SGC Investigation was
seriously tainted by the affair between a CEC attorney and the Mesirow director charged with
advising and assisting the SGC in its investigation.312 Caesars, on the other hand, believed that
neither the romantic relationship, nor the failure to disclose it, tainted the investigation.313 In
support of this assertion, Caesars pointed out that “Mesirow provided its first interim report to the
[SGC] in December 2014[,]” before CEC even retained the attorney’s firm.314 Moreover, upon
learning of the relationship, Caesars and Mesirow actively sought to prevent Mesirow’s work from
being tainted, screening the director “from further work on the SGC Investigation.”315 Mesirow
further retained independent outside counsel who conducted an investigation and concluded that
there was no evidence the Mesirow director disclosed any confidential information nor any
evidence that she “was influenced, biased or impacted in any way by her relationship with the . . .
attorney.”316 An investigation by “[t]he U.S. Trustee, which is the portion of the U.S. Department
of Justice responsible for protecting the integrity of the federal bankruptcy system,” also concluded
that “there [were] no facts to suggest that anyone at [Mesirow,] other than [the Mesirow employee],
had actual knowledge of the connection until mid-May 2015.”317 Lastly, to demonstrate the
investigation was not tainted, Caesars provided the chart below, asserting it established that the
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SGC’s “conclusions were comparable to, and in many instances resulted in higher value ranges
than, the conclusion drawn by the independent Examiner:”318

Regardless, Judge Goldgar concluded that the SGC and its investigation were tainted
because “what effect the affair had on the advice given to the [SGC]” could never be known.319
“We’ll never know for sure what happened here[,]” said the Judge.320

Part VIII: The Martingale – CEC, Apollo, and TPG Double Down on the
Caesars’ Controversial Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions
There is a flawed blackjack strategy out there called the Martingale.321 Invented in France
in the 1700s, the Martingale betting progressions calls for a bettor to “keep doubling [their] bets
until [they] finally win, at which point [they will] have recouped all [of their] losses in the
progression and have a net win[.]”322 The problem with the Martingale strategy is that, “[a]lthough
most players will walk away a small winner most of the time, the money [one could] lose in . . .
318
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one catastrophic losing session [could] more than completely wipe out all” of their winnings.323 In
this Part, we will discuss how CEC, Apollo, and TPG doubled down on the legitimacy of the
controversial prepetition transactions engaged in by Caesars, while the other parties in interest
protested that those transactions had not been a winning strategy. Instead, they took the view that
the strategy pursued by CEC, Apollo, and TPG was much like the Martingale—each transaction
loaded Caesars with more and more debt, all the while Apollo and TPG insisted that they just
needed to make one more move to get Caesars back in the black.
A. How CEC Viewed the Transactions
Of course, CEC took a much different position than the SGC and Examiner regarding the
Challenged Transactions, asserting the transactions were “undertaken in good faith and . . .
beneficial to the Debtors and their creditors[,]” and that “the Debtors received at least—and in
aggregate substantially more than—reasonably equivalent value for the assets sold or
transferred.”324 CEC further touted the benefits the Challenged Transactions provided Caesars,
such as providing “more than $2.3 billion in cash and $1 billion in debt relief” and enabling Caesars
to “pay billions of dollars in principal and interest to creditors.”325
B. How Apollo and TPG Viewed the Transactions
Similarly, Apollo, TPG, and associated individuals believed Caesars had “received fair and
reasonably equivalent value in connection with each of the transactions . . . all of which were the
product of fair processes and negotiations[.]”326 Thus, in the view of these private equity sponsors,
numerous material errors caused the SGC and Examiner to reach erroneous conclusions regarding
the transactions.327 Chiefly, they believed the SGC and Examiner “did not properly account for the
contemporaneous analyses and opinions provided by leading investment banks[,]” instead basing
their respective conclusions “on inaccurate assertions regarding the information available to those
investment banks, the role of [Apollo and TPG] representatives in providing such information[,]
and the reasons for each of the transactions at issue[.]”328
C. How the Noteholder Committee Viewed the Transactions
While the Examiner estimated the potential damages from the Challenged Transactions
ranged from $3.6 billion to $5.1 billion,329 “the Noteholder Committee”—representing the junior
bondholders—“believe[d] that the estate claims [were], in the aggregate, substantially more
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valuable[.]”330 The Noteholder Committee asserted the actual range of recoverable damages was
$8.1 billion to $12.6 billion.331 This difference in estimates, according to the Noteholder
Committee, was attributable to the categories of damages which the Examiner believed Caesars
was, or could be, entitled to recover but which the Examiner did not include or calculate.332 To
provide just one example, “the categories of damages not calculated by the Examiner include[d]”
damages for “lost profits attributable to transferred properties[.]”333
D. How the Ad Hoc Group of 5.75% and 6.50% Noteholders
Viewed the Transactions
In 2005 and 2006 respectively, Caesars, then-Harrah’s Operating Co., “issued (i) $750
million of 6.5% senior unsecured notes due 2016 . . . and (ii) $750 million of 5.75% senior
unsecured notes due 2017 . . . (collectively, the “Senior Unsecured Notes”)[,]” which were
guaranteed by CEC’s predecessor, Harrah’s Entertainment.334 The Senior Unsecured Notes were
issued “under a registration statement, which allowed [the companies] to sell the notes a broad
array of potential investors[.]”335
Later, in August 2014, “[Caesars] and CEC entered into a private arrangement . . . with . .
. four large Wall Street Players [(the “Favored Noteholders”)] holding a slight majority of the
outstanding Senior Unsecured Notes that were then held by non-affiliates of CEC and
[Caesars].”336 However, “[o]ther holders of the Senior Unsecured Notes” (collectively, the
“Disenfranchised Noteholders”) were precluded from participating in the transaction.337 Under the
agreement, these “Favored Noteholders agreed to exchange $155.4 million principal face amount
of the Senior Unsecured Notes at par value for $155.4 million in cash” and were also paid “accrued
and unpaid interest in cash on those exchanged notes[.]”338 Further, the Favored Noteholders
received “new notes in exchange for any notes held by [them] that were not redeemed at par plus
accrued interest.”339 The “new notes represented claims against [Caesars] only,” and Caesars
asserted that these notes would “receive approximately 46 cents on the dollar as a recovery in the
. . . bankruptcy case.”340
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“As part of the Favored Noteholders Transaction[,]” however, “the Favored Noteholders
agreed to . . . the purported removal of CEC’s guarantees of the Senior Unsecured Notes.” The Ad
Hoc Group of 5.75% and 6.50% Notes, therefore, felt that:
“If the Favored Noteholders Transactions were . . . given effect, the
Disenfranchised Noteholders . . . would be left with notes that had no rights
to sue or collect upon the guarantees by CEC, even though they were not
offered a chance to participate in the Favored Noteholders transaction.”341
The Ad Hoc Group agreed with the Examiner, who described the Favored Noteholders
Transaction as an “ugly transaction:”342
“In the Examiner’s view, this was an ugly transaction. The Participating
Noteholders—a small group of sophisticated investors—took advantage of
the circumstances and purported differences in the indentures governing the
Senior Unsecured Notes to cause CEC and [Caesars] to repurchase their
Senior Unsecured Notes at par, which was substantially higher than the
market prices available. To make matters worse, the Participating
Noteholders agreed as part of the transaction to amend the indentures in
ways that saddled the remaining noteholders with no Bond Guarantee and
substantially diminished rights. Nonparticipating noteholders were neither
given notice, nor the opportunity to participate in this debt buyback or to
agree to the amendment to the note indentures (although the participating
note holders were willing to allow others to participate). For their part, the
[private equity] Sponsors (Apollo in particular) negotiated this transaction
on behalf of both CEC and [Caesars], declined the opportunity to extend the
offer to participate to all non-affiliated Senior Unsecured Noteholders, and
frankly admitted during interviews that a principal, if not primary, purpose
in entering into the transaction was to remove any uncertainty with respect
to the release of the Bond Guarantee (as opposed to acting in the best
interests of [Caesars] and its creditors).”343
Consequently, “certain Disenfranchised Noteholders filed suits against [Caesars] and
CEC[,]” seeking “declarations that the Favored Noteholders Transaction: (1) violated Section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939; (2) breached the terms of the indentures governing the
Senior Unsecured Notes; and (3) CEC’s guarantee obligations remain in place.”344 The president
of one plaintiff-noteholder, Meehan Combs L.P., said:
341
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“The bond market needs to know whether or not we have gone back to the
1930s, when valuable rights could be stripped away from individual and
smaller investors through backroom deals between issuers and a favored
few. That’s what we think this case will determine.”345
It may also be worth mentioning that this lawsuit came only months before Meehan Combs,
a hedge fund, announced it was shutting down and “return[ing] most of its client money” after
“suffer[ing] mounting losses in the spring and summer.”346
Caesars’ proposed plan, however, included a third party release that would provide “a
broad release of civil liability of certain third parties . . . and others involved in the Favored
Noteholders Transaction.”347 The Ad Hoc Group of 5.75% and 6.50% Notes believed such a
release, “if approved and given effect, [would] release CEC from its guarantee of the Senior
Unsecured Notes and moot the . . . Litigation.”348 Additionally, the Ad Hoc Group highlighted the
fact that the proposed Plan did “not provide for the Disenfranchised Noteholders to receive a
recovery greater than other unsecured creditors who did not have guarantee rights against CEC.”349
The group, therefore, objected to both the proposed plan and the Favored Noteholders Transaction,
citing the fact that, under them, the Favored Noteholders would receive a “83.1% or 79.1%
recovery, depending on the series of Senior Notes they hold, while the Disenfranchised
Noteholders . . . [would] receive only 46% on the very same investment.”350

Part IX: The Buy-In – What Should the Value of CEC’s Contributions under
the Plan Be?
In poker, the buy-in is “[t]he minimum amount of money required by a player to sit down
in a particular . . . game.”351 Here, we discuss how various parties in this case took vastly different
views on how much CEC would contribute under the plan, i.e., how much it was paying to play
this chapter 11 “game.”
Millstein, who Caesars retained to serve as a financial advisor and investment banker,352
estimated that the aggregate value of contributions CEC would make to the Estates under Caesars’
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proposed plan ranged from $1.9 billion to $6.3 billion.353 Interested parties took differing views
on this estimated range, with CEC believing the value of its contributions to be at the high end,
possibly exceeding Millstein’s upper estimate, and the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 12.75%
Second Priority Senior Secured Notes believing the value to be at the low end, possibly even below
it.354 Therefore, the Ad Hoc Committee of 12.75% noteholders, as well as the Noteholder
Committee, asserted that CEC’s contributions under the proposed plan were inadequate. 355 In
particular, the Noteholder Committee argued that, upon proper consideration of the additional
value CEC would realize if the plan were confirmed, “the value of CEC’s net contribution . . . is
less than $1 billion or perhaps even negative.”356 The Noteholder Committee opined that such a
contribution was obviously inadequate “to justify the release of potential claims belonging to the
Debtors that . . . [had] a value in a range from $8.1 billion to $12.6 billion.”357

Part X: Fighting for a Seat at the Table – The Second Lien Standing Motion
“Standing is the legal right to initiate a lawsuit[.]”358 In 2021, it was reported that CEC was
“in the process or removing entire swaths of table games at its Las Vega casinos[,]” replacing them
“with electronic table games and slot machines.”359 In this Part, we will discuss how the
Noteholder Committee reacted to what it perceived as Caesars’ negligent inaction in pursuing
lawsuits for the bankruptcy estates just as a Caesars patron might react if they were struggling to
find a seat at a non-virtual table game and discovered a player just sitting at one of the tables not
even playing—by demanding their seat at the table.
Frustrated by Caesars not pursuing estate causes of action and, instead, trying to extinguish
them, the Noteholder Committee filed a motion seeking standing to pursue claims against CEC,
certain directors and officers of CEC and Caesars, the Sponsors, and others for, amongst other
things, “constructive and intentional fraudulent transfers” and “breach of fiduciary duty[.]”360 The
Noteholder Committee asserted that the claims arose:
“from a series of self-dealing prepetition transactions between [Caesars] . .
. and entities owned and controlled by CEC or the Sponsors . . . [t]he
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purpose and effect of [which] was to enrich CEC and its affiliates and
shareholders by moving billions of dollars of [Caesars’] assets beyond the
reach of [Caesars’] creditors[.]”361
Section 1103(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code permits “a committee appointed under section
1102”—such as the Noteholder Committee—to “perform such other services as are in the interest
of those represented.”362 Moreover, section 1109(b) permits such committees to raise, appear, and
be heard on any issue in a bankruptcy case.363 Therefore, in the Noteholder Committee’s opinion,
the court had authority to confer standing upon it under appropriate circumstances. 364 The
Noteholder Committee believed the predicates for such conferral had been met because (a)
Caesars, as debtor in possession, had unjustifiably refused a demand to pursue the actions, (b) a
colorable – i.e., a seemingly valid and genuine – claim or cause of action existed, and (c) the
Committee sought to obtain leave “to prosecute the action[s] for and in the name of” Caesars.365
Thus, the Committee argued that it, and not Caesars or the SGC—whose “willingness to forgo
prosecution of [such] immensely valuable causes of action . . . evidence[d] . . . an inherent conflict
of interest”—should be charged with pursuing the causes of action.366
Subsequently, the Noteholder Committee “issued discovery requests to seven different
parties . . . in connection with the Second Lien Standing Motion”367 Caesars, in response, filed a
Continuation Motion, requesting that the Standing Motion “be continued until the Court decides
whether to approve the Debtors’ settlement of [the] claims at confirmation[,]” or, in the alternative,
that the briefing schedule previously established for the Standing Motion be modified to provide
more time.368
However, both the Noteholder Committee and Ad Hoc Group of 5.75% and 6.50% Notes
filed objections.369 The Noteholder Committee objected on the grounds that “any delay of the
hearing on the Standing Motion, particularly for the lengthy period of time proposed by the
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Debtors, would be prejudicial to the Noteholder Committee and other creditors[.]”370 After all,
“statute of limitations deadlines [were] approaching[,]” urged the Noteholder Committee. 371 The
Committee deemed Caesars’ singular footnote saying it would preserve the Debtors’ claims to be
“lip service.”372 For support, it pointed to the fact that:
“the Examiner determined that at least two statute of limitations deadlines
arguably lapsed during the five-month period of time between the formation
of the SGC and the filing of the [chapter 11]. As a consequence of those
lapses, the Examiner downgraded one fraudulent transfer claim with
potential damages of $43-$123 million from ‘strong’ to ‘plausible,’ and
another breach of fiduciary duty claim with potential damages of $50-$56
million from ‘reasonable to strong’ to one that ‘would almost certainly be
time barred.’”373
Also believing time was crucial, the Ad Hoc Group of 5.75% and 6.50% Notes raised these
concerns in their objection as well:
“The Court should not defer consideration of the Standing Motion until after
the Court’s decision on plan confirmation. The statute of limitations for
many of the claims set forth in the Complaint will expire on January 12 or
15, 2017 . . . The Debtors’ proposed confirmation schedule, which provides
for commencement of the confirmation hearing on November 7, is the
subject of numerous objections. Regardless of whether the confirmation
hearing starts in November, December or even later, it is certain to be
contentious, will require a significant amount of time and the likelihood of
confirmation is uncertain.”374
A final hearing on the Second Lien Standing Motion was eventually set for September
2016. Apollo and TPG had a lot on the line. The transactions the Noteholder Committee sought
authority to sue over laid “at the heart of the conflicts” impeding Caesars “and its creditors from
agreeing on a consensual reorganization plan.”376 If an agreement could not be reached, Apollo
and TPG would be facing not only those lawsuits, but also “a half-dozen cases . . . pending in
federal and state courts . . . against CEC arising out of the transactions[,]” which, if “allowed to
375
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move forward, . . . could lead CEC to also file for Chapter 11 . . . and expose Apollo and TPG’s
equity interests to creditor claims.”377
At the same time, though, Caesars had indicated it would cramdown its proposed plan if
an agreement were not reached; this “cramdown would also release CEC, Apollo, and TPG from
further liability arising out of the prepetition transactions.”378 Thus, the Noteholder Committee
was also in a precarious position: by pursuing liability for those transactions, it was preventing a
consensual reorganization plan from being reached, which, in turn, caused Caesars to threaten to
“cramdown a settlement that would immunize CEC, [Apollo, TPG,] and insiders and affiliates.”379
However, all of the parties eventually reached an agreement whereby they “revise[d] the
economic terms of the distributions included in the plan of reorganization . . . [and] settle[d] [the]
claims of the Second Priority Noteholders.”380

Part XI: Table Talk – Negotiating Restructuring Support Agreements
Banter between players at a card table, known as table talk, is an art form.381 “Players can
either make it a weapon in their arsenal, ignore it altogether or be indifferent towards it.”382 In this
Part, we discuss the proverbial table talk Caesars engaged in with different creditor groups before
the cards were even dealt in this bankruptcy. These negotiations resulted in a Prepetition
Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA).383
RSAs “are written contracts usually between the debtor and one or more creditors (or
representative trustees or ad hoc committees), that set forth an agreed-upon framework for the
treatment of debt and a timeline for accomplishing the reorganization.”384 These contracts
generally:
“a) state with particularity the agreed-upon treatment of the claims of the
creditor signatories to the agreement (and may also include . . . the proposed
treatment of non-signatories); b) incorporate creditor promises not to
support other or alternative plans and the debtor promise not to propose
alternative plans; c) establish deadlines for the operative elements of the
377
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agreed-upon ‘plan’ such as a deadline for filing a sale motion or a plan of
reorganization; and d) permit termination of the agreement by parties
usually based on failure to meet certain agreed-upon deadlines (including
the commencement of the bankruptcy case by a date certain).”385
The Prepetition RSA reached by Caesars and its stakeholders proposed reorganizing
Caesars as a real estate investment trust (REIT).386 However, “[t]he Prepetition RSA contained
various milestones that [Caesars was] required to meet[,]” and Caesars was “unable to meet certain
of these milestones[.]”387 Further, it only “locked in a baseline deal structure to facilitate further
negotiations with [Caesars’] creditors during the Chapter 11[.]”388 Therefore, in spite of Caesars’
failure to meet certain requirements under the Prepetition RSA, the agreement remained in effect
as the parties continued to negotiate.389 Caesars, consequently, reached or attempted to reach final
RSAs with each of the following groups, and elements of each successful and unsuccessful RSA
would eventually be incorporated in Caesars’ first proposed plan of reorganization.390
A. The First Lien Noteholders
Negotiations with the First Lien Noteholders culminated in a First Lien Notes RSA
supported by over 80% of the Noteholders (the “First Lien Consenting Noteholders”).391 Receiving
the support of the First Lien Noteholders was crucial for Caesars, as there was “significant risk
that the company would be unable to cram down a plan on them[.]”392 In exchange for Caesars
“meet[ing] or comply[ing] with various milestones . . . relating to the timing of filing motions with
the Bankruptcy Court as well as the entry of orders with respect to certain aspects of the Chapter
11[,]” the First Lien Noteholders agreed to (1) vote in favor of the First Lien Notes RSA’s proposed
restructuring, (2) “forbear from exercising certain default-related rights and remedies under the
indentures governing the First Lien Notes, [(3)] not transfer their Secured First Lien Notes Claims
or Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims unless the transferee agrees to be bound by the terms of
the First Lien Notes RSA[,]” and (4) adjourn, stay, and/or dismiss without prejudice any litigation
between the parties and their respective directors.393 Once again, though, Caesars failed to meet or
comply with certain milestones, making the First Lien Notes RSA terminable by the First Lien
Consenting Noteholders.394 The Noteholders, however, did not exercise this right.395 Instead, they
385
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continued negotiating. Ergo, when Caesars filed its final disclosure statement, the deal was
weighing “certain modifications to the company’s proposed reorganization plan including, among
other things, ‘some amount of additional CEC bond consideration … to holders of secured firstlien notes claims in the event that the holders of second-lien notes claims in Class F vote as a class
to reject the plan[.]’”396
B. Certain Holders of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
In light of the First Lien Notes RSA, Caesars and certain Holders of Prepetition Credit
Agreement Claims (the “First Lien Consenting Bank Lenders”) entered into a First Lien Bank
RSA (the “Bank RSA”).397 This agreement received support from holders of over 80% of the
Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims.398 Thus, Caesars secured the support of its “largest and most
senior creditor constituencies . . . pav[ing] the way toward a confirmable plan for [its]
restructuring[.]”399 Pursuant to the Bank RSA, the First Lien Consenting Bank Lenders agreed to
vote “in favor of the Plan, forbear from exercising certain default-related rights and remedies under
the Prepetition Credit Agreement, not take any actions materially inconsistent with the Plan . . .,
and not transfer their Secured First Lien Note Claims or Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
unless the transferee agree[d] to be bound by the . . . RSA.” 400 In return, Caesars was to pay the
First Lien Consenting Bank Lenders their “pro rata share of a $62.5 million upfront[.]”401
However, as with the First Lien Notes RSA, Caesars failed to meet or comply with certain
milestones imposed on it by the Bank RSA, making the agreement terminable at the First Lien
Consenting Bank Lenders’ option.402 These Lenders, like the First Lien Noteholders, did not
exercise this option and, instead, reached an Amended Bank RSA with Caesars. 403 Under this
Amended Bank RSA, Caesars and CEC agreed to the following:404
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C. Certain Holders of Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims
Negotiations between Caesars, CEC, each Subsidiary Guarantor, and certain Holders of
Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims produced a SGN RSA to resolve the myriad of issues among
the parties.405 For example, the SGN RSA addressed such issues as:
“the potential existence of significant unencumbered assets at certain of the
Subsidiary Guarantors, the assertion by the Holders of SubsidiaryGuaranteed Notes Claims that such Claims are entitled to postpetition
interest due to the recoveries at certain of the Subsidiary Guarantors owning
such assets, with ongoing operations, or that hold Estate Claims, . . . and
alleged uncertainty and potential litigation related to the SubsidiaryGuaranteed Notes Intercreditor Agreement.”406
This agreement received support from the Holders of over 65% of Subsidiary-Guaranteed
Notes Claims.407 The SGN RSA required, among other things, “the allowance of SubsidiaryGuaranteed Notes Claims against [Caesars] and each Subsidiary Guarantor in the aggregate
principal amount of $502 million” and “the distribution of [$116.81 million] of New CEC
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Convertibles Notes and OpCo Series A Preferred Stock to be exchanged pursuant to the CEOC
Merger for 4.122% of New CEC Common Equity on a fully diluted basis[.]”408
D. CEC and Caesars Acquisition Company (“CAC”)
Caesars also reached separate RSAs with CEC and Caesars Acquisition Company
(“CAC”).409 The CEC RSA “require[d] CEC to support the Plan and take all actions necessary or
appropriate to consummate the Plan[.]”410 Such actions include, for example, “issuing the New
CEC Convertible Notes, . . . issuing up to 52.7 percent of the New CEC Common Equity, . . .
negotiating and entering into a definitive merger agreement to effectuate the CEC-CAC Merger
and obtain an agreement by the Sponsors to approve the Merger, . . . [and] purchasing 100 percent
of the OpCo Common Stock for $700 million in cash and, if applicable, 5 percent of the PropCo
Common Equity for $91 million[.]”411 CAC, under its RSA, had rights and obligations
“substantially similar to CEC’s rights and obligations under the CEC RSA, including with respect
to CAC’s obligations to support the Plan and take all actions necessary or appropriate to
consummate the Plan.”412
E. Holders of Second Lien Notes Claims
Caesars and CEC announced a Second Lien RSA “with Holders of a significant amount of
the Second Lien Notes Claims[,]” but it “never became effective . . . because Holders of at least
50.1% of the Second Lien Notes Claims failed to execute the Second Lien RSA by . . . the deadline
to do so.”413 While Caesars “did not disclose the level of support for the pact,” it was reported
“that the noteholders agreeing to the pact [only] held about 30% of the second-lien notes[.]”414
This lack of sufficient support is unsurprising given the fact that the Second Lien Noteholders were
a “thorn in the company’s side” throughout the Chapter 11 process.415 Despite the Second Lien
RSA’s ineffectiveness, however, “CEC’s proposed additional contributions to the Debtors’ Estates
under the [agreement served] as an important reference for CEC’s additional contributions and the
enhanced creditor recoveries available under the Plan[.]”416
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F. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC”)
Throughout the chapter 11 process, the UCC “argued that its constituents [were] entitled
to greater recoveries on account of the Estate Claims and what the [UCC] assert[ed] [were]
substantial unencumbered assets (including [Caesars’] Cash.)”417 In fact, the UCC made clear “that
it would fight confirmation of any . . . plan that did not account for [their] arguments[.]”418 Caesars
and the UCC, therefore, engaged in negotiations that were, in part, assisted by mediation and which
ultimately produced a UCC RSA. Signed in June 2016, the UCC RSA “provide[d] for the
following terms and conditions, including the recoveries available to unsecured creditors under the
Plan:”419
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Part XII: Fighting for a Seat at the Table II – More Lien Standing Challenges
Like Part X, this Part discusses how parties in interest sought to pursue lawsuits on behalf
of Caesars’ creditors. Again, you will see these lawsuits were ones the moving parties believed
Caesars had negligently failed to pursue, thus harming its creditors.
A. Motion by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC
Lien Standing Motion”)
In January 2008, when CEC was still Harrah’s Entertainment, the company and its OpCo
subsidiary, our Caesars, entered into a First Lien Credit Agreement with Bank of America whereby
Caesars “borrowed up to $9.25 billion in principal amount of secured debt, including a fully funded
term loan of $7.25 billion and a revolving credit line of $2 billion.”420 The First Lien Credit
Agreement was amended in May 2011 and again in 2012, with both amendments “extend[ing] the
Motion of Statutory Unsecured Claimholders’ Committee for Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 1103
and 1109, Granting It Derivative Standing to Commence, Prosecute, and Settle Certain Causes of Action on Behalf
of Debtors’ Estates [2029.pdf], at 7–8, In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D.
Ill. Filed Aug. 7, 2015).
420
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maturity of existing term loans or convert[ing] revolver commitments into extended term loans.”421
A third revision came in July 2014 and resulted in Caesars obtaining $1.75 billion of new term
loans.422 Caesars also issued approximately $6.35 billion in notes to First Lien Noteholders
pursuant to First Lien Notes Indentures.423 Further, the parties reached a First Lien Collateral
Agreement, under which Caesars’ “obligations under the First Lien Credit Agreement . . . and the
First Lien Notes Indentures (collectively, the “First Lien Debt”) . . . [were purportedly] secured by
. . . first priority liens against the collateral[.]”424 Thus, the First Lien Collateral Agreement granted
the First Lien Collateral Agent—Bank of America at the time but, eventually, Credit Suisse AG,
Cayman Island Branch (“Credit Suisse”)—“a security interest in certain . . . collateral that any
Pledgor [i.e., Caesars and certain of its subsidiaries] at any time” held or acquired.425 Section 7.18
of the Agreement, moreover, “waived recourse against the Subsidiary Pledgors ‘under any law’
for payment of the First Lien Debt.”426 Caesars and certain of its subsidiaries also “pledged
commercial tort claims to secure the First Lien Debt[,]” granting the First Lien Collateral Agent a
security interest in such claims and the proceeds thereof.427
Caesars’ Second Lien Debt received almost the exact same treatment. Second Lien
Noteholders received approximately $5.24 billion in notes from Caesars.428 Under three Second
Lien Notes Indentures and a Second Lien Collateral Agreement, certain of Caesars’ subsidiaries
“pledged to the Second Lien Collateral Agent”—Delaware Trust Company—“on a nonrecourse
basis substantially all their assets to further secure [Caesars’] obligations under the Second Lien
Notes Indentures.”429 Section 7.17 of the Second Lien Collateral Agreement, like section 7.18 of
the First, waived recourse against these Subsidiary Pledgors “under any law.”430 Further, under the
agreement, the Second Lien Collateral Agent received a security interest in commercial tort claims
and the proceeds thereof.431
In August 2014, the First Lien Collateral Agent identified commercial tort claims which
met the criteria of the First Lien Collateral Agreement and related to the challenged transactions
discussed in Part III.B of this paper.432 Shortly thereafter, the Pledgors granted the First Lien
Collateral Agent a security interest in, and lien against, claims “substantially similar” to those
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identified.433 Then, within 90 days of Caesars’ chapter 11 commencing, the Pledgors, acting in
accordance with the Second Lien Collateral Agreement, granted the same to the Second Lien
Collateral Agent.434
Soon after the case commenced, however, the bankruptcy court entered a Final Cash
Collateral Order whereby Caesars “stipulated to the validity, extent and enforceability of the
security interests, liens, and claims granted to the First Lien Collateral Agent.”435 This Final Cash
Collateral Order also set a deadline by which Caesars had to bring “challenges to the mortgages,
security interests, and liens of the Second Lien Collateral Agent (and the Second Lien Secured
Parties)[,]” but Caesars allowed that deadline to lapse.436 The deadline by which the Unsecured
Creditors’ Committee (the “UCC”) could bring challenges to the security interests, mortgages,
liens, and claims purportedly granted to First Lien Collateral Agent had not yet expired, however,
when the UCC filed a motion seeking derivative standing to challenge these actions (the “UCC
Lien Standing Motion”).437 Derivative standing confers upon an official creditors committee the
ability “to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy
trustee is unwilling or unable to do so[.]”438
In its motion, the UCC claimed it was “the Only Fiduciary Appropriate to Bring the . . .
Challenges” because Caesars had stipulated away its ability to do so, and the first lien noteholders
and lenders, as recipients of those stipulations, could not attack their own liens.439 Moreover, the
Official Committee of Second Priority Noteholders (the “Noteholder Committee”) was “prohibited
by the terms of its intercreditor agreement with the first lien lenders and noteholders from
advocating positions adverse to first liens and claims.”440 The UCC, thus, argued that if it were not
permitted standing to bring the challenges:
“‘(x) any and all such Challenges by any party . . . shall be deemed to be
forever waived, released, and barred, and (y) all of the Debtors’
Stipulations, waivers, releases, affirmations, and other stipulations as to the
grant, creation, attachment, perfection, priority, extent, and validity as to the
Prepetition First Lien Agents’ and Prepetition First Lien Creditors’ claims,
liens, and interests shall be of full force and effect and forever binding upon
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the Debtors, the Debtors’ bankruptcy estates and all creditors, interest
holders, and other parties in interest in the Chapter 11 Cases and any
Successor Cases.’”441
The UCC asserted “that a statutory creditors’ committee has an implied right to sue on
behalf of a bankruptcy estate pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 1103 and 1109.”442 More
specifically, section 1103(c)(5) of the Code permits a committee to “perform such . . . services as
are in the interest of those represented [by the committee,]” and section 1109(b) permits a
committee to raise, appear, and be heard on any issue in a bankruptcy case.443 Therefore, the UCC
argued a bankruptcy court should grant a statutory committee derivative standing where (1) a
colorable claim exists and (2) the debtor fails or unjustifiably refuses to pursue that claim.444 To
find a colorable claim – “a claim for relief that on appropriate proof would support a recovery” –
a bankruptcy “[c]ourt must simply determine ‘that the committee is not embarking on a senseless
enterprise[,]’” asserted the UCC.445 The motion then proffered a litany of, in its estimation,
colorable claims, such as “The Security Interests and Liens Granted in Late 2014 to the Collateral
Agents Do Not Extend to Any Commercial Tort Claims Arising Thereafter Because Those Claims
Did Not Exist at the Time of the Grant[.]”446 Finally, the UCC argued “courts have determined
stipulations constitute failure or unjustifiable refusal for the purposes of derivative standing[,]”
thus satisfying the second requirement for derivative standing to be conferred.447
B. Motion by the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Indenture
Trustee (the “Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Standing
Motion”)
The Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Indenture Trustee (the “SGNI Trustee”) filed a similar
motion (the “Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Standing Motion”) that same day.448 To avoid
confusion, please note that the SGNI Trustee and the 10.75% Notes Trustee, who was mentioned
several times in Part IV of this paper, are one in the same—i.e., Wilmington Trust. In its motion,
the SGNI Trustee sought “standing and authority, on behalf of the Subsidiary Guarantors, to
commence, prosecute, and settle causes of action seeking declaratory judgment unwinding the
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Subject Stipulations and objecting to the allowance of the First Lien Claims against the Subsidiary
Guarantors.”449 Under the Subject Stipulations contained in the Final Cash Collateral Order:
“each Subsidiary Guarantor stipulated to having allowed secured claims in
favor of the First Lien Parties for the full amount of [Caesars’] $11.6 billion
First Lien Obligations . . . even though those estates never agreed to incur
any debt claims against them, much less all of [Caesars’] first lien debt. The
Subject Stipulations, if recognized, would create billions of dollars of
claims at the Subsidiary Guarantors that simply did not exist prepetition and
would have the practical effect of diluting subsidiary unsecured recoveries
to near zero.”450
The SGNI Trustee, like the UCC in its motion, relied on section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code as providing committees the ability to raise and be heard on any issue in a chapter 11 case.451
Further, the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Standing Motion asserted that the “[a]uthority to assert
estate claims [had] been extended to creditors acting outside of an official committee[,]” thus
giving the SGNI Trustee the ability to assert estate claims on behalf of the Subsidiary
Guarantors.452 Then, under the same criteria as used in the UCC Lien Standing Motion, the SGNI
Trustee asserted derivative standing should be conferred because “it would be futile for [them] to
demand that the Subsidiary Guarantors disavow the Subject Stipulations,” as doing so would
trigger a default under the Final Cash Collateral Order and “also trigger a First Lien Noteholder
Party termination right under the RSA—which the Debtors [had] repeatedly vowed to attempt to
preserve.”453 As for a colorable claim, the SNI Trustee proffered actions seeking “declaratory relief
undoing the Subject Limitations to the extent they would deem allowed[:] any [(1)] secured claims
of the First Lien Parties in excess of the value of their Collateral at any Subsidiary Guarantor on
the Voluntary Petition Date” and (2) “any First Lien Claim against a Subsidiary Guarantor in
excess of a properly valued secured claim.”454
Lastly, the motion challenged the Subject Stipulations’ allowance of “First Lien Claims
against each Subsidiary Guarantor on a final basis, not subject to disallowance.”455 The SGNI
Trustee reasoned that such relief was “unwarranted” because the only way “any unsecured claims
at the Subsidiary Guarantors [would] arise [was] pursuant to section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code[,]” and there were “multiple circumstances in which section 1111(b) would not apply, such
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as a conversion of any case to chapter 7, confirmation of a plan with a sale of Collateral, or the
abandonment of Collateral to the First Lien Parties.”456 Thus, the SGNI Trustee argued that not
subjecting “any claims allowance imposed by the Subject Stipulations . . . to later disallowance
depending on future restructuring developments . . . would impermissibly curtail a Subsidiary
Guarantor’s ability to pursue valid, value-maximizing restructuring options designed to provide
its creditors recovery in full out of unencumbered assets.”457
C. Resolution of the Motions
As Caesars’ final disclosure statement put it, the two motions targeted:
“(a) the validity of the Secured Creditors’ liens in certain property,
including commercial tort claims, insurance policies, gaming and liquor
licenses, vessels, real property, equity interests, and intellectual property;
(b) certain stipulations agreed to by the Debtors in the Final Cash
Collateral Order; and (c) the Secured Creditors’ rights to assert deficiency
claims under section 1111(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code against certain of
the Debtors[.]”458
At an omnibus hearing held in October 2015, “the [SGNI] Trustee agreed to allow the
Unsecured Creditors Committee to litigate the standing issues raised in Subsidiary-Guaranteed
Notes Standing Motion[.]”459 Caesars, however, filed an objection, “arguing that the best and most
value creating resolution of the issues is the global settlement proposed by the . . . Plan[.]”460 Two
further joint objections were filed in response to the UCC Lien Standing Motion as well.
The first came from the Ad Hoc Committee of First Lien Noteholders (the “1L Notes
Committee”) and UMB Bank, N.A. as successor indenture trustee for the First Lien Notes (the “1L
Notes Trustee”) (collectively, the “First Lien Notes Parties”).461 The joint objection claimed “the
UCC [could not] satisfy the prerequisites for derivative standing and granting it . . . would not
align with the interests of the estates.”462 Contrary to the UCC’s assertion, the First Lien Notes
Parties argued, there was no unjustifiable refusal to bring suit, as Caesars’ plan would resolve “all
of the issues the UCC request[ed] standing to litigate.”463 Further, they asserted that few of the
claims were actually avoidance claims, and that the adjudication of claims not seeking lienavoidance would only be appropriate “[i]n the unlikely event that the Court were to determine that
[Caesars’] plan [did] not properly allocate value among classes, or if confirmation [was] otherwise
456
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. . . denied[.]”464 The First Lien Notes Parties, moreover, asserted that “the few actual avoidance
claims alleged . . . [were] not colorable and would not survive a motion to dismiss.”465
For their part, the Ad Hoc Bank Lender Committee of First Lien Bank Lenders, along with
Credit Suisse, as the First Lien Agent, filed a joint objection in which they claimed to demonstrate
that “many of the Challenges alleged in the UCC’s proposed complaint fail to state plausible
claims.”466 Like the First Lien Notes Parties, the First Lien Bank Lenders and First Lien Agent
asserted that “the UCC had failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the prosecution of the
purported Challenges . . . were unjustifiably denied[.]”467 The joint objection argued that
establishing an unjustified refusal required the creditor to prove, “through specific evidence, that
pursuing the action would result in a net benefit to the estate in the first instance.”468 If a creditor
could provide such evidence, courts in the Seventh Circuit—where this case was being
adjudicated—then “balanced the likelihood of success as well as the amount likely to be recovered
on behalf of the estate against the costs and risks associated with pursuing the action to determine
whether the action would in fact benefit the estate[,]” continued the joint objection.469 The First
Lien Bank Lenders and First Lien Agent argued that the UCC did not “provide any evidence
demonstrating that its pursuit of the Challenges, even if successful, would yield any benefit to the
UCC’s constituency” and went even further to assert that Caesars’ refusal was a justified exercise
of business judgment.470 After all, the joint objection stated, Caesars had “apparently determined
that the Challenges were impractical and of dubious benefit (particularly in light of the global
settlement contained in the current proposed Plan).”471
The UCC responded to these objections via an omnibus reply, attempting to rebuff their
arguments.472 After receiving new information, the UCC amended its Lien Standing Motion in
hopes of strengthening its case for “exclusive authority to pursue and settle the . . .
[c]hallenges[.]”473 Its efforts, however, were of no avail, for the court ultimately “issued an opinion
and order noting that [Caesars’] justification for not pursuing the Formal Challenges, namely that
the pursuit of a global settlement as part of a comprehensive plan of reorganization [was] superior
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to litigation, [was] a reasonable exercise of [Caesars’] business judgment[.]”474 Judge Goldgar
found this to be “sufficing grounds for denying the UCC Lien Standing Motion[.]” 475 He did not
outright deny the motion, though; Judge Goldgar continued it “so as to not prejudice the [UCC] if
the . . . Plan [was] not approved for any reason.”476 Surprisingly, a Forbes article quotes the UCC
as agreeing with Judge Goldgar, believing that “the scheduling of a hearing at [that] point in the
case would [have been] ‘premature,’ given the case’s uncertainties.”477 Efforts to “prosecute
avoidance actions and negotiate arms’ length settlements of substantial claims the debtors not only
refuse[d] to pursue, but [sought] to release and settle for negligible value under their proposed
plan[]” were, thus, stalled.478
Avoiding powers are designed, in part, “to insure the fair distribution of the assets of the
debtor available to the unsecured creditors as a whole.”479 Here, however, Caesars’ unsecured
creditors were left to watch as questionable transactions distributed assets out of the estates and,
thus, out of their reach—all in the name of deference to Caesars’ business judgment. “The business
judgment rule as generally applied [in chapter 11 cases] grants substantial deference to the . . .
debtor in possession.”480 And, as one scholar put it, the business judgment rule could, alternatively,
“be called a standard of non-review, entailing no review of the merits of a business decision [the
debtor in possession] . . . made.”481 Thus, one probably should not be surprised by this result.

Part XIII: The Overcard – Section 1111(b) Claim Objections
In poker, the “overcard” is the card which, at a given time, is “higher than any other on the
board.” Typically, “[c]reditors with liens on property are entitled to receive value that is equal
to the debt or the collateral—whichever is less.”483 In this Part, we discuss how the SGNI Trustee,
on behalf of holders of the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims, sought to prevent Caesars from
allowing other creditors to assert claims against its subsidiaries guaranteeing those notes. As you
482
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will see, the SGNI Trustee urged that the value of those creditors’ collateral was the “overcard” in
this situation, and that nothing higher was on the table.
To do this, the SGNI Trustee filed two 1111(b) Claims Objections “to proofs of claim filed
by the First Lien Collateral Agent and the First Lien Notes Indenture Trustee against 137 of
[Caesars’] wholly-owned Debtor subsidiaries with respect to assets other than Collateral (as such
term [was] defined in the First Lien Collateral Agreement).”484 Section 1111(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that “[a] claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be
allowed or disallowed under section 502 . . . the same as if the holder of such claim had recourse
against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse[.]”485
“This Code provision, adopted by Congress in 1978, reversed decisions under the prior Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 holding that, in reorganization proceedings, the holder of an undersecured nonrecourse
claim was not entitled to a claim against the debtor for any estimated deficiency claim.”486 A claim
is undersecured “when the creditor’s collateral is worth less than the amount of its claim[.]”487
Thus, under section 1111(b)(1), undersecured creditors can assert claims for the deficiency of the
collateral’s value as compared to the value of the debt. Here, however, the SGNI Trustee did not
believe this should be the case.
The first objection challenged “the allowance of . . . First Lien Note Claims against any
Subsidiary Guarantor in an amount in excess of the value of its Collateral[.]”488 Similarly, the
second objection challenged the allowance of First Lien Bank Claims against any such guarantor
“in an amount in the excess of the value of its Collateral[.]”489 Both objections sought, pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 3007, an order under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, disallowing First Lien
Note and Bank Claims asserted against Subsidiary Guarantors to the extent such claims exceeded
the value of a given guarantor’s collateral, “whether asserted as a secured or unsecured claim.”490
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After all, argued the objections, section 506(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code dictates that “the amount
of an allowed secured claim against a debtor cannot exceed the value of its collateral.”491 Thus,
the SGNI Trustee asserted that the First Lien Creditors should not be able to assert deficiency
claims under section 1111(b)(1) against the Subsidiary Guarantors.492 For support, the SGNI
Trustee looked to the First Lien Collateral Agreement, under which “the First Lien Creditors had
[allegedly] waived their right to assert claims under section 1111(b) . . . [by] waiv[ing] their right
to recourse against the Subsidiary Guarantor Debtors under ‘any law.’”493
The SGNI Trustee, together with the UCC, argued that it was necessary to eliminate all
deficiency claims the First Lien Creditors could assert against Subsidiary Guarantors, for doing so
“would unencumber value that [would] substantially improve recoveries to all unsecured
claimholders at the Subsidiary Guarantor Debtors.”494 Discovery was permitted into the issues
raised in the objections, and, shortly thereafter, “the First Lien Lenders, the First Lien Noteholders,
the Second Lien Creditors, and [Caesars] each filed pre-trial briefs[.]”495 After a one day
evidentiary hearing was held and closing arguments were made, Judge Goldgar entered an 1111(b)
Order, which:
“held that although rights under section 1111(b) can be waived by creditors
(and the First Lien Collateral Agreement, on its own, could be read to
provide such waiver), the First Lien Intercreditor Agreement referenced
section 1111(b) and to reconcile the First Lien Collateral Agreement with
the First Lien Intercreditor Agreement, the First Lien Collateral Agreement
could not be read to waive rights under section 1111(b).”496
Thus, the court sided with the First Lien Creditors, with Judge Goldgar holding that the
“language in other relevant transactional documents demonstrated that section 1111(b) rights
actually were preserved[.]”497 The SGNI Trustee, however, filed a notice of appeal.498 As part of
the SGN RSA discussed in Part XI.C of this paper, though, Caesars expected the SGNI Trustee to
hold this “appeal in abeyance through the Confirmation Hearing.”499 The UCC, through the UCC
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RSA discussed in Part XI.F of this paper, was also expected “to hold its appeal [on the matter] in
abeyance through the Confirmation Hearing.”500

Part XIV: Side Bets – Adversary Proceedings
In the game of craps, a side bet is “a bet made by the shooter in craps on any event other
than the outcome of his center bets[.]”501 Bankruptcy has something very similar to side bets in
craps: adversary proceedings. An adversary proceeding is “a lawsuit [which] arise[s] during the
course of a bankruptcy that relates to the bankruptcy but is handled separately.”502 In this Part, we
will discuss the most important adversary proceedings Caesars engaged in during its chapter 11.
Bankruptcy Rule 7001 provides that there are 10 types of adversary proceedings.503
Typically, though, an adversary proceeding can be described as “one of two sorts[:]” (1) one
seeking “to recover money or property (e.g., voidable preferences and fraudulent transfers)[,]” or
(2) one seeking “to determine the dischargeability of a debt, . . . object to or revoke a discharge,
or . . . revoke an order confirming a plan of reorganization.504 In the first adversary proceeding in
this case, however, Caesars sought to do something different: keep its non-debtor affiliates from
getting sued for transactions it completed with them prior to filing for chapter 11.
A. The Section 105 Adversary Proceeding
On March 11, 2015, Caesars commenced “an adversary proceeding seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to stay or enjoin the continued prosecution of four lawsuits . . . bring[ing]
claims against certain . . . non-debtor affiliates, including” CEC, CAC, CERP, CGP, and Caesars
Enterprise Services, LLC (“CES”).505 These are the same non-debtor affiliates who were involved
in the controversial transactions discussed in Part III.B of this paper: the Growth Transaction,
CERP Transaction, Four Properties Transaction, and B-7 Transaction. As one news article put it:
“[Caesars’] creditors, described by one member of the buyout group as the
‘smartest debt investors in the world,’ alleged that the private equity owners
had methodically siphoned Caesars’ crown jewel properties to other entities
500
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they owned to salvage what ever [sic] value remained for themselves.
Apollo and TPG insisted that they had battled to keep Caesars alive so it
could fight another day.”506
Caesars sought to prevent its creditors from prosecuting claims relating to not just the
transactions described in Part III.B, but other disputed transactions as well.507 For example, the
creditors challenged what was deemed the “CIE Transaction,” a deal wherein Caesars “transferred
[its] interest in . . . World Series of Poker (“WSOP”) intellectual property to non-Debtor affiliate
Caesars Interactive Entertainment (“CIE”) in exchange for certain preferred shares in CIE, which
were valued at $15 million[,]” and later “transferred [its] rights to host WSOP tournaments to CIE
for $20.5 million in cash.” 508 In the view of one of the lawsuits, the transactions being challenged
were “a series of self-dealing transactions between [Caesars] – at all relevant times an insolvent
corporation – and entities controlled by CEC, or under common control with CEC, that involved
transfer made for less than adequate consideration and with intent to hinder or delay [Caesars’]
creditors.”509 That the lawsuit mentioned Caesars being insolvent is telling. In bankruptcy, a
fraudulent transfer exists where a “debtor receive[s] less than reasonably equivalent value and was
either insolvent or became insolvent as a result of [that] transfer[.]”510 Accordingly, the lawsuit
attacked Apollo and TPG directly. As the news article quoted above suggests, the lawsuit claimed
that, in 2013, the private equity firms realized Caesars “would be unable to repay its massive debt”
and “started to remove [Caesars’] most valuable assets from the reach of its creditors, . . .
transfer[ring] them to two affiliates not liable for [Caesars’] debt[:]” CERP (“a wholly owned
subsidiary of CEC”) and CGP (“an entity controlled by the Sponsors and . . . 58% owned by
CEC”).511
Caesars, however, believed that neither that lawsuit nor the other three should proceed
because they “threaten[ed] CEC’s ability to make [the] contribution to the estate” the RSA called
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for.512 Specifically, the lawsuits sought to “reinstat[e] CEC’s guarantee of the $5.24 billion in
Second Lien Notes and $530 million in Senior Unsecured Notes outstanding as of the petition
date[.]”513 Caesars believed that, if the plaintiffs succeeded in that suit, “CEC [would] likely not
have the funds to make the contributions contemplated by the RSA—or, indeed, any substantial
contributions to the estate.”514 Moreover, under the Management Liability Insurance Policy (the
“Policy”) that Caesars shared with CEC, both companies were “entitled to use the proceeds [of the
Policy] to satisfy defense costs, settlements, and judgments for claims covered by the Policy.”515
Therefore, Caesars argued that any potential “payments on behalf of the Non-Debtor Affiliates[,]”
mandated by Caesars’ indemnification obligations to them, would “deplete the proceeds available
to” Caesars.516 Finally, Caesars argued that the lawsuits sought “to litigate claims that are
themselves property of the estate,” and, moreover, the burdensome discovery the lawsuits would
entail would distract individuals critical to the restructuring from their bankruptcy-related
obligations.517
Caesars, therefore, submitted that “an injunction enjoining the continued prosecution of the
Actions against the Non-Debtor Affiliates [was appropriate] under section 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code[.]”518 That section of the Code provides that a bankruptcy “court may issue any
order . . . that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” Title 11.519 Caesars’ wish,
however, was not granted. Unfortunately for Caesars, in the Seventh Circuit, where its bankruptcy
was being administered, “the section 105(a) injunction [was] a more limited remedy than in other
circuits.”520 For the court to “issue an injunction halting third-party litigation against a non-debtor
in another court[,] . . . the third party’s claims against the non-debtor [must] arise out of the same
acts as claims the bankruptcy estate has against the non-debtor[,]” wrote Judge Goldgar in his
memorandum opinion.521 Additionally, “both sets of claims [must be] claims to the same assets in
possession of the same defendants[.]”522 He explained that Caesars had failed to establish this:
“The debtors have not demonstrated that the claims the estates have against
CEC arise out of the same acts as the guaranty claims the defendants are
pursuing against CEC in Delaware and New York. As for [Caesars’]
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insurance, the policy may be property of the estate, but the proceeds are not.
CEC has an independent right under the policy to payment of its losses,
regardless of whether any other insured is a debtor in a bankruptcy case.”523
Consequently, Judge Goldgar entered an order denying the motion.524 Caesars did not give
up, though, filing an appeal two days later.525 The company even argued that the bankruptcy court’s
“conclusion that the Seventh Circuit [was] an outlier in its legal interpretation of the relief available
under Section 105(a) require[d] immediate review by the Seventh Circuit itself.”526 Caesars’
appeal would, in fact, eventually reach the Seventh Circuit. In the meantime, however, Judge
Robert W. Gettleman presided over the appeal for the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.527
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), the federal district court of “the judicial district in which
the bankruptcy judge is serving” has jurisdiction over appeals from that judge’s final orders.528
When reviewing an order denying an injunction, the district court’s review is limited to
determining whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion.529 The court abuses its discretion
where “it commits an error of law or makes a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” 530 Accordingly,
Judge Gettleman wrote that the district court “should reverse ‘only where no reasonable person
could take the view adopted by the [bankruptcy] court.’”531 Although he acknowledged that section
105(a) of the Code permits a bankruptcy court to stay actions “‘to which the debtor [is] not . . . a
party but which may affect the amount of property in the bankrupt estate, or the allocation of
property among creditors[,]’” Judge Gettleman agreed with Judge Goldgar that “[t]he bankruptcy
court's authority to enjoin actions under § 105(a) is not absolute[.]”532 He wrote that, when “third
parties are asserting individual personal claims (as opposed to general claims that belong to the
corporate debtor,) the court may enjoin prosecution only of claims that are sufficiently ‘related to’
claims brought on behalf of the estate in the bankruptcy case.”533 Determining whether such
523
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sufficiency existed, thus, was “a key component” in determining whether a section 105(a)
injunction should have been permitted.534
Judge Gettleman held that the “defendants’ claims against CEC [did] not in any way
depend on CEC's misconduct with respect to” Caesars, for their “claims [arose] out of CEC's
failure to honor guarantee agreements entered by CEC well before any of the alleged Disputed
Transactions.”535 While the “defendants’ claims involve[d] the same pool of money as [Caesars’]
claims, and that money [was] in the possession of the same defendant[,] [t]he claims [were] not,
however, based on the same acts[,]” and “[n]o other factors compel[led], or even support[ed] the
issuance of an injunction.”536 He, therefore, found Caesars’ “argument that [the] defendants’
claims against CEC ‘[arose] from the same capital market transactions involving debtors and their
debt,’ [to be] simply wrong.”537 Consequently, in the opinion of Judge Gettleman, Judge Goldgar
had not abused his discretion by denying the injunction after determining the claims Caesars had
against the non-debtors did not arise out of the same acts as the claims of the third parties.538
Caesars did not give up, however. The second denial of its injunction was only met by an
appeal to the Seventh Circuit.539 This time, Caesars was finally able to get an answer to an issue
which Judge Gettleman had purposely avoided in his opinion:
“Whether [the third-party's claims against a non-debtor arising out of the
same acts as the estate's claims] is a requirement for injunctive relief, as the
bankruptcy court held, or whether it is simply a key factor that may tip the
scale when no other factors mandate an injunction, is an issue that need not
be resolved here.”540
Judge Richard A. Posner—“the most-cited legal scholar on record”541—wrote the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion.542 He found that “nothing in . . . [section] 105(a) authorize[d] the limitation on
the powers of a bankruptcy judge that CEC's creditors (the guaranty plaintiffs) [had] successfully
urged on the judges below.”543 In his opinion, the lower courts’ narrow interpretation of section
105(a) led to those courts not asking the right question: “whether the injunction sought by [Caesars
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was] likely to enhance the prospects for a successful resolution of the disputes attending its
bankruptcy.”544 Judge Posner held that:
“If it [was], and its denial [would] thus endanger the success of the
bankruptcy proceedings, the grant of the injunction would, in the language
of section 105(a), be ‘appropriate to carry out the provisions’ of the
Bankruptcy Code, since successful resolution of disputes arising in
bankruptcy proceedings is one of the Code's central objectives.”545
After conducting this analysis, Judge Posner concluded that:
“If before [Caesars’] bankruptcy [was] wound up CEC [was] drained of
capital by the lenders' suits to enforce the guaranties that CEC had given
them, there [would] be that much less money for [Caesars’] creditors to
recover in the bankruptcy proceeding. [Caesars sought] on behalf of the
creditors to recover from CEC assets that CEC caused to be fraudulently
transferred to it from [Caesars], and to use the recovered assets to pay the
creditors. The less capital CEC [had] for [Caesars] to recapture through
prosecution or settlement of its fraudulent-transfer claims, the less money
its creditors [would] receive in the bankruptcy proceeding. Those creditors,
and [Caesars] as their debtor, thus [had] a direct and substantial interest in
the litigation between CEC and the firms to which it [had] issued guaranties.
That interest would be furthered by a temporary injunction staying the
lenders' lawsuits against CEC.”546
Thus, while not saying that the injunction sought by Caesars had to be granted, the Seventh
Circuit did find that both the bankruptcy court and district court had “erred in thinking that section
105(a) . . . foreclosed such a procedure.”547 Whether the injunction sought by Caesars was
appropriate was a factual question to be answered on remand, concluded the court. 548 Judge
Goldgar and the bankruptcy court, thus, had to make this factual determination.
One commentator noted that the Seventh Circuit’s decision was “likely to have a dramatic
impact in the highly-contested . . . bankruptcy case.”549 The commentator further pointed out that,
while “[t]he Seventh Circuit did not order the injunction be granted, . . . dicta from the opinion
certainly indicate[d] that the appellate court believe[d] that the injunction should be issued.”550
They even highlighted the wide-ranging implications of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, as “[t]he
test [it] enunciated . . . as to when non-debtor stays should be granted [was] arguably broad enough
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to capture any non-debtor against whom the debtor [had] claims.”551 In light of the fact that one
could easily “imagine a variety of situations in which the debtor’s parent company would have
potential liability to the debtor and other parties[,]” this commentator believed that, “[u]sing the
logic enunciated by the Seventh Circuit, a stay of claims against the non-debtor parent would
arguably be appropriate if the stay would allow the debtor to assert its claims and to thereby
enhance creditor recoveries.”552 Such a standard, of course, sets a very low bar for a section 105(a)
injunction to be issued, for, in most instances, the debtor asserting claims against a non-debtor will
enhance creditor recoveries. After all, money won by the debtor asserting claims against nondebtors will go to the estate, increasing the size of the pie creditors have to divide. Thus, another
commentator was led to observe that, while “[t]he breadth of section 105 [had] long been
interpreted broadly[,] . . . this ruling clearly position[ed] the Seventh Circuit as a court that
interprets section 105 even more broadly to protect debtors in chapter 11.”553
Accordingly, and to Caesars’ delight, Judge Goldgar granted the company’s wishes on
remand.554 Of the four lawsuits, Judge Goldgar temporarily enjoined one and, as to the other three
suits, continued Caesars’ motion to stay the litigation.555 The enjoined action sought to enforce
CEC’s guaranty obligations under its “2010 Indenture whereby CEC, as a signatory, ‘irrevocably
and unconditionally’ guaranteed to the Trustee”—BOKF, N.A. (“BOFK”)—“and each holder of
the 12.75% Second Lien Notes ‘the full and punctual payment when due’ of all obligations of
Caesars[.]”556 Judge Goldgar granted the injunction for three reasons: (1) its issuance would “likely
. . . enhance the prospects for a successful reorganization[;]” (2) its issuance would “serve the
public interest[;]” and (3) “the equities weigh[ed] in [Caesars’] favor.”557 An injunction would
likely enhance Caesars’ prospects for a successful reorganization, said Judge Goldgar, because it
would provide “a short spell . . . during which CEC [would] not [be] subject to the imminent threat
of an adverse judgment . . . [allowing] the parties [to] negotiate a consensual plan[.]”558 As for the
public interest—which, for bankruptcy purposes, is “the interest in successful reorganizations,
551
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since reorganizations preserve value for creditors and ultimately the public”—Judge Goldgar
believed that “[e]njoining the guaranty litigation . . . [served the public interest by] maintain[ing]
the value of those claims (by protecting the CEC assets that would pay them) while [also] allowing
settlement discussions [to be conducted without] the immediate threat of an adverse judgment.”559
Finally, in weighing the equities, Judge Goldgar concluded that they “heavily favor[ed] granting
the . . . motion.”560 He reached this conclusion by acknowledging that, if the litigation continued,
and the creditors obtained a judgment against CEC, that judgment could be worth “more than twice
the company’s value.”561 This, in turn, would force CEC into bankruptcy and render Caesars’
“chances of a global settlement in the . . . bankruptcy . . . slim[,]” as Caesars would “have to pursue
equitable remedies for the return of the assets transferred to CEC.”562 Judge Goldgar found that
this would effectively cause Caesars to “litigat[e] for the return of property from one estate to
another[.]”563 In the opinion of Millstein, the financial advisor and investment banker Caesars hired
for its restructuring,564 this would have created “one of the great messes of our time.”565
Accordingly, BOKF was “enjoined from pursuing the action . . . until (a) 60 days after the examiner
file[d] his initial report in the bankruptcy case, or (b) May 9, 2016, whichever [came] first.”566
In two of the three remaining lawsuits, Caesars agreed to have its motion continued because
it had requested a section 105(a) “injunction lasting 60 days from the filing of the examiner’s initial
report[,]” which would expire before the trial date set for those actions, thus making “an injunction
aimed at [them] . . . seem[] unnecessary.”567 Thus, Caesars agreed to “continu[e] the request . . .
until such time as [there was] further visibility into when the examiner’s report [would] come[]
out[.]”568 Caesars’ motion as to the last remaining lawsuit was also continued, not because Caesars
agreed to continue it, but because Judge Goldgar determined that there was not, at that time, any
need to enjoin it.569 Judge Goldgar reasoned that, because the lawsuit did not have a trial date set,
it would make no sense to go ahead and enjoin the action when it had already been agreed that the
other two lawsuits, which did have set trial dates, did not need to be enjoined.570
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Caesars, thus, was given “a critical window . . . to advance Plan negotiations toward a
consensual plan.”571 “With the help of a mediator,” Caesars was able to negotiate “a materially
enhanced contribution from CEC and its affiliates, and [make] substantial progress toward
resolving” its chapter 11.572 However, on May 9, 2016, the temporary injunction against BOKF
expired.573 Moreover, pursuant to summary judgment schedules, oral arguments were set to begin
for each lawsuit in mid- or late-June of that year, with a “global” trial set to begin, if necessary, on
August 22nd.574 Caesars, accordingly, filed a motion on June 6, 2016, whereby the company
requested that the court “enjoin the Guaranty Creditors from further prosecuting their guaranty
suits until the Court issue[d] its decision confirming or denying confirmation of [Caesars’]
Plan.”575 However, because “rulings on dispositive motions [were] imminent,” Caesars sought “a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the parties from proceeding with oral arguments scheduled
for June 16 . . . and June 24 in New York to provide the Court time to determine whether to enter
the preliminary injunction.”576
Caesars asserted that, because it only needed to demonstrate that a temporary injunction
was “likely to enhance the prospects for a successful resolution of the disputes attending . . . [the]
bankruptcy[,]” and the guaranty litigation threatened the only thing making the Plan possible, a
temporary injunction should be issued.577 After all, urged Caesars, the “imminent potential multibillion dollar judgments in the guaranty litigation” would greatly imperil CEC’s proposed $4
billion contribution under the Plan.578 Judge Goldgar granted Caesars’ wish and entered an order
continuing the adversary proceeding until August 17, 2016.579 This deadline was later extended
until August 29th.580
On August 8th, though, Caesars filed another motion, once again seeking to enjoin its
creditors from prosecuting the guaranty lawsuits “until the first omnibus hearing after the Court
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issue[d] its decision confirming or denying confirmation of the . . . plan of reorganization[.]”581
Caesars believed the litigation should not be allowed to advance since it had made “substantial
progress towards a fully consensual plan with numerous key stakeholders[,]” obtaining the support
of an estimated $14 billion of its $18 billion capital structure. 582 Again, Caesars urged upon the
court that the litigation would threaten CEC’s contribution under the plan, and that, “[w]ithout
CEC’s contribution, there [was] no Plan.”583
Two of Caesars’ creditors, BOKF and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (“WSFS”),
were unperturbed, however, and “served requests for production on” Caesars the next day and also
informed the company of their intent to depose the two independent directors who comprised
Caesars’ Special Governance Committee.584 Through negotiations between the parties’ attorneys,
all but one issue got resolved: “WSFS [still] refused to withdraw the deposition notice for [one of
the independent directors,] Mr. Stauber.”585 In response, Caesars filed a “motion for a protective
order to prevent a deposition [it deemed] irrelevant to the issues presented in [its just-filed] 105
Extension Motion[.]”586 Not even an hour later, WSFS filed a motion to compel Stauber’s
deposition.587 WSFS argued that it was August 12th, and that the deadline Judge Goldgar had set
for resolution of the issues was fast approaching, yet WSFS had still not been allowed to conduct
“discovery as to all of [the relevant] issues, factual assertions and arguments[.]”588 Thus, WSFS
sought authority to depose Stauber “regarding his personal knowledge of [the] negotiations and
discussions that [had] taken place since” Judge Goldgar’s last order continuing the adversary
proceeding.589 Apparently, WSFS was distrustful of either the progress Caesars was actually
making towards a consensual restructuring plan or of what was actually being agreed to during
those negotiations.590 Judge Goldgar sided with the creditor this time, granting WSFS’s motion to
compel and ordering Caesars to make Stauber “available for deposition on or before August 22,
Debtors’ Motion to Extend the Section 105 Injunction Enjoining Defendants from Further Prosecuting Their
Guaranty Lawsuits [105Adversary284.pdf], at 1, In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-00149 (ABG)
(Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Aug. 8, 2016).
582
Id. at 1–2.
583
Id. at 5.
584
Debtors’ Motion for a Protective Order Forbidding Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB from Deposing
CEOC Director Ronen Stauber for the 105 Hearing [105Adversary286.pdf], at 2, In re Caesars Entertainment
Operating Co., 15-00149 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Aug. 12, 2016); see also supra Part VII (discussing the
Special Governance Committee).
585
Debtors’ Motion for a Protective Order Forbidding Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB from Deposing
CEOC Director Ronen Stauber for the 105 Hearing [105Adversary286.pdf], at 3, In re Caesars Entertainment
Operating Co., 15-00149 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Aug. 12, 2016).
586
Id.
587
Motion of Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB to Compel Deposition of Ronen Stauber
[105Adversary287.pdf], In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-00149 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed
Aug. 12, 2016).
588
Id. at 3–4.
589
Id. at 6.
590
See id. at 3.
581

81

2016.”591 Finally, on August 26th, three days before the injunction was set to expire, Judge Goldgar
made his decision.592 To Caesars’ dismay, Judge Goldgar denied its motion to extend the section
105 injunction.593
Caesars appealed immediately.594 The appeal proved unnecessary, however, as Caesars
was “able to achieve a consensual plan with all of [the] creditor groups” shortly thereafter.595
Caesars announced “an agreement in principle” on September 27th, which it expected all of the
guaranty litigants to consent to – that is, aside from Trilogy Portfolio Company, LLC
(“Trilogy”).596 Consequently, Caesars filed a motion seeking a section 105 injunction enjoining
Trilogy from continuing to prosecute its action.597 Caesars pointed to the fact that Trilogy had
rejected the same offer “that the Noteholder Committee—which represent[ed] debt that [was]
senior to Trilogy’s holdings—and other unsecured noteholders [had] accepted: a 65% recovery
plus attorneys’ fees.”598 Further, Caesars asserted that:
“If [Trilogy] accepted [the deal], Trilogy would recover at least $11 million
on its $9.4 million claim. [But] [i]f Trilogy prevail[ed] in the guaranty
litigation, it [would] do no better and perhaps worse as its attorneys’ fees
[were] unlikely to be reimbursed. [And,] as Trilogy admitted before [the]
Court, it [was] seeking roughly a 150% recovery on its claim.”599
Judge Goldgar sided with Caesars, granting the injunction.600 He found that “each of the
elements necessary for injunctive relief against Trilogy . . . under section 105” had been
established.601 After all, Caesars had a likelihood of successful reorganization, letting the litigation
proceed would threaten the reorganization, the equities weighed in Caesars’ favor since Trilogy,
compared to the $18 billion at stake, was “a comparatively small unsecured creditor,” and “[t]he
public interests in settlements and in successful reorganizations favor[ed] issuance of the
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injunction.”602 Judge Goldgar ordered that the injunction “remain in effect until the earlier of (a)
the first omnibus hearing after the court . . . confrim[ed] or deni[ed] confirmation of the plan[,] . .
. (b) the termination of any restructuring support agreement with the [Noteholder Committee], or
(c) further order of the court.”603
Later on, following the confirmation of the plan on January 17, 2017, the parties agreed to
keep the injunction “in place until the earlier of (a) the Effective Date of the plan . . . (b) the
termination of any restructuring support agreement with the [Noteholder Committee], or (c) further
order of the Court.”604 Accordingly, Trilogy’s appeal of Judge Goldgar’s order granting a section
105 injunction was dismissed by stipulation.605 Then, finally, on October 17, 2017—more than
two years after this adversary proceeding commenced—the parties stipulated to dismiss the
lawsuits altogether.606 The Plan had gone into effect eleven days prior, rendering pursuit of the
actions pointless.607
B. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (“UCC”) Lien
Challenge Adversary Proceeding
Contemporaneous with its Lien Standing Motion—discussed in Part XII.A of this paper—
the UCC filed a Lien Challenge Adversary on August 7, 2015.608 In contrast to the UCC Lien
Standing Motion, though, the committee’s Lien Challenge Adversary sought “standing to pursue
various causes of action . . . for which the [UCC] believe[d] it already [had] standing to pursue.”609
“The UCC commence[d] [the] adversary proceeding to challenge and object to certain claims and
stipulations” contained in the Final Cash Collateral Order.610 Specifically, the UCC brought this
action due to paragraph 12 of the order, which said that Caesars’ “stipulations in paragraph E of
the Final Cash Collateral Order . . . [would] be binding on all parties in interest, including the
UCC, unless the UCC challenge[d] such stipulations.”611 The UCC wanted these stipulations to be
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ruled non-binding because, if they were found binding, the UCC would be unable to bring the
causes of action it wished to pursue.
In its complaint, the UCC named five defendants, all of whom should be familiar to you,
the reader, from earlier portions of this paper: (1) Credit Suisse AG was sued in its capacities as
First Lien Collateral Agent and First Lien Administrative Agent; (2) Delaware Trust Company,
FSB was sued in its capacity as the Second Lien Collateral Agent and was also sued in its capacity
as the Delaware Trust Trustee under an indenture pursuant to which Harrah’s Operating Company
(“HOC”), the predecessor to our Caesars, “issued 10.00% Second Priority Senior Secured Notes
due 2015 and 10.00% Second Priority Senior Secured Notes due 2018[;]” (3) UMB Bank, N.A.
was sued in its capacity as the “indenture trustee, paying agent, and notes custodian under” an
indenture pursuant to which HOC had “issued 12.75% Second Priority Senior Secured Notes due
2018[;]” and (4) WSFS was sued in its capacity as trustee under an indenture pursuant to which
HOC had “issued 10.00% Second Priority Senior Secured Notes due 2018.”612
The complaint raised five issues. First, the UCC attacked what its complaint deemed the
“Recourse Stipulation.”613 This stipulation of paragraph E to the Final Cash Collateral Order stated
that Caesars “and each of the Subsidiary Pledgors . . . were ‘indebted and liable’ for the full amount
of the First Lien Debt as of the Petition Date[.]”614 The UCC found this contradictory of the First
Lien Collateral Agreement, which provided that “no recourse [would] be had . . . for any payment
of the Obligations, against [any Subsidiary Pledgor] or the assets of any [Subsidiary Pledgor],
other than the Collateral[.]”615 Thus, the UCC asserted that “[t]he Subsidiary Pledgors are
obligated on the First Lien Debt only to the extent of the assets they pledged as collateral for the
loans made to [Caesars,]” not for the full amount of the First Lien Debt.616 After all, reasoned the
UCC, the Subsidiary Pledgors had “only pledged their assets[;]” they had not guaranteed the
debt.617 The UCC, therefore, requested for the court to “issue a declaratory judgment that the
Recourse Stipulation [was]: (i) inaccurate . . . and (ii) not binding on the Debtors’ estates and all
parties in interest.”618
Second, the UCC attacked what its complaint deemed the “Lien Stipulation.”619 This
stipulation of paragraph E proclaimed that, “as of the Petition Date, all security interests, liens, and
mortgages granted to the First Lien Collateral Agent, on behalf of the First Lien Secured Parties,
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were ‘valid, binding, enforceable, non-avoidable, and properly perfected[.]’”620 The UCC
disagreed, arguing that “[c]ertain of the security interests, liens, and mortgages purportedly granted
to the First Lien Collateral Agent in commercial tort claims, insurance policy claims, [and] gaming
licenses[,]” to name just a few examples, were not so.621 Thus, again, the UCC claimed a
stipulation contained in paragraph E of the Final Cash Collateral Order was inaccurate.622
Accordingly, the UCC asked the court to also “issue a declaratory judgment that the Lien
Stipulation [was]: (i) inaccurate . . . and (ii) . . . not binding on the Debtors’ estates and all parties
in interest.”623
Third, the UCC attacked what its complaint deemed the “Subsidiary Pledgor Stipulation”
on the same grounds.624 The stipulation stated that, “as of the petition date, all obligations of the
Subsidiary Pledgors were ‘legal, valid, binding, enforceable, and non-avoidable[,]” yet “the Final
Cash Collateral Order [did] not identify any specific Subsidiary Pledgors.”625 The UCC argued
that, because 32 of the debtors in this consolidated chapter 11 case “were not parties to the First
Lien Financing Documents[,]” the Subsidiary Pledgor Stipulation was inaccurate and non-binding
on those Non-Pledgor Debtors.626 The complaint, therefore, requested that the court enter a
declaratory judgment to that effect.627
Fourth, the UCC attacked what its complaint deemed the “Fee and Charges Stipulations,”
under which the Debtors stipulated that “both the First Lien Debt and the Second Lien Debt
included certain fees, costs, and other charges[,]” such as default interest, premiums, professional
fees, and indemnities as secured claims.628 In the UCC’s opinion:
“The Fee and Charges Stipulations [did] not relieve the First Lien Secured
Parties and Second Lien Secured Parties of the requirement to demonstrate:
(i) that they [were] oversecured on a debtor-by-debtor basis; and (ii)
otherwise entitled by the underlying documentation and applicable law to
default interest, premiums, indemnities, and reasonable professional fees.
Absent such a showing, [the First and Second Lien Secured Parties were]
unable to recover any amounts on account of the postpetition fees, costs,
and other charges described in the Fee and Charges Stipulations.”629
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Consequently, the UCC once again asked the court to “issue a declaratory judgment that
the Fee and Charges Stipulations in the Final Cash Collateral Order: (i) [did] not establish or relieve
the First Lien Secured Parties and Second Lien Secured Parties from having to establish [these
requirements] . . . and (ii) [were] not binding on the Debtors’ estates and all parties in interest.”630
Finally, the UCC sought a declaratory judgment that: (1) the First and Second Lien
Collateral Agents, acting on behalf of the First and Second Lien Secured Parties, had “waived
[their rights] to assert unsecured deficiency claims against the Subsidiary Pledgors pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code section 1111(b)[,]” (2) that “the Defendants [were] not entitled to assert
unsecured deficiency claims against the Subsidiary Pledgors[,]” and (3) that “the Subsidiary
Pledgors [were] not liable for payment of the First and Second Lien Debt beyond the value of the
pledged First Lien Collateral and Second Lien Collateral.”631 Section 1111(b)(1)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code “provides that ‘[a] claim secured by a lien on property of the estate [is treated]
the same as if the holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim,
whether or not the holder of such claim has such recourse.’”632 Therefore, the First and Second
Lien Collateral Agents believed they could assert deficiency claims as if they did have recourse.
The UCC, however, reasoned that, because the Subsidiary Pledgors only made nonrecourse
pledges under the First and Second Lien Collateral Agreements, the Collateral Agents (1) had
waived their rights to assert unsecured deficiency claims and (2) were prohibited from “pursuing
the Subsidiary Pledgors for payment of the First and Second Lien Debt beyond the value of the
pledged First Lien Collateral and Second Lien Collateral.”633 After all, the Collateral Agreements
had waived recourse “under any law,” which would, of course, include section 1111(b)(1).634
In response to this complaint, the defendants filed a series of motions to extend their time
to respond, all of which were granted.635 Finally, on March 2, 2016, BOKF and WSFS filed a joint
motion to dismiss the UCC’s complaint.636 Specifically, the motion attacked the fifth issue raised
by the UCC in its complaint: that the defendants had “waived their right to assert unsecured
deficiency claims against the Subsidiary Pledgors . . . and otherwise [were] not entitled to assert
such claims against the Subsidiary Pledgors or recover payment from them beyond the value of
the Collateral.”637 BOKF and WSFS relied on a Seventh Circuit decision, In re Wright, 492 F.3d
829 (7th Cir. 2009), as making “clear that a ‘contract-defeating provision’ in the Bankruptcy Code
630
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defeats any contrary language in the contract.”638 The defendants believed that section 1111(b)(1)
was such a “contract-defeating provision.”639 Therefore, the defendants argued that the Second
Lien Collateral Agreement did not constitute a waiver of their right to assert unsecured deficiency
claims pursuant that section.640 They put it this way:
“[B]ecause the purported waiver [was] contained within the very agreement
whose limitations [were] ‘surpassed’ by section 1111(b)(1) . . . the UCC’s
argument is circular and unavailing. If accepted, the UCC’s position would
enable borrowers to draft non-recourse provisions in a manner that would
eviscerate the benefits afforded to secured creditors under section
1111(b)(1), in contravention of well settled rules of statutory
interpretation.”641
Moreover, BOKF and WSFS argued that, even if section 1111(b)(1) is not “contractdefeating,” the plain language of the Second Lien Collateral Agreement made clear that the section
at issue, Section 7.17, did not constitute a waiver.642 That section of the agreement began by
providing that, “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, no recourse shall be
had, whether by levy or execution, or under any law[,]” and ended by stating, “it being expressly
understood that the sole remedies available to the Collateral Agent and the Secured Parties
pursuant to this Agreement with respect to the Obligations shall be against the Collateral.”643
Accordingly, the defendants made the following argument:
“The opening phrase of the provision, ‘[n]otwithstanding anything to the
contrary in this Agreement,’ defines and limits its scope, which excludes
applicability of the Bankruptcy Code. Had it been possible for the provision
to override a statute, and had the parties intended to do so, that opening
phrase should have been drafted to read ‘Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in this Agreement or under any law, . . .’ When read together with
the last part of the provision, which states ‘it being expressly understood
that the sole remedies available to the Collateral Agent and the Secured
Parties pursuant to this Agreement with respect to the Obligations shall be
against the Collateral,’ it is evident that the drafters did not intend to provide
for a waiver of statutory rights, and that Section 7.17 is nothing more than
a garden variety non-recourse provision of the kind that section
1111(b)(A)(1) was designed to override.”644
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Then, as a last resort, BOKF and WSFS argued that, no matter what, a waiver under Section
7.17 would be unenforceable under New York law.645 The defendants asserted that, under that
state’s law, “parties cannot waive statutory and/or constitutional rights if ‘such waiver contravenes
public policy considerations.’”646 They believed a waiver “would contravene public policy by
undermining the purpose of [section 1111(b)], which is intended to apply whether or not the
agreement provides for recourse.”647 Further, the defendants argued that “any waiver of rights
under section 1111(b) would also contravene well established public policy in favor of protecting
secured creditors.”648 Thus, for all these reasons, BOKF and WSFS asserted that the fifth issue
raised in the UCC’s complaint—Count V—“should be dismissed with prejudice.”649
Five days later, Delaware Trust Company (“DTC”) filed a motion seeking to dismiss Count
IV of the UCC’s complaint, which sought to have the Fee and Charges Stipulations ruled nonbinding.650 DTC sought to have Count IV dismissed on procedural grounds, relying on Rules
12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.651 Rule 12(b)(1) attacks claims for a “lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction[,]” while Rule 12(b)(6) attacks claims for “fail[ing] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted[.]”652 DTC contended that “[t]he UCC [had] neither identified,
nor even alleged, any ambiguity in the language of the Stipulation[s] that merit[ed] judicial
clarification or interpretation – much less what the UCC [was] actually requesting: judicial
embellishment.”653 Courts must “not rewrite a contract, but [instead] enforce its terms as
written[,]” urged DTC.654 Thus, by having “not allege[d] a single fact regarding fees, charges, or
collateral valuation [that] put [the] issues into controversy[,]” the UCC had not, in the eyes of
DTC, “prove[n] the existence of an ‘actual controversy.’”655 And, according to DTC, the
Declaratory Judgment Act made clear that the UCC had to do so to receive its declaratory judgment
as to Count IV.656 Therefore, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the UCC’s request for declaratory
judgment had to “be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction[,]” urged DTC.657 Moreover,
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DTC believed that, because Count IV had not presented an actual controversy, it had failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted, thus making Count IV dismissible under Rule 12(b)(6)
as well.658
The UCC submitted a response the next day to the motion filed by BOKF and WSFS,
asserting that the motion to dismiss was unnecessary, as “[t]he UCC . . . intended to defer litigation
in the . . . Adversary Proceeding indefinitely pending resolution of the First Lien Claim
Objections.”659 The First Lien Claim Objections that the UCC’s response references are the
1111(b) Claim Objections discussed in Part XIII of this paper. The UCC was willing to defer
litigation of its Lien Challenge Adversary until the resolution of the 1111(b) Claim Objections
because:
“With respect to . . . section 1111(b), . . . they present[ed] substantively
identical legal issues—namely, (a) whether the applicable secured creditors
waived their right to assert, or cap their recovery on, deficiency claims
against . . . [the Subsidiary Pledgors] under their respective collateral
agreements, and (b) whether such waiver, or cap, [was] enforceable in
bankruptcy.”660
Accordingly, two weeks later, all of the parties stipulated to “amend the [UCC’s]
Complaint to delete Count V[.]”661 However, because “[t]he Amended Complaint did not amend
Count IV, . . . the Count IV Motion to Dismiss continue[d] . . . pending[.]”662 The bankruptcy court
entered an order shortly thereafter which extended the time that the Defendants and the UCC had
to respond to the Amended Complaint and the Count IV Motion to Dismiss respectively. 663 The
UCC would later file another motion to extend its time to respond, “believ[ing] such an extension
[would be] in the best interests of the UCC, the Debtors, and their creditors” while they continued
to negotiate towards a consensual plan of reorganization.664 In its motion, the UCC stated that, if
a plan “acceptable to the UCC [was] confirmed, [became] effective, and [was] fully consummated,
[it would] seek the voluntary dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding[.]”665 The motion was
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granted,666 and, ultimately, the UCC would dismiss its Lien Challenge Adversary Proceeding five
days after the effective date of Caesars’ plan of reorganization.667
C. The National Retirement Fund (the “NRF”) Adversary Proceeding
and Related Litigation in the Southern District of New York
1. The NRF Adversary Proceeding
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) regulates “two types
of employment benefit plans[:] pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans.”668 Under ERISA,
“pension plan[s] must comply with complex rules concerning employee participation, distribution
and vesting of benefits, benefit funding requirements and” more.669 Prior to the petition date,
Caesars had obligations related to its “contributions to the National Retirement Fund (the ‘NRF’),
a multiemployer pension fund within the meaning of ERISA[.]”670 The NRF, as noted in Part VI.A
of this paper, was also a member of the UCC.
In the aftermath of the controversial transactions described in Part III.B, the NRF
threatened Caesars, CEC, and other affiliates with expulsion from the Fund.671 The threatened
expulsion would have “trigger[ed] approximately $480 million of withdrawal liability.”672 While
“disput[ing] the NRF’s ability to do so[,]” Caesars, CEC, and CERP entered a standstill agreement
to protect their interests.673 Under the agreement, the NRF promised not to expel Caesars or any
of its affiliates in exchange for a commitment from Caesars “to provide the NRF with five days’
notice of certain ‘insolvency events[.]’”674 Caesars, however, later terminated the agreement when
it determined that chapter 11 was imminent.675 On the same day, CEC commenced a lawsuit
against the NRF, seeking a declaratory judgment that the NRF did “not have the authority to refuse
contributions” or “take any action [to] . . . cause the involuntary withdrawal of any member of the
Caesars Group[.]”676
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The NRF expelled Caesars from its fund in response and demanded it “pay the liability as
the debt-laden [company] prepared to file for Chapter 11[.]”677 Jim Brubaker, the chairman of the
Fund, was quoted as giving the following justification:
“We did not start this. Caesars started this, and had Caesars not done what
they were going to do, and did do, we would never have taken these actions
. . . The ongoing bankruptcy is going to divide the company and the
ownership group . . . When that happens, we no longer have the ability to
pursue the other parts of Caesars — the so-called good Caesars — for the
obligations of the bad Caesars. So we had to act before the bankruptcy.”678
In response to this demand by the NRF, which was made after the involuntary bankruptcy
petition was filed against Caesars in Delaware, Caesars commenced an adversary proceeding
against the Fund (the “NRF Adversary”).679 Caesars alleged that the NRF, in making the demand,
had violated the automatic stay imposed by section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.680 That section
of the Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition, whether voluntary or involuntary,
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” which essentially prohibits the debtor’s creditors
from making any further collection efforts.681 In its complaint, Caesars argued that, while the NRF
had “cagily sent . . . [the] Demand only to [Caesars’] non-debtor affiliates, the effect [was] as if
the demand had been sent to [Caesars] itself.”682 After all, urged Caesars, ERISA made Caesars
“and [the] non-debtor affiliates a single ‘controlled group’ for the purposes of the act and any
withdrawal liability thereunder.”683 Thus, in the eyes of Caesars, “[n]otice to any one member
[was] notice to all.”684
Also, on that day—March 6, 2015—Caesars filed a motion (the “Expulsion Motion”) in its
main bankruptcy proceeding whereby it requested the bankruptcy court enter an order: (1)
“enforcing the automatic stay with respect to the decision of . . . NRF . . . to expel [the Caesars
Group] . . . from the NRF,” (2) “voiding such expulsion,” (3) “holding the NRF and [its] trustees
. . . in contempt of court imposing sanctions for willful violations of the automatic stay, and” (4)
“granting related relief.”685 Hitting similar themes as the NRF Adversary, the Expulsion Motion
677
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pointed out that, under section 362(a)(1), the automatic stay “is not limited solely to the parties
actually named in an action or proceeding, but rather . . . [applies to] any action against the ‘real
party in interest in the matter.’”686 Moreover, because “[t]he automatic stay . . . applie[d] ‘to any
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control
over property of the estate[,]’” Caesars believed section 362(a)(3) had been violated because “the
provision ‘bar[red] actions against even third-parties that would have an adverse impact on the
property of the estate.”687 Caesars also found it telling that the NRF Trustees had “styled their
actions in such a way as to attempt to avoid the most blatant of violations of the automatic stay . .
. cagily stating that the Expulsion Notices should not be construed as violating the automatic
stay.”688 Thus, the Expulsion Motion asked the court to exercise its “civil contempt powers
pursuant to section 105(a)” of the Code and sanction the NRF Trustees for “[a] willful violation
of the automatic stay[, which] occurs [where] the creditor has knowledge of bankruptcy petition
and commits a deliberate act in violation of the stay.”689
Furthermore, back in the NRF Adversary Proceeding, Caesars filed a motion to extend the
automatic stay to enjoin the NRF from seeking payments and prevent certain legal processes
related to Caesars’ expulsion from the Fund from moving forward.690 Caesars argued an immediate
interim stay should be granted so as to provide time for the violation of the automatic stay claims
to be litigated.691 And, even if no violation of the automatic stay was found, Caesars still asserted
that an extension of the stay would be warranted to afford Caesars time to address the NRF’s
claims in its “own bankruptcy proceedings, and not in collateral proceedings elsewhere.”692
The parties, however, were able to reach another standstill agreement pursuant to which
the Caesars Group would continue make “monthly payments to the NRF at the [same] rate and on
the same terms . . . it [would] have been obligated to . . . had an alleged withdrawal not
occurred[.]”693 Judge Goldgar entered an order on March 30, 2015, confirming the agreement and
setting a briefing schedule to address the issues raised in the motions and NRF Adversary. 694 By
November, the process had played out, and Judge Goldgar issued his opinion wherein he denied
Caesars’ motions seeking to enforce the automatic stay and, thus, have the payment demands
686
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voided.695 Judge Goldgar found Caesars’ arguments entirely unavailing, agreeing with the NRF
that the automatic stay does not protect non-debtors and their property.696 Therefore, by only
“attempting to collect withdrawal liability . . . [from] non-debtors, the NRF [had] not violate[d]
the stay.”697 Unlike Caesars, who found the NRF’s demand stating that “nothing in it should be
deemed to violate the stay in the involuntary case” to be nefarious, Judge Goldgar cited it as
supportive of the fact that NRF never “direct[ed] any sort of action against any debtor or any
property of the estate in any debtor’s bankruptcy case.”698 In response to Caesars’ argument that,
under ERISA, trying to collect from one was trying to collect from all, Judge Goldgar pointed out
that it had two flaws.699 First, because ERISA imposed joint and several liability on the Caesars
Group, “the party to whom liability [was] owed ‘[could] choose to collect the entire indebtedness
from one or more of the liable parties, to the exclusion of others.’”700 Second, the relief Caesars
requested “conflict[ed] with the purpose of withdrawal liability under ERISA.”701 ERISA makes
“[w]ithdrawal liability . . . the compulsory responsibility of the entire controlled group . . . to
prevent an employer ‘from shirking [its] ERISA obligations by fractionalizing operations into
many separate entities,’ . . . avoiding liability by ‘shifting its assets to its back pockets.’”702
Consequently, Judge Goldgar believed Caesars was trying to “turn ERISA against itself” by
“tak[ing] ERISA provisions designed to expand withdrawal liability beyond the withdrawing
employer and, in tandem with the automatic stay . . . , use[] them to restrict that liability.”703
Caesars filed an appeal.704 However, the parties agreed to delay the appeal while they
negotiated towards a potential settlement.705 This settlement would not be reached until March of
2017 when CEC and the NRF reached a settlement whereby CEC would pay the NRF $45 million
in exchange for the NRF dropping its $363.6 million withdrawal liability claim against Caesars.706
Pursuant to the settlement, Caesars had no payment obligations other than those imposed by the
plan, which had just been confirmed in January.707 CEC touted the settlement as “a benefit to
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Caesars because it [was] less than what the company [could] have [had] to pay if [it was] required
catch up on [the] missed withdrawal liability payments.”708
2. Related Litigation in the Southern District of New York
A week after Caesars filed its motion in the NRF Adversary to extend the automatic stay—
where Caesars argued that, even if no violation of the stay was found, it should be allowed to
address NRF’s claims in its own bankruptcy proceeding709—NRF filed a lawsuit against CEC and
CERP in the Southern District of New York, seeking to hold the Caesars affiliates “liable for the
first installment payment, the full amount of the prejudgment interest attributable to the first
installment payment, liquidated damages . . . , and [the NRF’s] costs and expenses incurred in
connection with [the] action.”710 CEC and CERP moved to dismiss the lawsuit “on ripeness
grounds and for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”711 The Caesars affiliates argued there was a lack of ripeness because, under the
standstill agreement reached between the NRF and the Caesars Group, no installment payment
was yet due, meaning CEC and CERP had not defaulted.712 The NRF opposed this motion, and
Magistrate Judge James L. Cott was left to resolve the issue.713 Magistrate Cott first pointed out
that, under ERISA, the type of dispute at issue—one “between an employer and plan sponsor of a
multiemployer plan”—had to resolved via arbitration.714 Despite CEC and CERP asserting that
there was not a dispute due to its belief “that the Standstill Agreement [made] clear that no payment
[was] currently due[,]” Magistrate Cott determined that a dispute did indeed exist.715 After all, the
NRF alleged that “payment [was] still due despite the Standstill Agreement because its carveout
language [made] the Standstill Agreement inapplicable to [the] case.”716 The agreement, in
pertinent part, provided that “[n]othing in [the] Agreement [would] be construed to limit the rights
of the Parties in, or the powers of the court[], in” NRF’s action against CEC and CERP.717
Accordingly, the Magistrate recommended that CEC’s motion to dismiss be denied.718
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Subsequently, the NRF “sought leave to file a motion for summary judgment.”719 The court
granted the request over CEC and CERP’s objections, and, upon the NRF filing its motion,
Magistrate Cott once again had to decide the matter.720 Magistrate Cott determined “that the
Standstill Agreement . . . [did] not operate to forestall or reduce the amount of the First Installment
Payment that [the NRF] claim[ed] [was] due[,]” so the issue had to be arbitrated.721 He,
accordingly, recommended that the NRF’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that
CEC and CERP be ordered to “pay $7,862,140.79, which [was] comprised of the First Installment
Payment ($5,981,493.64), interest that accrued on the First Installment Payment as of the date of
[the NRF’s] motion ($684,348.42), and liquidated damages ($1,196,298.73).”722
An objection to the magistrate’s report of course followed, but District Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan, presiding over the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
“agree[d] entirely with Magistrate Judge Cott.”723 Accordingly, Judge Kaplan adopted Magistrate
Cott’s recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor of the NRF. 724 Consequently,
approximately $7.9 million in liability was imposed on CEC and CERP.
D. Second Lien RSA Adversary Proceeding
On August 10, 2015, the Noteholder Committee commenced an adversary proceeding
against CEC “to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief regarding CEC’s unlawful effort to
purchase votes from holders of Second Priority Notes pursuant to the” Second Lien RSA Caesars
negotiated with certain noteholders, but which never became effective.725 The Noteholder
Committee took issue with:
“CEC . . . agree[ing] to make payments to Second Priority Noteholders who
become parties to the Second [Lien] RSA by a specified date . . . in exchange
for the agreement of those holders, among other things: (a) to vote in favor
of a Plan that provide[d] a broad release of valuable estate and third-party
claims against CEC and its affiliates, and enable[d] CEC to retain ownership
and control of [Caesars] in violation of the absolute priority rule; and (b)
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not to support or vote for any alternative plan or restructuring of
[Caesars].”726
In the view of the Noteholder Committee, such an “effort by a non-debtor insider to buy
votes in favor of [a] Plan threaten[ed] irreparable harm not only to the Second Priority Noteholders
. . . but to all parties in interest in the bankruptcy[.]”727 After all, the Committee believed that:
“CEC’s vote-buying efforts [would] result in a fatally-flawed solicitation
process and cause irreparable harm to all Second Priority Noteholders,
including those who [would] be deprived of hundreds of millions of dollars
if they [chose] not to sign the Second [Lien] RSA and those who [were]
coerced into signing the Second [Lien] RSA and then face[d] the prospect
of designation of their votes.”728
Accordingly, the Noteholder Committee also filed a motion which asked the court to
impose “a preliminary injunction to prohibit . . . CEC . . . from paying or agreeing to pay or provide
any consideration to holders of Second Priority Notes in exchange for a vote in favor of a plan of
reorganization proposed by [Caesars] or against any alternative plan.”729 However, after a few
preliminary hearings were held on the issue, the Noteholder Committee and CEC were able to
reach an agreement, stipulating to dismiss the Second Lien RSA Adversary.730

Part XV: To Fold or to Call, That is the Question – The Rejection and
Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
The opening bet has been placed; the poker game is underway. The next player up checks
his cards and weighs whether he should fold or call. If he does not like his hand, he will fold,
“relinquishing [his] cards and taking no further part in the hand.”731 However, if he does like his
hand, he will call, “matching the amount already bet in order to see the next card[.]”732 In this Part,
we discuss how Caesars, much like our hypothetical poker player weighing his hand, looked at its
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prepetition executory contracts733 and unexpired leases and determined whether to reject (fold) or
assume (call) them.
According to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), a debtor-in-possession, “subject to the court’s approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”734 Moreover,
“[p]rior to the Petition Date and in the ordinary course of business, the Debtors entered into
thousands of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases.735 In the most recent Disclosure
Statement, the Debtors stated that they had “filed five omnibus motions (the ‘Contract Rejection
Motions’) seeking to reject a total of fifteen Executory Contracts in the aggregate [Docket Nos.
378, 666, 1175, 1755, 1863],” and the Court had approved the relief sought in twelve of these
contracts.736 Later, in April of 2015, the Debtors filed a “Motion for Entry of an Order (I)
Extending the Time Within Which the Debtors Must Assume or Reject Unexpired Leases of
Nonresidential Real Property and (II) Granting Related Relief [Docket No. 1176], whereby the
Debtors requested a 90-day extension to assume or reject unexpired leases of nonresidential real
property through and including August 13, 2015.”737 Shortly thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court
granted the relief requested and extended “the time by which the Debtors must assume or reject
such leases until August 13, 2015.”738 This was done in accordance with § 365(d)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which states:
“(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), an unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property under which the debtor is the lessee shall be deemed rejected, and
the trustee shall immediately surrender that nonresidential real property to
the lessor, if the trustee does not assume or reject the unexpired lease by the
earlier of—
(i) the date that is 210 days after the date of the order for relief; or
(ii) the date of the entry of an order confirming a plan.”739
In other words, the Debtors had to use this extra time to decide which leases they should
assume, reject, or seek a further extension. They did just this, finding around 53 leases to go
through this analysis for.740 Factors that aided in this analysis included whether the lease:
“(a) [was] operationally indispensable; (b) generate[d] a net economic
benefit for the Debtors’ Estates (e.g., whether the related hotel and/or casino
733
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[was] profitable); (c) contain[ed] market or fair and reasonable terms under
the circumstances; (d) counterparty [had] recently renegotiated, or refused
to renegotiate, the lease on more favorable terms; (e) [was] replaceable by
another lease, including the costs associated with such replacement; (f)
[had] strategic or intrinsic real estate value; (g) support[ed] services that are
standard to, if not necessary to remain competitive in, the gaming industry;
and (h) [had] any defaults to cure and the costs thereof.”741
Shortly thereafter, and before the 365(d)(4) deadline, the Debtors filed a motion on July 30,
2015, seeking “to assume thirty-one unexpired leases, reject two unexpired leases, and further
extend (with written consent from the applicable lease counterparty) the Section 365(d)(4)
Deadline with respect to twenty unexpired leases.”742
Additionally, the Debtors estimated they had obtained, at a minimum, $15.4 million in
annual savings “from the various Contract Rejection Motions, through the assignment of certain
leases to CES, and through the rejection of certain unexpired nonresidential real property
leases.”743

Part XVI: Dealing in Texas Hold’em – The Evolution of Caesars’ Plan of
Reorganization
In a variant of poker known as Texas Hold’em, the cards are dealt in a very specific
order. First, two so-called hole cards are dealt.745 These are the “cards which are only viewable
and usable by the player.”746 Then, comes the flop: “three cards are dealt face-up to the center of
the table[,]” where they serve as community cards, which are “cards that everyone may
incorporate in [their] hand.”747 After players take their bets in light of the community cards
provided by the flop, the card known as the turn is dealt.748 From there, more betting is done, but,
once that betting has ceased, the river is dealt.749 As this process plays out—from flop to turn to
river—the players at the table become increasingly aware of their odds of recovering money
from the pot. In this Part, we will discuss the evolution of Caesars’ plan of reorganization, from
an extremely rough plan in the first disclosure plan to an incredibly detailed and complex plan
which the bankruptcy court took over two years from Caesars’ petition date to confirm. As you
744
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will see, this evolution can be compared to how cards in Texas Hold’em are dealt. The very
rough plan Caesars provided in its first disclosure statement, filed shortly after the petition date,
represents the hole cards. It provided a point of reference from which all the parties in interest
could advance. Approximately a year-and-a-half later, Caesars’ plan truly began to take shape
with the filing of its final disclosure statement—the flop. Then, this Part will show how different
creditors’ recoveries changed over the next few months as negotiations between the parties
continued—the turn. Then, finally, this Part will conclude by discussing Caesars’ final plan of
reorganization and how parties in interest fared under it—the river.
However, before we dive into our proverbial hole, flop, turn, and river cards, we will first
provide some context to help frame the final plan. In the following three Sections of this Part, we
will briefly discuss: (A) Caesars’ debt as of the petition date; (B) the REIT model Caesars aways
intended to reorganize under; and (C) how Caesars’ capital structure would eventually look
under the plan of reorganization confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
A. Caesars’ Debt Entering Chapter 11
When Caesars filed for chapter 11, the company’s total indebtedness had a face value of
approximately $18 billion, as reflected in the table below:750
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Really, though, this was debt borrowed by CEC at its OpCo level—CEOC, i.e., our Caesars
in this paper—“where the casino assets were held[,]” which “gave comfort to debt buyers that they
had a direct claim on those assets if Caesars ever faltered.”751 Moreover, under Apollo and TPG’s
direction, CEC had provided further “credit support” via guaranteeing “the repayment of [the]
loans and bonds of” Caesars pictured above.752 However, as you may recall from Part III.B of this
paper, CEC—much to the chagrin of its creditors—was able to water down this guarantee of
payment to a guarantee of protection, meaning that enforcing the guarantee would require years of
litigation. This, combined with the controversial transactions Caesars engaged in leading up to its
chapter 11, eliminated any comfort Caesars’ creditors had previously possessed in their loans and
bonds.
Now, to provide a brief overview of the more than $18 billion in debt, we will quickly
describe each type of debt depicted in the table above (except for the miscellaneous “other general
unsecured borrowings”). The Term Loans listed reflect the seven tranches of bank loans Caesars
had borrowed since the 2008 LBO.753 The last of these Term Loans, B-7, was discussed in Part
III.B of this paper as one of the controversial transactions Caesars engaged in prior to filing for
bankruptcy. “[O]f the [approximately] $1.75 billion B-7 term loan,” investment firms “GSO and
BlackRock [had] collectively bought $820 million,” which, in turn, “successfully induced other
hedge funds and institutions to feel safe enough to put in orders” over the “objections [of] creditors
who saw it as a ‘terrible deal[.]’”754 To raise the $1.75 billion, “Caesars [had] paid an enormous
$219 million in fees[.]”755 Moreover, because “the interest rate on the B-7 loan was a generous
9.75% [but was] paying off debt that was mostly cheaper[,]” Caesars’s annual interest expense
“went up by $43 million.”756 And “[w]orse yet, [the] $450 million worth of bonds bought by OpCo
at 100 cents were [being] held by [CGP], making it appear that Apollo and TPG were scratching
the back of another company they controlled.”757
The First Lien Notes listed reflect the $6.35 billion in notes Caesars had issued prior to
filing for bankruptcy to First Lien Noteholders pursuant to indentures.758 Indentures are written
agreements between issuers of debt securities and trustees who act “as representatives of the
securityholders[,]” which specify “the terms and conditions of the debt securities[.]”759 As
indicated in Part XII.C of this paper, UMB Bank served as indenture trustee for each of these
751
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indentures. Similarly, the Second Lien Notes were also issued pursuant to indentures. 760 And,
likewise, the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes were issued pursuant to a Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes
Indenture, under which the Subsidiary Guarantors discussed in Part XII.B of this paper guaranteed
Caesars’ obligations under the notes.761 As for the Senior Unsecured Notes—over half of which
were held by affiliates of CAC—holders of approximately $82.4 million of the notes had reached
an agreement with Caesars and CEC in August 2014 whereby “they agreed to be deemed to consent
to any restructuring of the Senior Unsecured Notes . . . that [was] consented to by holders of at
least 10 percent of the outstanding 6.50% Senior Unsecured Notes Due 2016 and 5.75% Senior
Unsecured Notes Due 2015[.]”762 Consequently, of the $530 million in Senior Unsecured Notes,
only about $159 million remained outstanding as of the petition date.763
B. The Plan in Very Rough Form
Faced with these seemingly insurmountable debts, Caesars, from the get-go, proposed a
restructuring plan that would separate “virtually all of its U.S.-based gaming operating assets and
real property assets into two companies: an operating entity (‘OpCo’) and a newly formed,
publicly-traded real estate investment trust (‘REIT’) that [would] directly or indirectly own a
newly formed property company (‘PropCo’).”764 A REIT is a company that “owns, operates or
finances income-producing real estate.”765 It is a relatively simple business model: “[t]he REIT
leases space and collects rents on the properties, then distributes that income as dividends to
shareholders.”766 Moreover, REITs invest in a variety of properties, “including apartment
buildings, cell towers, data centers, hotels, medical facilities, offices, retail centers, and
warehouses.”767 Of course, REITs, like most regulated investment entities, have certain
requirements that must be met. “To qualify as a REIT[,] a company must:
•

Invest at least 75% of total assets in real estate

•

Derive at least 75% of gross income from rents from real property, interest on mortgages
financing real property or from sales of real estate

•

Pay a minimum of 90% of taxable income in the form of shareholder dividends each year

•

Be an entity that is taxable as a corporation

•

Be managed by a board of directors or trustees
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•

Have a minimum of 100 shareholders

•

Have no more than 50% of its shares held by five or fewer individuals[.]”768

Caesars had first considered the REIT as a solution to “unlocking the value of [its] vast real
estate portfolio” back in 2006 when David Bonderman, of TPG, suggested it to then-CEO, Gary
Loveman.769 “The hotel sector was already utilizing the so-called ‘OpCo/PropCo’ model [back
then,]” which “avoided corporate income tax and instead paid out big dividends.”770 Compared to
an integrated company, this model was at least theoretically “supposed to be worth more . . .
because of the tax savings.”771 Moreover, Caesars believed this business model could be used in
its reorganization to reduce the Debtors’ debt by around $10 billion.
Thus, on a basic level, Caesars’ very rough plan broadly called for a “PropCo [to] lease its
real property assets to [an] OpCo in exchange for annual lease payments of $635 million[.]”772
Caesars’ proposal, therefore, was essentially a sale-leaseback transaction. The OpCo, upon being
leased the real property assets, would manage them. Master Lease Agreements between the OpCo
and PropCo would “underpin the REIT’s ability to support the more than $6 billion of debt
[eventually] contemplated in the [Final] Plan.”773 Finally, to solidify this structure, “a global
settlement of the Debtors’ claims and causes of action against CEC and its affiliates [would be
secured by] substantial contributions from CEC and its affiliates[.]”774
C. How Caesars’ New Capital Structure Would Eventually
Look under the Final Plan of Reorganization
In the end, Caesars would implement the above-mentioned structure. Under this structure,
Caesars’ reorganized capital structure would be supported as follows. “New CEC”—the product
of a merger between CEC and CAC, which was announced less than a month before Caesars filed
for bankruptcy775—would “provide substantial contributions to the . . . restructuring through direct
contributions to the estate, consideration in the form of cash and securities directly to the . . .
creditors, and important ongoing credit support for the REIT structure.”776 Furthermore, the New
CEC would “provide a full guarantee of all payments and performance of [the] OpCo’s monetary
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obligations” under the Master Lease Agreements.777 There would be two Master Lease
Agreements, one for Caesars Palace Las Vegas (“CPLV”) facilities, and one for non-CPLV
facilities.778 “Each of the [l]eases [would] have a 15 year initial term” and “four 5-year renewal
terms . . . to be exercised at [the OpCo’s] option[.]”779 Moreover, on the Effective Data, the OpCo,
PropCo, New CEC, and “a wholly-owned subsidiary of New CEC that [would] provide
management services” would “enter into . . . Management and Lease Support Agreements[.]”780
New CEC, trading under a new symbol—CZR781—would also issue new 5% convertible notes
worth approximately $1.119 billion.782 Further, in exchange for Caesars transferring “substantially
all of its real property assets” to the REIT, “the newly formed REIT entity, [named] VICI,” would
issue “common and preferred stock [to Caesars] which . . . it would [later] distribute to . . . first
lien creditors.”783 This new capital structure, as depicted in Caesars’ final disclosure statement,
would look something like the image below:784
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D. The Road to Caesars’ Final Plan
Caesars filed its first disclosure statement in March 2015, but it was quite sparse on
details. Very little progress was made towards a consensual plan over the next 11 months, as all
of the potential lawsuits Caesars was facing prevented negotiations from advancing. However,
from February 2016 until May 2016, several creditors filed objections to the very rough form of
the proposed restructuring that had thus-far been provided by Caesars. We now turn to these
objections and discuss how they led Caesars down the path to an “adequate” disclosure statement
and, thus, a point from which to really fine tune its final plan of reorganization.
785

1. Objections: Developing an Adequate Disclosure
Statement
On behalf of holders of the subsidiary-guaranteed notes, Wilmington Trust (the “10.75%
Notes Trustee”) filed the first objection in February, and it was a limited one which was filed in
response to Caesars’ motions to appoint a mediator and extend its period of exclusivity.786 The
objection was limited in the sense that the 10.75% Notes Trustee was not objecting to the motions
but, instead, providing some context for the court. First, the limited objection made the following
powerful statement:
“The fact that the Debtors have petitioned the Court to appoint a plan
mediator, without their ever having sought on their own to bring all key
creditor constituencies into a room, perhaps says all the Court needs to know
about the halting progress of their agenda to have their exit from chapter 11
tied to a final resolution of all CEC-related issues.”787
However, the 10.75% Notes Trustee did not object to extending the exclusivity period or
the appointment of a mediator because, in its opinion, doing so “could create momentum towards
a meaningful engagement on substantive plan issues.”788 The limited objection, therefore, simply
reminded “each Debtor to approach [what it deemed a] critical juncture in [the] case with a careful
eye to its particular duties and obligations to its creditors, independently of its prepetition duties
to CEC, its ultimate parent.”789 A mediator would be appointed, and more about the mediation
process employed will be discussed later in this paper.790 The exclusivity period referred to is the
statutorily-imposed period in which only the debtor may file a plan of reorganization. 791 Under
785

See First Disclosure Statement [556.pdf].
Limited Objection of the 10.75% Notes Trustee to (A) Debtors’ Motion for the Entry of an Order Approving
Appointment of a Mediator to Mediate Issues Related to a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization and (B) Debtors’
Motion to Further Extend their Exclusive Periods to File a Chapter 11 Plan and Solicit Acceptances Thereof
[3225.pdf], In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Feb. 10, 2016).
787
Id. at 2.
788
Id.
789
Id. at 3.
790
See infra Part XVI.D.2.
791
See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 [https://perma.cc/WAP6-KYE5]
786

104

section 1121(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, “only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after
the date of the order for relief[,]” but subsection (d) allows bankruptcy courts to extend this period
to last for up to 18 months.792 Judge Goldgar extended Caesars’ exclusive period to file a plan
through July 15, 2016, and extended its exclusive period to solicit acceptance of the plan through
September 15, 2016.793 In light of these deadlines, it is unsurprising that—as you will soon see—
Caesars’ plan began really moving toward its final shape in June 2016 and, by September 2016,
had evolved into a much more creditor-friendly form.794
In March 2016, 10.75% Notes Trustee filed another objection. This time it was a
preliminary objection to Caesars’ motion to schedule a hearing to consider its most recent
disclosure statement, establish the deadline for filing objections to it, and set initial plan
confirmation discovery dates.795 Essentially, the preliminary objection argued Caesars was trying
to proceed with a plan that “incur[red] more than $11 billion in unnecessary deficiency claims of
. . . secured creditors while providing no meaningful recovery to their actual prepetition secured
creditors[.]”796 At the time of this preliminary objection, the 10.75% Trustee was gearing up to
challenge the deficiency claims allowed to secured creditors against the Subsidiary Guarantors.797
You may, however, recall from Part XIII of this paper that Judge Goldgar eventually ruled against
them on this issue, holding the secured creditors had preserved their rights to assert section 1111(b)
deficiency claims. The 10.75% Notes Trustee, of course, did not know this when it filed the
preliminary objection. Therefore, it sought to “adjourn [Caesars’] Motion until after the
publication of the examiner’s report”—which would determine which plan issues would need to
be resolved via litigation—“and the [aforementioned] mediator [made] an initial report on the
[mediation’s] progress[.]”798
On the same day, the Noteholder Committee and the UCC both also filed objections to the
motion. For its part, the Noteholder Committee took issue with Caesars “ask[ing] the Court to
impose a severely-constrained (and admittedly “somewhat unusual”) timetable that, among other
things, [only] provide[d] parties with the bare minimum of [28] days to assess and object to a
massive disclosure document that” would contain “brand new information regarding the
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Examiner’s Report” and much more.799 And Caesars was making this request “before any party
[had] even had the chance to review the relevant Plan and related Disclosure Statement” because
neither had even been made available, which made it “impossible to assess [whether the] deadlines
might be reasonable.”800 Likewise, the UCC contested the motion on the grounds that, by the time
the bankruptcy court considered Caesars’ motion, many crucial events would either have just
occurred or not occurred at all yet.801 First, the Examiner’s report, expected to “be nearly 1,000
pages long[,]” would “have just been filed with an uncertain degree of redactions,” and “the plan
and disclosure statement still would] not be on file.”802 Second, the mediation would not have yet
commenced.803 Third, the creditor committees would not have had “time to file motions for
derivative standing to prosecute the Debtors’ estates avoidance actions and actions for breach of
fiduciary duties[.]”804 And, finally, the Special Governance Committee would still not have been
disclosed.805 Therefore, the UCC believed “the parties [were] still largely working in a vacuum.”806
Consequently, it argued Caesars should not be able to move forward under the schedule proposed
in its motion.807
Notwithstanding these objections, Judge Goldgar entered an order granting Caesars’
motion.808 The scheduling order set the following deadlines: (1) final, but not preliminary,
“objections to the adequacy of the Disclosure Statement” had to be filed by May 2, 2016; (2)
Caesars and other parties in interest would have until May 9, 2016 to “file replies or responses to
[those] Objections;” and (3) the Disclosure Statement Hearing was set for May 9 as well.809 The
deadline to file objections and replies to objections was subsequently pushed back to May 17th,
and the Disclosure Statement Hearing was reset for May 25th.810
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Accordingly, on May 17th, two objections and two reservations of rights were filed by
creditors. International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund (the “Pension Fund”)
objected to the adequacy of a disclosure statement Caesars filed in April because it did not disclose
how any withdrawal liability proof of claims would be treated in the event that Caesars stopped
contributing and withdrew from the Pension Fund.811 Although the Pension Fund did not expect
this to happen, as the April disclosure statement did “not provide for the rejection of any labor
contracts relating to Pension Fund contributions[,]” it sought clarification on the issue in light of
there being “a split in the case law” regarding it.812 Frederick Barton Danner, an individual holder
of 6.50% Senior Notes due in 2016, also filed an objection to adequacy of the disclosure statement,
believing it “fail[ed] to provide creditors the information they need[ed] to decide whether to accept
or reject the . . . Plan.”813 According to Mr. Danner, the April disclosure statement was
“fundamentally deficient because it [did] not disclose the recovery percentage of allowed claims
that creditors in Class F (Unsecured Claims) would receive nor [did] it include information
sufficient to determine CEC’s contribution to the plan in return for the nonconsensual third party
releases.”814 He, therefore, “believe[d] that the Plan [was] patently unconfirmable insofar as its
Third Party Release provisions [did] not pass must under controlling Seventh Circuit precedent”
by not providing adequate information.815
The 10.75% Notes Trustee returned to reserve the rights of the noteholders it represented
to object to the disclosure statement, for, while the holders of 10.75% Notes were willing to accept
the 85% recovery proposed, “the parties [were still] seeking to reach closure with respect to the
value of consideration necessary to represent a payment of 85%.”816 Thus, in the event the
“negotiations . . . ultimately fail[ed] to achieve a final agreement with respect to the treatment of
the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Note Claims[,]” the 10.75% Notes Trustee sought to reserve the
Subsidiary-Guaranteed Note Claimholders’ ability to object to the adequacy of the disclosure
statement.817 After all, it argued, the April disclosure statement “lack[ed] material information . . .
essential for the interested parties, including the holders of the 10.75% Notes, to make an informed
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judgment with respect to the underlying plan.”818 Specifically, the 10.75% Notes Trustee cited the
lack of “a liquidation analysis illustrating the amount that holders of the 10.75% Notes could
recover from the substantial unencumbered assets owned by their Subsidiary Guarantors in a
hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation.”819 Ergo, the 10.75% Notes Trustee wanted information to see
whether the Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claimholders would fare much better if Caesars was
liquidated in lieu of being reorganized.
Similarly, BOKF, Delaware Trust, and WSFS, as the indenture trustees representing all
second lien noteholders, jointly filed to reserve the rights of the second lien noteholders to object
to the adequacy of the April disclosure statement.820 These Second Lien Trustees reserved the
rights of the noteholders they represented on the ground that, while “[t]he Second Lien Trustees
[had] provided [Caesars] with technical, trustee-specific comments and changes to the . . .
proposed . . . Plan[,]” which Caesars had taken under consideration, Caesars had yet to incorporate,
or agree to incorporate, them.821
Accordingly, Caesars filed another disclosure statement the next day.822 This, however,
would not be the last disclosure statement filed—several more followed.
2. The Examiner’s Report: A Shift in Negotiating
Dynamics
Due to it being mentioned numerous times in the preceding Subsection, and because the
rest of this paper will make several references to it as well, we thought this would be an appropriate
place to briefly discuss the Examiner’s Report and its findings. “The report clocked in at more than
1,800 pages, including all the exhibits and appendices.”823 The Examiner, Howard Marks, had
found his “smoking gun” in the form of an October 2012 presentation given by Apollo wherein
the private equity firm “described the creation of Caesars Growth Partners” as creating a “war
chest” in case of “a potential restructuring event” and as a transaction that would allow the firm
“to ‘have [its] cake and eat it too.’”824 However, the slide deck containing those comments was
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never shared with TPG or CEC’s CEO, Gary Loveman.825 Consequently, the Examiner’s
conclusions were crystalized:
“Apollo’s complex deals at Caesars—the Growth transaction, CERP, the
Four Properties deal, the B-7 term loan, the Unsecured Notes deal—while
nominally designed to help Caesars generate cash and extend runway, were
really about positioning Apollo against creditors in an inevitable
restructuring fight.”826
Therefore, the Examiner concluded that “assets were removed from [Caesars] to the
detriment of [Caesars] and its creditors[,]” and that “[t]he potential damages from those claims . .
. range[d] from $3.6 billion to $5.1 billion.”827 He believed “several of these big transactions [even]
gave rise to claims for the grave ‘actual fraudulent transfer’ where there was intent to ‘hinder,’
‘delay’ or ‘defraud’ creditors.”828
However, Apollo was not the only bad actor. Instead, an “intricate narrative about a
massive corporate governance failure driven by Apollo” developed.829 Caesars, according to the
Examiner, “had been insolvent since the end of 2008, the year the [LBO] closed.”830 Being in the
“so-called ‘zone of insolvency,’ . . . a board of directors distinct and independent from the Caesars
parent board—dominated by Apollo and TPG—[should have been appointed] to safeguard the
interests of creditors.”831 CEC and its private equity sponsors had instead continued to steer
Caesars through transactions undeniably harmful to its creditors for nearly 7 years before the
company finally filed for chapter 11. The Examiner consequently felt it was appropriate to charge
the directors of CEC and Caesars with breaches of fiduciary duty, and to charge Apollo and TPG
for aiding and abetting those breaches.832 “[A]llegations of impropriety gained enough legal
traction that Apollo’s co-founder Marc Rowan and TPG co-founder David Bonderman were [even]
ordered by a court . . . to produce personal financial documents showing their ability to meet [the]
billions of dollars of potential personal judgments against them.”833
Bruce Bennett, an attorney for Jones Day—the firm was representing the second lien
noteholders—was quoted as referring to this Examiner’s Report as the “[b]est Examiner’s [R]eport
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in the history of mankind!”834 Such a reaction was undoubtedly appropriate. After all, in the
report’s aftermath, the clients he was representing were in a much better negotiating position.835
3. The June 2016 Plan
As you have seen, Caesars filed a number of disclosure statements starting in March 2015,
but the plan did not really begin to take shape until June 2016 when Caesars “file[d] a revised
Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization[.]”836 Under
the June disclosure statement, the proposed plan (the “June 2016 Plan”) included 100% recoveries
for the three types of claims that section 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires to be
unclassified: (1) administrative claims; (2) priority tax claims; and (3) professional fee claims.837
In total, it was estimated that there were 1,865 of these claims worth up to $82 million.838 As for
classified claims, the proposed plan separated the types of claims or interests into 22 different
classes: A through V.839 A claimholder’s ability to vote on, and their distributions under, the plan
depended “on the type of Claim or Interest held by such Holder (if any) and the treatment afforded
any such Claim or Interest.”840 As for the classified claims, the June 2016 Plan provided the
following tables depicting the proposed treatment of each class:841
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To limit our discussion, this paper will focus on the recoveries of Classes D, E, F, and G,
consisting of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims, Secured First Lien Notes Claims, Second Lien
Notes Claims, and Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims. After all, it was the creditors holding
these types of claims who caused most of the controversy in Caesars’ chapter 11. Moreover, as
indicated by the charts above, these claimholders held a substantial portion of the allowed claims,
estimated to be worth up to nearly $18 billion.
a. Proposed Recovery for Class D—Holders of
Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims—under the
June 2016 Plan
Class D, the holders of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims, were impaired, meaning such
claimholders were either having their contractual rights modified or being “paid less than the full
value of their claims under the plan[.]”842 Because the charts above show that Class D would
receive an over 100% recovery, whether Class F—holders of Second Lien Notes Claims—
accepted or rejected the proposed plan, Class D was impaired in the sense that those claimholders’
contractual rights were modified. One of the sources of recovery under the proposed plan, in fact,
was that “the Holders of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims and First Lien Notes Claims” would
waive their turnover rights under the Second Lien and Subsidiary-Guaranteed Intercreditor
Agreements.843 “[T]urnover law applies [in bankruptcy] when a noncustodian entity is in
possession, custody, or control of estate property at any time during the case, and the property is
842
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of a type that a trustee may use, sell, or lease, to the benefit of creditors.”844 Thus, Class D was
impaired in that its contractual rights under those Intercreditor Agreements had been modified so
as to forbid the claimholders from invoking their rights to have assets turned over to the estate.
Pursuant to the proposed plan, each claimholder in Class D was to receive their pro rata
share of the following resources. First, they would receive their pro rata share of $705 million in
cash.845 Each would also receive their pro rata share of “$882 million [in] additional Cash [from]
the proceeds of the syndication of the OpCo First Lien Debt to third parties[.]”846 “Loan
syndication occurs when two or more lenders come together to fund one loan for a single
borrower[,]” and it is usually the result of “a loan [being] too large for one bank or fall[ing] outside
the risk tolerance of a bank.”847 Caesars’ proposed plan contained “a material financing
contingency in that the Debtors [had] agreed to syndicate OpCo and [Caesars Palace Las Vegas
(“CPLV”) ] debt to third parties so that at least [over $3 billion] in Cash proceeds [were] distributed
to first lien creditors.”848
Prepetition Credit Agreement Claimholders would also each receive their pro rata share of
“$406 million [in] additional Cash [from] the proceeds of the issuance of OpCo Second Lien Debt
to third parties[.]”849 Moreover, such claimholders were also entitled to either receive their pro rata
share of the nearly $2 billion “aggregate principal amount of the PropCo First Lien Term Loan”
or “PropCo Common Equity . . . pursuant to the PropCo Equity Election.”850 Essentially, the
PropCo Equity Election permitted “[t]he respective aggregate principal amounts of the CPLV
Mezzanine Debt (if any), the PropCo First Lien Notes, the PropCo First Lien Term Loans, and
PropCo Second Lien Notes”—all of which are depicted in Part XVI.C’s chart showing Caesars’
new capital structure under the plan—to be reduced via holders of such debt electing to receive
PropCo Common Equity instead.851 Further, Class D claimholders would each receive their pro
rata share of $1.45 billion from “the PropCo Second Lien Upsize Amount,” if any, and “additional
Cash in the amount of the difference between” that $1.45 billion and “the amount of the PropCo
Second Lien Upsize Amount.”852 This Second Lien Upsize Amount referred “to up to [$330
million] in aggregate principal amount of PropCo Second Lien Notes, which . . . [would] only be
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issued if the Debtors . . . [were] unable to finance [$2.6 billion] of CPLV Market Debt”—which is
also depicted in the new capital structure chart above—“to third parties[.]”853
Class D claimholders would also each receive their pro rata share of “OpCo Series A
Preferred Stock, which [was to] be exchange pursuant to the CEOC Merger[.]” 854 The CEOC
Merger referred to Caesars merging into “a newly formed subsidiary of New CEC[.]”855 If Class
F—holders of Second Lien Notes Claims—accepted the plan, their OpCo Series A Preferred Stock
would be exchanged for 5% of New CEC Common Equity.856 If Class F rejected, Class D
claimholders would receive 4% of New CEC Common Equity instead.857 Finally, each Prepetition
Credit Agreement Claimholder would be entitled to “Additional CEC Consideration,” which
would be equal to $10 million per month from January 1, 2017 until the earlier of either the plan’s
Effective Date or June 30, 2017, but only if Class F voted to accept the plan.858
Consequently, the proposed plan envisioned Class D claimholders receiving the following
recovery:859
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b. Proposed Recovery for Class E—Holders of Secured
First Lien Notes Claims—under the June 2016 Plan
As indicated by the chart at the beginning of Part XVI.D.3 of this paper, which showed the
proposed treatment of each Class under the June 2016 Plan, Class E—the holders of Secured First
Lien Note Claims—were also impaired because they could potentially face a less than 100%
recovery under the proposed plan whether Class F accepted it or not. Pursuant to the proposed
plan, each Secured First Lien Note Claimholder was to receive their pro rata share of the following
sources of recovery. First, each of these claimholders would receive their pro rata share of $700
million in cash.860 Each would also receive their pro rata share of “$306 million [in] Cash [from]
the proceeds of the issuance of the OpCo First Lien Debt to third pirates[.]”861 As for OpCo Second
Lien Debt, Class E claimholders would be entitled to their pro rata shares of $141 million in cash
from the proceeds of its issuance.862 Further, each would receive their pro rata share of “$431
million aggregate principal amount of the PropCo First Lien Notes, subject to” such claimholders
exercising their rights under the PropCo Equity Election.863 Moreover, under the June 2016 Plan,
Class E claimholders were entitled to $1.425 billion in PropCo Second Lien Notes and “[c]ash
equal to the excess (if any) of (I) $250 million over (II) the aggregate principal amount of CPLV
Mezzanine Debt allocated to” Class E claimholders.864
Each claimholder was also entitled to receive PropCo Preferred Equity, “subject to the
PropCo Equity Put Right and the PropCo Preferred Equity Call Right[.]”865 Under the PropCo
Equity Put Right, the claimholders could:
“elect . . . to put all, but not less than all, of such Holder’s Pro Rata share of
the PropCo Preferred Equity Distribution to . . . Backstop Investors, who
will . . . purchase [the equity] on the Effective Date . . . for Cash at a price
per share equal to 83.3% of the liquidation value thereof.”866
“A backstop purchaser . . . is an entity that agrees to buy all the remaining, unsubscribed
securities from a publicly traded company’s rights offering, or issue.”867 Pursuant to the PropCo
Preferred Equity Call Right, these “Backstop Investors” could themselves also “elect . . . to
purchase . . . up to 50% of the PropCo Preferred Equity Distribution distributed to each Holder of
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Allowed Secured First Lien Notes Claims for” the same price as Class E claimholders could sell
their shares of the PropCo Preferred Equity under the Put Right.868
Class E claimholders were also to receive over $1 billion of “aggregate principal amount
of the CPLV Mezzanine debt” and “additional Cash in the amount of the difference between” that
over $1 billion sum and “the aggregate principal amount of the CPLV Mezzanine Debt . . . and the
PropCo Preferred Equity Upsize Shares[.]”869 The disclosure statement defined the PropCo
Preferred Equity Upsize Shares as:
“additional PropCo Preferred Equity, if any, which shall be issued to the
Holders of Allowed Secured First Lien Notes Claims (subject to the PropCo
Preferred Equity Call Right and the PropCo Preferred Equity Put Right) in
the event that the CPLV Market Debt is issued to third parties in an amount
equal to or greater than [$1.8 billion] but less than [$2 billion].”870
Further, “if the Spin Structure [was] used,” the proposed plan called for Class E
claimholders to each receive their pro rata share of “100% of PropCo Common Equity on a fully
diluted basis.”871 However, “if the Partnership Contribution Structure [was] used [instead],” such
claimholders would receive “95% of PropCo Common Equity on a fully diluted basis” and “$91
million in Cash[.]”872 Caesars intended to use the Spin Structure, saying the Partnership
Contribution Structure would only be used if certain issues arose.873 The Spin Structure, also
known as a Spin-Off, is “a common restructuring mechanism for companies to enhance
shareholder value.”874 Typically, there is at least two steps: (1) the parent company transfers “assets
and/or liabilities into a new entity (SpinCo), followed by (2) the distribution of SpinCo stock to
[the] Parent’s shareholders as a dividend, or a sale of SpinCo stock to public investors through an
initial public offering.”875 Looking at the chart depicting Caesars’ new capital structure under the
Final Plan,876 the “spin” is easily recognizable, with PropCo being the “SpinCo.”
Under the proposed plan, the Secured First Lien Note Claimholders were also entitled to
their pro rata share of “OpCo Series A Preferred Stock, which [was to] be exchanged pursuant to
the CEOC Merger” discussed in Part XVI.D.3.a of this paper.877 If Class F—holders of Second
Lien Notes Claims—accepted the plan, they would receive “12.5% of New CEC Common
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Equity[.]”878 If, however, Class F rejected the plan, Class E claimholders would receive “15.8%
of New CEC Common Equity[.]”879 Finally, similar to Class D, the claimholders of Class E were
to receive “Additional CEC Bond Consideration” via cash payments of $20 million per month
and/or New CEC Common Equity worth $20 million per month starting on May 1, 2017 and going
until the Effective Date, but only if Class F accepted the plan.880
Consequently, the proposed plan envisioned members of Class E making the following
recovery:881

c. Proposed Recovery for Class F—Holders of Second
Lien Notes Claims—under the June 2016 Plan
Class F, comprised of the holders of Second Lien Notes Claims, was also impaired
according to the chart at the beginning of Part XVI.D.3 of this paper. Per that chart, the Second
Lien Notes Claimholders were to receive nowhere close to a 100% recovery. Instead, they were to
receive a 29–48% recovery if their Class voted to accept the plan, and a 22–34% recovery if Class
F voted to reject it. Under the June 2016 Plan, these vote-based recoveries would be sourced as
follows. If Class F voted to accept the plan, each Second Lien Notes Claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $790.98 million “aggregate principal amount of New CEC Convertible
Notes[.]”882 Class F would also receive “OpCo Series A Preferred Stock . . . [to] be exchanged
pursuant to the CEOC Merger for 17.435% of New CEC Common Equity[.]”883
878
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However, if Class F voted to reject the plan, they would receive the same amount of New
CEC Convertible Notes, but the OpCo Series A Preferred Stock they received would, instead, only
be convertible for 8.939% of New CEC Common Equity.884 Consequently, the June 2016 Plan
envisioned the following recovery for Second Lien Notes Claimholders:885

d. Proposed Recovery for Class G—Holders of
Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims—under the
June 2016 Plan
Finally, Class G—holders of Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims—were also impaired
under the June 2016 Plan, with the chart at the beginning of Part XVI.D.3 of this paper showing
an estimated recovery of 61–105% recovery for such claimholders. Pursuant to the June 2016 Plan,
each Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claimholder was to receive their pro rata share of $116.81
million “aggregate principal amount of New CEC Convertible Notes . . . [to] be convert[ed] . . .
for up to 1.425% of New CEC Common Equity on a fully diluted basis[.]”886 Class F claimholders
were also entitled to “OpCo Series A Preferred Stock . . . [to] be exchanged pursuant to the CEOC
Merger for 4.122% of New CEC Common Equity[.]”887 Thus, the June 2016 Plan envisioned the
following recovery for Class G:888
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e. Summary of the Estimated Creditor Recoveries
under the June 2016 Plan
Based on the proposed treatment of each Class described above, as well as the treatment of
the other Classes not discussed, Caesars believed its proposed plan would provide for the following
creditor recoveries. Absent the occurrence of certain conditions, First Lien Bank Lenders would
receive approximately $3.193 billion in cash, $1.961 billion of first lien PropCo debt, $250 million
of second lien PropCo debt, and 5% of the New CEC Common Equity.889 For their part, First Lien
Noteholders would receive approximately $2.037 billion in cash, $431 million of first lien PropCo
debt, $1.425 billion of second lien PropCo debt, preferred equity in PropCo, $100 million of CPLV
Mezzanine Debt, 100% PropCo Common Equity, and 15.8% of New CEC Common Equity,
subject, of course, to the occurrence of certain conditions.890 As for holders of the Second Lien
Notes Claims and Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims—Classes F and G—the proposed plan
combined them with five other groups of “Non-First Lien Claimants” whose recoveries would
come from the same sources.891 Each of these Non-First Lien Claimants would receive their
respective Class’s share of the over $1 billion in New CEC Convertible Notes that were to be
issued under the June 2016 Plan, convertible “for up to 12.2% of New CEC Common Equity[.]”892
They were also to receive “OpCo Series A Preferred Stock . . . [to] be exchanged for up to 24.4%
of New CEC Common Equity . . . pursuant to the CEOC Merger.”893
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4. The Evolution of the Plan from June through
September of 2016
The June 2016 Plan, however, would not be confirmed. In September of that year, Caesars
filed their first amendment to the proposed plan’s supplement, which had been filed in July.894 The
chart below, which comes from another academic paper studying Caesars’ bankruptcy, provides
an insightful look into how Caesars’ proposed plan evolved from June to September 2016:895

The Second Lien Noteholders were the biggest winners in this process, in large part due to
the release of the Examiner’s Report discussed in Part XVI.D.2 of this paper. Those creditors had
originally been offered only 9 cents on the dollar, and, at one point in the beginning of 2016, Marc
Rowan of Apollo had even said that a 42-cent offer was excessive, giving “far too rich a recovery
for [the Second Lien Noteholders’] claims.”896 In the end, however, these noteholders—most
notably, Oaktree and Appaloosa—received a recovery of 66 cents on the dollar.897 This is
unsurprising given that, as you may recall from Part XI.E of this paper, the Second Lien
Noteholders were a “thorn in the company’s side” throughout the bankruptcy.898 Following the
release of the Examiner’s Report in March, these noteholders had “use[d] the [E]xaminer’s
findings to press [a] scorched earth strategy in court.”899 However, to help prevent “Apollo [from]
. . . trying to pick off . . . remaining holdout creditors groups to create momentum for a cramdown
where the second-lien group would have unfavorable recoveries forced [up]on them[,]” mediation
was used.900 This mediation brought Ken Liang of Oaktree and David Sambur of Apollo together
First Amendment to Supplement to Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code [4998.pdf], In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D.
N.D. Ill. Filed Sept. 16, 2016).
895
NATHAN MOONEY ET AL., supra note 781, at 31 [https://perma.cc/X77Y-U6RK].
896
FRUMES & INDAP, supra note 47, at 285.
897
Id.
898
See supra Part XI.E.
899
FRUMES & INDAP, supra note 47, at 243.
900
Id.
894

120

in the same room where these “warring parties” could attempt to find a solution.901 To demonstrate
the hostilities between these two, please consider the following quote credited to Mr. Sambur:
“Somebody tell me where Ken Liang’s breakfast is so I can dip my balls in it[!]”902
“[A] mix of shuttle diplomacy and speed dating[,]” the mediation consisted of “bilateral
sessions conducted between specific groups” and “large gatherings at Kirkland & Ellis’s office for
the private equity firms and the creditors.”903 The Second Lien Noteholders were led by Liang and
Appaloosa’s lead negotiator, Jim Bolin, who “saw through what was happening.”904 In Bolin’s
view, “Apollo was just using mediation as a tactic to stall while they tried to strike deals with every
other credit group.”905 The truth of Mr. Bolin’s assessment was demonstrated in Part XI.A of this
paper, where we discussed how Caesars reached RSAs with many creditor groups, but not the
Second Lien Noteholders. Thus, although the whole point of the mediation process was to avoid a
cramdown, Bolin realized Apollo was using it to prepare for one.
“A cramdown is the imposition of a bankruptcy reorganization plan by a court despite . . .
objections by certain classes of creditors.”906 Normally, to confirm a plan of reorganization in
chapter 11, the requirements of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code have to be met, but, under
subsection (b), so long as all requirements of subsection (a) besides (a)(8) are met, the debtor can
cramdown the plan.907 Section 1129(a)(8) requires “each class of claims or interests” to either
accept the plan or be unimpaired under the plan.908 Thus, because the Second Lien Noteholders
had been deemed impaired since Caesars filed its first disclosure statement,909 and they were not
going to vote for the plan in its current form, there was a real concern that, if Caesars reached
agreements with all the other creditor groups, it would cramdown the plan on the Second Lien
Noteholders.
Real progress first began to be made when the June 2016 Plan proposed that the First Lien
Noteholders would receive all of the PropCo Equity, while the Second Lien Noteholders “would
get their recovery strictly in cash and securities in OpCo.”910 This battle between an “immovable
object, Apollo, and [an] unstoppable force, Appaloosa/Oaktree,” was finally resolved when Judge
Goldgar “ripped Apollo for slow walking the mediation session” and “pummeled [both] Apollo
and TPG over their contempt for the process [in general].”911 Accordingly, Judge Goldgar decided
901
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he would no longer keep in place the injunctions preventing Apollo and TPG from being dragged
into countless lawsuits over the controversial transactions they had facilitated for Caesars leading
up to its chapter 11.912 As Judge Goldgar put it:
“The injunctions [had] provided the Caesars parent, Apollo, and TPG a
comfortable, free ride on the debtors’ coattails. They [had] shown no keen
sense of urgency to resolve the outstanding disputes that gave rise to the
bankruptcy case—and, frankly, neither [had] the debtors, at least where the
disputed transactions [were] concerned. The Caesars parent, Apollo, and
TPG [had] evidently felt no particular pressure to expedite the
reorganization process. Now perhaps they [would].”913
Most importantly, though, Judge Goldgar was “so offended by the arrogance of Caesars’
negotiating tactics that he had completely upended [the bankruptcy’s] dynamic.” 914 He
“specifically stated that he was not inclined to give the private equity firms and their executives
coveted liability releases in a cramdown scenario.”915 Therefore, “[t]he private equity firms [had]
to cut a deal with the second-lien [noteholders], who suddenly were holding all the cards—and
were not inclined to be gracious.”916 Hence, the recovery the Second Lien Noteholders were
originally supposed to receive—9 cents on the dollar—climbed all the way to 66 cents on the
dollar, a remarkable feat.
5. Caesars’ Final Plan of Reorganization
Following several more amendments, a proposed plan—which would eventually be
confirmed as Caesars’ official plan of reorganization—was filed on January 13, 2017 (the “Final
Plan”).917 The Final Plan, as compared to the June 2016 Plan, treated Classes D, E, F, and G as
follows.
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a. Class D’s Recovery under the Final Plan as Compared
to the June 2016 Plan
The table below has been provided to facilitate an easy comparison of the recovery of Class
D—holders of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims—under the Final Plan as compared to the
June 2016 Plan:
Source of Recovery
for Class D: the
Prepetition Credit
Agreement
Claimholders

Cash

Under the June 2016 Plan918

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $705
million in cash

Additional cash
from the proceeds
of the syndication
of OpCo Debt to
third parties

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $882
million in additional cash from
“the proceeds of the syndication
of the OpCo First Lien Debt to
third parties”

Additional Cash
from the issuance
of OpCo Second
Lien Debt to third
parties

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of “$406
million [in] additional [c]ash
[from] the proceeds of the
issuance of OpCo Second Lien
Debt to third parties”

Under the Final Plan 919

Each claimholder would now instead
receive their pro rata share of $710
million in cash

Each claimholder would now instead
receive their pro rata share $916.9
million in additional cash from “the
proceeds of the syndication of the
OpCo”—not first lien, but—"Market
Debt to third parties”
OpCo Market Debt refers to the $1.235
billion “of debt to be issued by OpCo
to third parties for [c]ash on or before
the Effective Date[,]” and that “[c]ash
[was to] be distributed to Holders of
Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
and the Holders of Secured First Lien
Notes Claims”920

None provided for

918
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PropCo First Lien
Term Loan

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $1.961
billion “aggregate principal
amount of the PropCo First Lien
Term Loan”

Same as the June 2016 Plan

This entitlement was subject to
Class D claimholders exercising
their rights pursuant to the
PropCo Equity Election

Aggregate of
PropCo Second
Lien Upsize
Amount and
additional cash

OpCo Series A
Preferred Stock to
be exchanged for
New CEC Common
Equity

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $1.45
billion from the PropCo Second
Lien Upsize Amount plus
additional cash worth the
difference between that $1.45
billion and the PropCo Second
Lien Upsize Amount

Class D would receive OpCo
Series A Preferred Stock to “be
exchanged pursuant to the CEOC
Merger for” 5% of New CEC
Common Equity if Class F voted
to reject the Plan, but only 4% of
New CEC Common Equity if Class
F voted to accept it

Same as the June 2016 Plan

Class D, subject to claimholders in that
class exercising their rights to
participate in the New CEC Common
Equity Buyback, would receive OpCo
Series A Preferred Stock to exchange
for 4.010% of New CEC Common
Equity
The “New CEC Common Equity
Buyback” referred to “the purchase of
shares of New CEC Common Equity . . .
by New CEC from [participants in the
buyback for] an aggregate amount
equal to or greater than [$1 billion]
but [not] to exceed the amount of the
CIE Equity Buyback Proceeds”921
The “CIE Equity Buyback Proceeds”
referred to the $1.2 billion in cash
earned on the sale of a subsidiary,
Caesars Interactive Entertainment
(“CIE”), which, on the Effective Date,

921
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would be distributed to the
claimholders922

Additional CEC
Consideration

Allowance

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of “Additional
CEC Bond Consideration”
(monthly payments worth $20
million)

Each claimholder would now instead
receive their pro rata share of
“Additional CEC”—not bond, but—
"Bank Consideration” (monthly
payments of only $10 million)

Not provided

Each claimholder would receive their
pro rata share of $5.426 billion in
allowed claims drawn from several
sources, including the Term B-4, B-5,
and B-6 Term Loans

b. Class E’s Recovery under the Final Plan as
Compared to the June 2016 Plan
The table below has been provided to facilitate an easy comparison of the recovery of Class
E—holders of Secured First Lien Notes Claims—under the Final Plan as compared to the June
2016 Plan:
Source of
Recovery for Class
E: the Secured
First Lien Notes
Claimholders

Cash

Additional cash
from the proceeds
of the syndication
of OpCo Debt to
third parties

Under the June 2016 Plan923

Under the Final Plan924

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $700 million
in cash

Each claimholder would now instead
receive their pro rata share of $970.9
million in cash

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $306 million
in additional cash from “the
proceeds of the syndication of the
OpCo First Lien Debt to third
parties”

Each claimholder would now instead
receive their pro rata share $318.1
million in additional cash from “the
proceeds of the syndication of the
OpCo”—not first lien, but—"Market
Debt to third parties”

922
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“OpCo Market Debt” referred to the
$1.235 billion “of debt to be issued by
OpCo to third parties for [c]ash on or
before the Effective Date . . . which
[was to] be distributed to Holders of
Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
and the Holders of Secured First Lien
Notes Claims”925

Additional cash
from the proceeds
of issuing OpCo
Second Lien Debt
to third parties

PropCo First Lien
Notes

Aggregate of
PropCo Second
Lien Notes and
additional cash

PropCo Preferred
Equity
Distribution

925

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $141 million
in additional cash from the
proceeds of issuing OpCo Second
Lien Debt to third parties

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $431 million
“aggregate principal amount of the
PropCo First Lien Notes, subject to
. . . such [h]older[s]” electing to
exercise their rights “pursuant to
the PropCo Equity Election”

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $1.425
billion consisting of PropCo Second
Lien Notes plus cash equal to the
excess of $250,000 over “the
aggregate principal amount of
CPLV Mezzanine Debt allocated to
[h]olders of First Lien Notes
Claims”

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of the PropCo
Preferred Equity Distribution,
subject to rights being exercised
under either the PropCo Preferred
Equity Put Right or PropCo
Preferred Equity Call Right

None provided for

Same as the June 2016 Plan

Same as the June 2016 Plan

Same as the June 2016 Plan

Id. at Ex. 1 at 23.
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CPLV Mezzanine
Debt plus
additional cash

PropCo Common
Equity

OpCo Series A
Preferred Stock to
be exchanged for
New CEC Common
Equity

Additional CEC
Consideration

Allowance

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $1.107
billion consisting of CPLV
Mezzanine Debt plus “additional
[c]ash in the amount of the
difference between” $1.107 billion
minus that aggregate principal
amount of CPLV Mezzanine Debt
and the PropCo Preferred Equity
Upsize Shares

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of 100% of
PropCo Common Equity if the Spin
Structure was used, and their pro
rata share of 95% of PropCo
Common Equity if the Partnership
Contribution Structure was used

Class E would receive “OpCo Series
A Preferred Stock . . . [to] be
exchanged pursuant to the CEOC
Merger for” 15.8% of New CEC
Common Equity if Class F voted to
reject the plan, and 12.5% of New
CEC Common Equity if Class F
voted to accept it

If Class F voted to accept the Plan,
each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of “Additional
Bond Consideration” (monthly
payments worth $20 million)

Not provided

Same as the June 2016 Plan

Same as the June 2016 Plan

Class E, subject to claimholders in
that class exercising their rights to
participate in the New CEC Common
Equity Buyback, would still receive
OpCo Series A Preferred Stock, but
now that stock would be
exchangeable “for 12.532% of New
CEC Common Equity . . .
approximately equivalent to 14.524%
of New CEC Common Equity before
giving effect to the conversion of the
New CEC Convertible Notes”

Same as the June 2016 Plan, except it
was no longer long contingent on
Class F voting to accept the plan

Each claimholder would receive their
pro rata share of $6.350 billion in
allowed claims coming from the
8.50%, 9.00%, and 11.25% First Lien
Notes Indentures
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c. Class F’s Recovery under the Final Plan as
Compared to the June 2016 Plan
The table below has been provided to facilitate an easy comparison of the recovery of Class
F—holders of Second Lien Notes Claims—under the Final Plan as compared to the June 2016
Plan:
Sources of
Recovery for
Class F: the
Second Lien Notes
Claimholders

Cash

New CEC
Convertible Notes
to be Exchanged
for New CEC
Common Equity

Under the June 2016 Plan926

None provided

If Class F voted to accept the plan,
each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $790.98
million “aggregate principal
amount of [the] New CEC
Convertibles Notes” to be
converted under the notes’
indenture for, in the aggregate, “up
to 9.646% of [the] New CEC
Common Equity”

Under the Final Plan927

Each claimholder would now receive
their pro rata share of $344.59 million
in cash

Each claimholder would now, in the
aggregate, receive their pro rata share
of $898.96 million of the New CEC
Convertible Notes, and they would be
convertible under their indenture “for
up to 11.017% of [the] New CEC
Common Equity”

If Class F voted to reject the plan,
they would receive the same
amount of New CEC Convertible
Notes exchangeable for the same
amount of New CEC Common
Equity

OpCo Series A
Preferred Stock to
be Exchanged for
New CEC
Common Equity

If Class F voted to accept the plan,
Class F claimholders would receive
OpCo Series A Preferred Stock to
“be exchanged pursuant to the
CEOC Merger for 17.435% of [the]
New CEC Common Equity”

Subject to the claimholders exercising
their rights under the New CEC
Common Equity Buyback, Class F
claimholders would now receive OpCo
Series A Preferred Stock exchangeable
for approximately “37.111% of [the]

926
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If Class F voted to reject the plan,
Class F claimholders would receive
OpCo Series A Preferred Stock to
“be exchanged pursuant to the
CEOC Merger for [only] 8.939% of
[the] New CEC Common Equity”

Allowance

None provided

New CEC Common Equity before
giving effect to the conversion of the
New CEC Convertible Notes”

Each claimholder would receive their
pro rata share of $5.524 billion in
allowed claims comprised of notes due
under 2008, 2009, and 2010 Second
Lien Indentures, “plus fees, costs, and
expenses incurred pursuant to” those
indentures

d. Class G’s Recovery under the Final Plan as
Compared to the June 2016 Plan
The table below has been provided to facilitate an easy comparison of the recovery of Class
G—holders of Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims—under the Final Plan as compared to the
June 2016 Plan:
Source of
Recovery for Class
G: the SubsidiaryGuaranteed Notes
Claimholders

New CEC
Convertible Notes

Under the June 2016 Plan928

Under the Final Plan929

Each claimholder would receive
their pro rata share of $116.81
million “aggregate principal
amount of [the] New CEC
Convertible Notes,” which,
pursuant to those notes’
indenture, would be convertible
for an aggregate of “up to 1.425%
of [the] New CEC Common
Equity”

Each claimholder was entitled to the
same pro rata share of New CEC
Convertible Notes as under the June
2016 Plan, but those notes would now
be convertible, in the aggregate, “for up
to 1.431% of [the] New CEC Common
Equity”

928
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OpCo Series A
Preferred Stock to
exchange for New
CEC Common
Equity

Allowance

Class G claimholders would
receive OpCo Series A Preferred
Stock, which they would
exchange “pursuant to the CEOC
Merger for 4.122% of [the] New
CEC Common Equity”

None provided

Class G claimholders, subject to their
right to participate in the New CEC
Common Equity Buyback, would still
receive OpCo Series A Preferred Stock,
but that stock would now be convertible
“for 4.045% of [the] New CEC Common
Equity . . . which [would] be
approximately equivalent to 4.688% of
[the] New CEC Common Equity before
giving effect to the conversion of the
New CEC Convertible Notes”

Each claimholder would receive their
pro rata share of approximately $502
million in allowed claims

e. Analysis: The Final Plan vs. The June 2016 Plan
i. How Class D Fared
In several regards, Class D—holders of Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims—received
an improved recovery under the Final Plan, as compared to the June 2016 Plan. Under the Final
Plan, these Prepetition Credit Agreement Claimholders would receive $5 million more in cash and
$34.9 million more in additional cash from syndicating OpCo debt to third parties. Some aspects
of Class D’s recovery remained the same, though. Class D’s entitlement to PropCo First Lien Term
Loan debt, as well as to an aggregate of the PropCo Second Lien Upsize Amount plus additional
cash equal to the difference between their applicable share of the Upsize Amount and what the
Upsize Amount actually ended up being, remained constant between the two plans.
In some ways, though, Class D’s recovery seemed to worsen under the Final Plan. While
the June 2016 Plan called for Class D to receive $406 million more in additional cash from the
proceeds of issuing OpCo Second Lien Debt to third parties, no such additional cash was provided
for in the Final Plan. Moreover, whereas Class D had the potential to exchange OpCo Series A
Preferred Stock for 5% of the New CEC Common Equity under the June 2016 Plan if Class F
voted to reject the plan, the Final Plan would provide Class D with 4.010% at most. Similarly, the
June 2016 Plan had called for Additional CEC Bond Consideration, defined as monthly payments
of $20 million. But, under the Final Plan, Class D would, instead, receive Additional CEC Bank
Consideration, which was defined as monthly payments worth only $10 million.
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Finally, the Final Plan provided for a total allowance of $5.462 billion for Class D. Caesars,
in its June 2016 Plan, had estimated that Class D would have $5.425 billion in allowed claims.930
Therefore, from June of 2016 until Caesars filed its Final Plan in January of 2017, the Prepetition
Credit Agreement Claimholders had increased the value of their allowed claims by $37 million.
ii. How Class E Fared
In comparison to Class D, the holders of Secured First Lien Notes Claims—Class E—did
not see the details of their recovery change nearly as much under the Final Plan. The most
significant change was that, under the June 2016 Plan, Class E was to receive $700 million, but
the Final Plan provided for those claimholders to receive $970.9 million, a $270.9 million increase.
Similarly, the Final Plan called for Class E to receive $8.1 million more in additional cash from
the syndication of OpCo debt to third parties than the June 2016 Plan had. But, conversely, both
plans provided for the Secured First Lien Notes Claimholders to receive same amount of: (1)
PropCo First Lien Notes, (2) aggregate of PropCo Second Lien Notes and additional cash, (3)
PropCo Preferred Equity Distribution, (4) aggregate of CPLV Mezzanine Debt and additional
cash, and (5) PropCo Common Equity.
Another small difference between the plans, though, is that the June 2016 Plan had called
for Class E to receive OpCo Series A Preferred Stock to be exchanged for 15.8% of New CEC
Common Equity if Class F voted to accept the plan, and 12.5% of the New CEC Common Equity
if Class F voted to reject it. However, the Final Plan provided for these claimholders to exchange
OpCo Series A Preferred Stock for 12.532% of New CEC Common Equity regardless of how
Class F voted, which would be worth approximately 14.524% of the New CEC Common Equity
before the conversion of the New CEC Convertible Notes. Similarly, the Additional CEC Bond
Consideration called for under the June 2016 Plan—worth monthly payments of $20 million—
was no longer contingent upon Class F voting to accept the plan. Finally, the Final Plan provided
for a total allowance of $6.530 billion. Thus, compared to the June 2016 Plan, which had estimated
Class E’s allowed claims totaled $6.529 billion,931 the Secured Lien Notes Claimholders would be
allowed $1 million more in claims under the Final Plan.
iii. How Class F Fared
Part XVI.D.4 of this paper discussed how creditor recoveries changed from the June 2016
Plan through September 2016, and, as you may recall, the Second Lien Noteholders—the members
of Class F—saw their recovery improve the most out of any Class over that time period. Therefore,
it should come as no surprise that, between the June 2016 Plan and the Final Plan, Class F’s
recovery changed tremendously. The affect the Examiner’s Report, discussed in Part XVI.D.2 of
930
931
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this paper, on these claimholders’ negotiating power cannot be understated. While no cash had
been provided for Class F under the June 2016 Plan, the Final Plan called for each Second Lien
Note Claimholder to receive their pro rata share of $344.59 million in cash. Moreover, whereas
Class F would have received $790.98 million in New CEC Convertible Notes to convert for up to
9.646% of New CEC Common Equity under the June 2016 Plan, under the Final Plan, those
claimholders would receive $898.96 million in notes convertible for up to 11.017% of the New
CEC Common Equity. As for OpCo Series A Preferred Stock, the June 2016 Plan provided that,
if Class F voted to accept the plan, their stock would be exchangeable for 17.435% of New CEC
Common Equity, and, if they rejected the plan, 8.939% of the equity. Under the Final Plan,
however, the OpCo Series A Preferred Stock that the Second Lien Notes Claimholders were to
receive would be exchangeable for approximately 37.111% before the conversion of the New CEC
Convertible Notes, up nearly 20% from the maximum amount of equity under the June 2016 Plan.
Lastly, like Class E, the claimholders of Class F saw their total amount of allowed claims under
the Final Plan increase by $1 million, as compared to the June 2016 Plan. The Final Plan provided
for a $5.524 billion allowance, while the June 2016 Plan had estimated Class F’s allowed claims
to total $5.523 billion.932
iv. How Class G Fared
Class G—holders of Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Claims—saw very little change in its
recovery under the Final Plan, as compared to the June 2016 Plan. Class G was to receive $116.81
million of New CEC Convertible Notes under both plans, but, while the June 2016 Plan said Class
G could convert those notes for up to 1.425% of the New CEC Common Equity, the Final Plan
provided that Class G could convert them for slightly more equity: 1.431%. Conversely, while
both plans provided for Class G to receive OpCo Series A Preferred Stock to exchange for New
CEC Common Equity, the Final Plan provided for that stock to be exchanged for slightly less
equity: 4.122% under the June 2016 Plan versus 4.045%—worth 4.688% before the conversion of
the convertible notes—under the Final Plan. As for Class G’s allowance, the Final Plan provided
for those claimholders to have $502 million in allowed claims,933 the exact same sum that Caesars
had estimated Class G would be allowed under the June 2016 Plan.
f. Implementation of the Final Plan
Now, we shall turn to how Caesars implemented its Final Plan. As one can imagine, to
effectuate a reorganization on this scale, much had to be done. For brevity’s sake, this paper will
focus on the most key aspects of implementing the plan: (1) Caesars’ settlements with creditor
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groups that secured releases from potential liability for CEC, Caesars, Apollo, TPG, and many
others, and (2) Caesars’ corporate governance following the Final Plan’s effective date.
i. Settlements with Creditor Groups and Releases
from Liability
To implement its Final Plan, Caesars reached settlements with the holders of SubsidiaryGuaranteed Notes Claims, the UCC, the Noteholders Committee, and the Mr. Danner whose
objection to the adequacy of Caesars’ April disclosure statement was discussed in Part XVI.D.1 of
this paper.934 Included within these agreements were releases from liability essential to the plan of
reorganization. First, there was the Debtor Release.935 Pursuant to this release, on the Final Plan’s
effective date:
“each Released Party [would be] deemed released by each and all of the
Debtors, the Estates, and the Reorganized Debtors from any and all . . .
liabilities . . . provided that the . . . Release [would] not operate to waive or
release any right, Claim, or Cause of Action (1) in favor of any Debtor,
Reorganized Debtor, or New Property Entity, as applicable, arising under
any contractual obligation owed to such Debtor or Reorganized Debtor not
satisfied or discharged under the Plan or (2) as expressly set forth in the
Plan or the Plan Supplement.”936
The Released Parties included: (1) each debtor, (2) each debtor’s direct and indirect nondebtor affiliates, (3) the former and current shareholders, affiliates, partners, officers, directors,
and many others who worked, or did work, for the debtors and their non-debtor affiliates, and (4)
numerous creditors, including (a) the consenting First Lien Noteholders and Bank Lenders, (b)
consenting Subsidiary-Guaranteed Notes Creditors, (c) the various indenture trustees, (d) the UCC,
(e) the Noteholder Committee, and (f) Mr. Danner.937 Caesars cited section 1123(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code as providing the authority for this release.938 Subsection (b)(6) of that section
provides that “a plan may . . . include any . . . appropriate provision not inconsistent with the
applicable provisions of [Title 11 of the United States Code].”939
Caesars’ Final Plan also called for a Third-Party Release whereby “each and all of the
Releasing Parties[,]” on the Effective Date, would be “conclusively, absolutely, unconditionally,
irrevocably, and forever discharge[d] and release[d] . . . from any and all . . . liabilities[.]”940 The
Releasing Parties included: (1) the Debtors, (2) CEC, (3) CAC, (4) Apollo and TPG, (5) the
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creditors’ committees’ members, and (6) essentially every other party in interest.941 Only five
obligations/liabilities were not released under this Third-Party Release, including: (1) obligations
or liabilities under the Final Plan or any other “agreement . . . executed to implement the Plan[;]”
(2) “any postpetition settlement agreements between any Released Party and a creditor of the
Debtors or the Estates[;]” and (3) “any postpetition liabilities incurred in the ordinary course by
the Released Parties[.]”942
Further, the Final Plan contained an Exculpation under which, on the Effective Date:
“each Debtor, each Reorganized Debtor, each New Property Entity [created
under the plan], each Estate, and each Exculpated Party [would be] released
and exculpated from any . . . liability for (a) any prepetition action taken or
omitted to be taken in connection with, or related to, formulating,
negotiating, or preparing the Plan or the [RSAs], or (b) [1] any postpetition
action taken or omitted to be taken in connection with, or related to
formulating, negotiating, soliciting, preparing, disseminating, confirming,
administering, or implementing the Plan, or consummating [various parts
of the Final Plan] . . . or [2] selling or issuing the New Debt, . . . Interests, .
. . CEC Convertible Notes, . . . CEC Common Equity, and/or any other
Security to be offered, issued, or distributed in connection with the Plan, the
Chapter 11 . . ., or other agreement or document created or entered into in
connection with the Plan . . . or [3] any other postpetition act taken or
omitted to be taken in connection with or in contemplation of the
restructuring of the Debtors, . . . except for actual fraud, willful misconduct,
or gross negligence in connection with the Plan or the Chapter 11[.]”943
The Exculpated Parties included: (1) each Debtor, (2) CES, (3) the UCC and its members,
(4) the Noteholder Committee and its members, (5) CEC, (6) CAC, and (7) amongst others, all of
these parties’ “direct and indirect current and former: affiliates, subsidiaries, partners . . ., officers,
directors, principals, employees, managers, controlling persons, agents, attorneys, investment
bankers, other professionals, [and] advisors[.]”944
Moreover, the Final Plan also provided for an injunction to go into effect on the Effective
Date against all entities who had held, were currently holding, or may hold claims, interests, or
liens that were discharged, released, or subject to exculpation.945 Caesars cited section 524(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code as authorizing the injunction under the Final Plan.946 Specifically, subsection
(a)(2) of that Code section provides that a discharge “operates as an injunction against the
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commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor[.]”947
Finally, Caesars’ Final Plan stated that, on the Effective Date, “all mortgages, deeds of
trust, Liens, pledges, or other security interests against any property of the Estates [would] be fully
released, settled, and discharged[.]”948 And, upon this happening, “the interest of any Holder
[holding those] . . . [would] automatically revert to the applicable Debtor and its successors and
assigns.”949 In the end, in spite of all the hay raised in this bankruptcy over different parties in
interest potentially facing liability, all was basically forgiven.
ii. Caesars’ New Corporate Governance
You may recall that in Part XVI.D.2 of this Paper we discussed how the Examiner’s Report
unearthed a “massive corporate governance failure driven by Apollo” leading up to Caesars’
bankruptcy.950 Perhaps to remedy this failure, the Final Plan called for steps seemingly designed
to make sure it did not occur again. For one, the Fina Plan called for the filing, “[o]n or immediately
before the Effective Date,” of New Corporate Governance Documents, which would “prohibit the
issuance of non-voting equity securities to the extent required by section 1123(a)(6) of the
Bankruptcy Code.”951 That section provides that a plan of reorganization must “provide for the
inclusion in the charter of the debtor, if the debtor is a corporation, . . . a provision prohibiting the
issuance of nonvoting equity securities[.]”952 Caesars’ Final Plan further called for new boards of
directors to be appointed to the OpCo, the REIT, and the New CEC.953
The new OpCo Board was to “consist of three voting members to be designated by [New
CEC], one of whom [would] be independent . . . [and] a member of all [the] committees of the . .
. New Board.”954 The board would also have “one non-voting observer, reasonably acceptable to
OpCo, to be designated by” the bond creditors.955 This observer was to “be given notice of and an
opportunity to attend the portion of all meetings . . . of the OpCo New Board concerning business
and strategy session matters and other matters that would have an adverse material economic
impact on PropCo (and receive all materials given to OpCo board members in connection with
such matters)[.]”956 As for the REIT, its new board was to “consist of seven voting members to be
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designated by the” bond creditors.957 “At least three [of these] voting members [had to] be licensed
by the required regulatory authorities by the Effective Date.”958 Because the REIT was to be
publicly traded under the name VICI, it had to be registered with the SEC.959 New CEC, for its
part, would have an “initial Board of Directors . . . consist[ing] of eleven members, one of whom
[would] be the CEO . . . and ten others, eight of whom [had to] be ‘independent’ directors . .
.[which meant they could not be] an officer, director, manager of full-time employee of” Apollo
or TPG. 960

Part XVII: The Texas Hold’em Showdown – Confirmation of Caesars’ Final
Plan of Reorganization and the Occurrence of the Plan’s Effective Date
In Texas Hold’em, “[a]fter the river betting round is complete, players show their cards
(called the showdown) and the dealer announces the winner[.]”961 A little over a month before
filing its Final Plan, Caesars had announced that it had secured the support of “more than 90% of
[the] voting creditors.”962 Specifically, Caesars’ press release asserted that the “first lien
noteholders, first lien bank lenders, second lien noteholders, subsidiary-guaranteed noteholders,
and unsecured noteholders [had] voted to accept the Plan in numbers well in excess of what [was]
necessary to confirm the Plan.”963 Thus, as the river card was dealt—i.e., as the Final Plan was
filed—Caesars felt confident it would make it out of chapter 11 without losing it all. And this
confidence was not misplaced. After all, as this Part demonstrates, Caesars came away from this
Texas Hold’em “showdown” with a confirmed plan that eventually took effect and allowed our
proverbial dealer here—the bankruptcy court—to announce it had emerged from chapter 11
victorious.
A. Confirmation of the Final Plan
Three days after Caesars’ Final Plan was filed, a proposed order to confirm that plan was
filed. In giving notice of its proposed order, Caesars indicated that it would seek to have its Final
Plan confirmed at a hearing scheduled for the next day: January 17, 2017.965 And, at that hearing,
964
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Judge Goldgar did indeed enter an order confirming Caesars’ Final Plan.966 Judge Goldgar’s order
confirmed “[t]he [Final] Plan, including (a) all of the modifications to the Plan filed with the Court
prior to or during the Confirmation Hearing and (b) all documents incorporated into the Plan
through the Plan Supplement[.]”967 One article cited Judge Goldgar as hailing the Final Plan’s
confirmation as a “monumental achievement.”968 That same article also contained a quote from
Mark Frissora, the former-Chairman and CEO of Hertz who was appointed as CEO of CEC in July
of 2015 with the support of Apollo and TPG.969 His appointment came pursuant to a “transition
plan” CEC announced shortly after Caesars filed for bankruptcy.970 The article quoted him as
saying “[t]he new Caesars [would] be a stronger company with a healthy balance sheet, a plan for
growth and investment, operating discipline and a relentless focus on employee and customer
satisfaction.”971
B. The Occurrence of the Final Plan’s Effective Date
From the Final Plan’s confirmation on January 17th through October 3rd, however, seven
amendments to the Plan Supplement were filed. The Final Plan’s effective date could not occur
until all of these amendments were filed, as each amendment finalized certain aspects of the plan
necessary for it to take effect. The first of these amendments set “forth the proposed composition
of the OpCo New Board, the REIT New Board, and the Initial Board of New CEC[.]”972 The next
amendment provided the procedures to be followed for: (1) the PropCo Equity Election and
Preferred Subscription Procedures, and (2) the New CEC Common Equity Cash Election.973 With
the next amendment came the REIT Ownership Waiver Notice,974 which was a waiver form First
Lien Notes Claimholders had to complete in order to receive PropCo Common Equity or PropCo
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Preferred Equity “as opposed to additional REIT Common Stock and REIT Series A Preferred
Stock[.]”975 This was important because, under the Final Plan:
“[A]fter taking into account the exercise of all of the PropCo Preferred
Equity Put [and Call] Rights . . ., all PropCo Common Equity and all PropCo
Preferred Equity [was to] be issued as REIT Common Stock and REIT
Series A Preferred Stock, except to the extent that a beneficial owner . . . of
such PropCo Common Equity or PropCo Preferred Equity . . . would be
treated [for federal income tax purposes] as owning more than 9.8% of
either the REIT Common Stock or the REIT Series A Preferred Stock[.]”976
Thus, if a holder of a First Lien Notes Claims was to be issued more than 9.8% of REIT
Common Stock or Series A Preferred Stock, they could sign the waiver and receive that surplus in
PropCo Common or Preferred Equity instead.
For its part, the following amendment set forth the REIT Series A Preferred Stock Articles,
the New CEC Convertible Notes Indenture, the Non-CPLV Management and Lease Support
Agreement, and Non-CPLV Master Lease Agreement.977 The next amendment to come provided
the OpCo Market Debt Documents.978 Then, the following amendment provided the REIT Articles
of Incorporation, REIT bylaws, PropCo First Lien Credit Agreement, and the indentures for
PropCo First and Second Lien Notes.979 Finally, the Fourteenth—and final—amendment to the
Plan Supplement was filed on October 3rd, 2017.980 This amendment provided Call Right
Agreements for specific casinos owned by Caesars, as well as other miscellaneous items such as a
Golf Course User Agreement, OpCo Board Observer Agreement, REIT Registration Rights
Agreement.981
At last, after more than two years in chapter 11, all issues regarding its reorganization had
been resolved, and it was time for the plan to take effect. On October 6, 2017, Caesars filed with
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the bankruptcy court a notice that the effective date of its Final Plan had occurred.982 Caesars had
finally exited chapter 11.

Part XVIII: Cashing in Their Chips – The Final Fee Applications of the
Professionals Retained by Caesars
Early in the history of casinos, when they “realized that many cheaters were trying to add
their own chips into the stack, they started collaborating with manufacturers to create chips that
would look different from chips from other casinos.”983 In a similar vein, the section 330(a)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code only permits professionals retained by the debtor to receive “reasonable
compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” and “reimbursement for actual, necessary
expenses.”984 However, under subsection (a)(2), the bankruptcy court is entitled to “award
compensation that is less than the amount of compensation that is requested.”985 The necessity of
the court’s discretion in awarding compensation to these professionals is made clear by the
following paragraph from an article co-authored by legal scholar Lynn M. LoPucki, a vocal critic
of the U.S. bankruptcy system:
“Regulation of professional fees is necessary because U.S. law permits the
debtor’s prepetition managers to remain in control of the reorganizing
debtor. The managers have the authority to retain professionals on behalf
of the estate and to pay them for the estate. But in large, public-company
cases, the managers rarely have significant interests in the estates. When
they spend money on professionals they spend other people’s money –
usually creditors’ money. For that reason, policymakers have long
understood they need for professional fees regulation. In recognition of
that need, bankruptcy judges have been responsible for reviewing fee
applications and awarding fees since at least 1934.”986
Notwithstanding this long tradition of judicial review, Professor LoPucki’s empirical study
found that:
“the United States bankruptcy courts routinely authorize and tolerate
professional fee practices that violate the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. The
practices are concentrated in the largest, most visible bankruptcy cases . . .
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The practices are promoted and taken advantage of by attorneys,
investment bankers, accountants, consultants, and other professionals.
Some of the firms involved are among the largest and most prestigious in
the world. They include Skadden Arps, Weil Gotshal, Kirkland and Ellis,
Jones Day, Fried Frank, Blackstone, Houlihan Lokey, and many
others.”987
Notably, one of the firms Professor LoPucki mentions is the law firm Caesars retained as
its lead counsel, Kirkland & Ellis. Jones Day, another firm mentioned, also participated in this
case, representing the Second Lien Noteholders.988 In this Part, we discuss the final fee applications
filed by the professionals Caesars retained to assist it in its chapter 11.989 Because this case was
being adjudicated in the Northern District of Illinois, please consider the following from a
handbook published by the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education in Business
Bankruptcy:
“Generally, courts consider three questions when evaluating a fee
application: (a) whether the services that are subject of the application
were performed pursuant to an order authorizing employment, if so; (b)
whether the services were necessary and adequately document; and if so,
(c) how they should be valued.”990
Against this backdrop, Judge Goldgar had to review the various final fee applications. It
was his duty to check whether the “chips” these retained professionals were trying to cash in were
authentic and deserving of the house’s—i.e., the estate’s—money. An independent fee examiner
raised concerns regarding “[l]aw firms’ spring 2015 fees in the contentious bankruptcy of
Caesars[,]” saying “the original bills of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Jones Day, Winston & Strawn LLP,
DLA Piper and others were often duplicative, overused the most expensive attorneys and included
vague travel expenses.”991 Nevertheless, as you will see, Judge Goldgar granted each retained
professional, except for DLA Piper, all of the compensation requested in their respective final fee
applications.
A. Kirkland & Ellis LLP
In Part V.B, we discussed how Caesars retained Kirkland & Ellis (“Kirkland”) as lead
counsel for its bankruptcy. On November 22nd of 2017, Kirkland filed its final fee application for
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services it had rendered over the period of January 15, 2015 to January 17, 2017. 992 In the
application, Kirkland sought $76,930,291.51 in actual, reasonable, and necessary compensation
for the fee period.993 As for expenses, Kirkland sought reimbursement of $2,030,602.45 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary expenses “incurred in connection with providing such services[.]”994
According to Kirkland, this requested compensation represented the 96,973 hours of work that
Kirkland attorneys and paraprofessionals had performed on Caesars’ case.995 The court entered an
order granting Kirkland the amount requested in its final fee application in full.996 Please see the
table below for an easy comparison of the compensation and expense reimbursement requested as
compared to that granted by Judge Goldgar.

Amount Requested

Amount Granted

Kirkland requested
$76,930,291.51 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation for the fee period

Judge Goldgar awarded
Kirkland $76,930,291.51 in
actual, reasonable, and
necessary compensating for the
fee period

Kirkland requested
$2,030,602.45 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
expense reimbursement

Judge Goldgar awarded
Kirkland $2,030,602.45 in
actual, reasonable, and
necessary expense
reimbursement

Percentage of
Request Received

100%

100%
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Total Amount Requested997:
$78,960,893.26

Total Amount Received998:
$78,960,893.96

100%

B. AP Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”)
As noted in Part V.C, Caesars retained AP Services, LLC (“AlixPartners”) to provide it
with a Chief Restructuring Office and certain additional personnel. However, unlike the other
professionals retained by Caesars, AlixPartners was not employed as a professional under section
327 of the Bankruptcy Code and was not “required to submit fee applications pursuant to sections
330 and 331 of the Bankruptcy Code.”999 Rather, AlixPartners only had to submit monthly invoices
to the Debtors, namely, a monthly staffing report and “a quarterly report of compensation earned
and expenses incurred.”1000 An example of one of these reports, from August 2016, is shown
below.1001 As can be seen, in August 2016, AlixPartners accrued a total of $1,620,287.46 in
compensation.

C. Millstein & Co., L.P.
In Part V.D of this paper, we discussed how Caesars retained Millstein & Co., L.P.
(“Millstein”) to serve as a financial advisor and investment banker. On November 22nd, 2017,
Millstein filed its final fee application for services rendered over the period of January 18, 2017
through October 6, 2017 (the “Seventh Interim Application Period”) and March 1, 2015 through
October 6, 2017 (the “Final Application Period”).1002 Millstein sought $13,735,483.87 in actual,
997
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reasonable, and necessary compensation for the services it rendered over those periods, less the
$6,983,339.12 it had been already been paid prior to its application.1003 As for expenses, Millstein
sought the reimbursement of $218,822.99 in actual, reasonable, and necessary expenses incurred
during the Final Application Period, but did not seek the reimbursement of any expenses incurred
during the Seventh Interim Application Period.1004 Thus, Millstein requested $6,970,967.74 in
total. The bankruptcy court subsequently entered an order granting all of the compensation
Millstein had requested.1005 Please see the table below for an easy comparison of the compensation
and expense reimbursement requested as compared to that granted by Judge Goldgar.

Amount Requested
or Reduced
Millstein requested
$13,735,483.87 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

Amount Granted

Judge Goldgar’s order did not
specify how much of the final
payment being awarded was
attributable to compensation
versus expense reimbursement,
but, in light of the fact that 100%
of the requested payment was
granted, he likely granted
exactly what was requested.

Percentage of
Request Received

100%

Millstein reduced the
compensation it requested by
the $6,983,339.12 it had already
been paid

Millstein requested the
reimbursement of $218,822.99
in actual, reasonable, and
necessary expenses

Judge Goldgar’s order did not
specify how much of the final
payment being awarded was
attributable to compensation
versus expense reimbursement,

100%

1003
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2017).
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but, in light of the fact that 100%
of the requested payment was
granted, he likely granted
exactly what was requested.

Total Amount Requested:
$6,970,967.74

Total Amount Received:
$6,970,967.74

100%

D. DLA Piper LLP
As seen in Part V.E, Caesars retained DLA Piper LLP (“DLA Piper”) to serve as its counsel
where Kirkland & Ellis was barred from doing so due to conflicts of interest. DLA Piper filed its
first and final fee application for the services it rendered over the period of January 15, 2015
through May 31, 2015 on July 14th, 2015.1006 DLA Piper sought $266,129.00 in actual, reasonable,
and necessary compensation and the reimbursement of actual, reasonable, and necessary expenses
totaling $1,348.71.1007 DLA Piper, therefore, sought a total of $267,477.71. However, this time,
Judge Goldgar did not grant all of the compensation requested by Caesars’ retained
professional.1008 While the exact reason Judge Goldgar refused to grant all of the compensation
DLA Piper requested is not made clear by the case docket, one cannot help but assume that his
order—entered following the fee examiner’s report being made available1009—was impacted by
the concerns raised in the report. Please see the table below for an easy comparison of the
compensation and expense reimbursement requested as compared to that granted by Judge
Goldgar.

1006

Notice of First and Final Fee Application of DLA Piper LLP (US) as Special Conflicts Counsel to the Debtors
and Debtors in Possession for the Period From January 15, 2015 Through May 31, 2015 [1882.pdf], at 5, In re
Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Jul. 14, 2015).
1007
Id.
1008
Order Approving the First and Final Fee Application of DLA Piper LLP (US) as Special Conflicts Counsel to
the Debtors and Debtors in Possession for the Period From January 15, 2015 Through May 31, 2015 [2631.pdf], In
re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Nov. 18, 2015).
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See supra Part XVIII.
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Amount Requested

Amount Granted

DLA Piper requested
$266,129.00 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

Judge Goldgar awarded DLA
Piper $184,120.25 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

DLA Piper requested the
reimbursement of $1,348.71 in
actual, reasonable, and
necessary expenses

Judge Goldgar reimbursed DLA
Piper $1,348.71 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
expenses

Total Amount Requested:
$267,477.71

Total Amount Received:
$185,468.96

Percentage of
Request Received

69.18%

100%

69.34%

E. Paul Hastings LLP
In Part V.F, we discussed how, in addition to DLA Piper, Caesars retained Paul Hastings
LLP (“Paul Hastings”) to serve as special conflicts counsel. On November 21st, 2017, Paul
Hastings filed their final fee application for services rendered over the period of May 27, 2015
through January 17, 2017.1010 The application sought $284,647.00 in actual, reasonable, and
necessary compensation, as well as the reimbursement of $884.65 in actual, reasonable, and
necessary expenses incurred during the fee period.1011 Paul Hastings, therefore, requested
$285,531.65 in total. The bankruptcy court subsequently entered an order granting Paul Hastings’
request in full.1012 Please see the table below for an easy comparison of the compensation and
expense reimbursement requested as compared to that granted by Judge Goldgar.

1010

Summary Cover Sheet to the Final Fee Application of Paul Hastings LLP, Special Conflicts Counsel to the
Debtors, For the Period From May 27, 2015 Through and Including January 17, 2017 [7612.pdf], In re Caesars
Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Nov. 21, 2017).
1011
Id. at 2.
1012
Order Granting Final Fee Application of Paul Hastings LLP, Special Conflicts Counsel to the Debtors, For the
Period From May 27, 2015 Through and Including January 17, 2017 [7672.pdf], In re Caesars Entertainment
Operating Co., 15-01145 (ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Dec. 8, 2017).
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Amount Requested

Amount Granted

Paul Hastings requested
$284,647.00 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

Judge Goldgar awarded DLA
Piper $284,647.00 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

Paul Hastings requested the
reimbursement of $884.65 in
actual, reasonable, and
necessary expenses

Judge Goldgar reimbursed DLA
Piper $884.65 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
expenses

Total Amount Requested:
$285,531.65

Total Amount Received:
$285,531.65

Percentage of
Request Received

100%

100%

100%

F. KPMG LLP
Finally, as you may recall from Part V.G, Caesars retained KPMG, LLP (“KPMG”) to
serve as tax consultants during the reorganization. KPMG filed its final fee applications for
services it rendered over the period of January 15, 2015 through January 17, 2017 on November
21st, 2017.1013 The application sought $10,359,732.50 in actual, reasonable, and necessary
compensation and the reimbursement of $912,863.81 in actual, reasonable, and necessary expenses
incurred over that period.1014 KPMG, thus, requested a total of $11,272,596.31. As with all of
Caesars’ retained professionals except for DLA Piper, Judge Goldgar entered an order granting
the entire amount requested by KPMG.1015 Please see the table below for an easy comparison of

1013
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Reimbursement of Expenses as Tax Consultants to the Debtors and Debtors in Possession for the Period From
January 15, 2015 Through January 17, 2017 [7613.pdf], In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 15-01145
(ABG) (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill. Filed Nov. 21, 2017).
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the compensation and expense reimbursement requested as compared to that granted by Judge
Goldgar.

Amount Requested

Amount Granted

KPMG requested
$10,359,732.50 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

Judge Goldgar awarded KPMG
$10,359,732.50 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
compensation

Paul Hastings requested the
reimbursement of $912,863.81
in actual, reasonable, and
necessary expenses

Judge Goldgar reimbursed
KPMG $912,863.81 in actual,
reasonable, and necessary
expenses

Total Amount Requested:
$11,272,596.31

Total Amount Received:
$11,272,596.31

Percentage of
Request Received

100%

100%

100%

Part XIX: Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas? – Caesars’ Emergence from
Chapter 11 and Where The Company is Now
Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas is a well-known book and movie where “[a]n oddball
journalist” is accompanied by “his psychopathic lawyer” on a trip to Las Vegas. 1016 Common
Sense Media, a website that provides “reviews and advice to help [families and schools] navigate
the digital world with their kids[,]”1017 provides the following slightly-amusing description of the
film:
“Parents need to know that Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas is a two-hour
celebration of drugs, foul language, and debauchery, with little or no
consequences, redemption, or lessons learned.”1018
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Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, IMDB, https://perma.cc/AHB4-82SE (last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
About, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, https://perma.cc/GQL9-5LCM (last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
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Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, https://perma.cc/5XL8-72QT (last visited Apr. 22,
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While Caesars’ bankruptcy may not have been quite that flagitious, it surely was a
spectacle. Thus, in this Part, we discuss the aftermath of the chapter 11—its consequences, whether
any lessons were learned, and the potential redemption of Caesars.
Caesars emerged from what some would describe as the most contentious bankruptcies
ever in January 2017. Judge Goldgar, on the day of the final confirmation, emphasized all that had
been done to reach the confirmation, saying, “‘This plan, as everybody knows, is a great big
settlement . . . Given the number of players and the number of different interests involved in this
case, that you could reach something like this is extraordinary. I think it is really a monumental
achievement.’”1019 Caesars’ creditors emerged from the bankruptcy owning around two-thirds of
the New Caesars equity.1020 Apollo and TPG had to “hand over their $950 million stake in Caesars
Entertainment’s parent company, which is publicly traded and [was] not in bankruptcy
protection.”1021 Moreover, they would maintain a 16% stake in the New Caesars but not own any
equity in the REIT.1022 All in all, though, the reorganization allowed Caesars to shed “$10 billion
in debt from its books.”1023
In June of 2019, Caesars announced a sale to Eldorado Resorts, which would be “the final
affront to Gary Loveman.”1024 Shortly after, in March, Apollo and TPG sold their remaining shares
in Caesars of which most were bought by the famous investor Carl Icahn.1025 Some thought that
David Sambur, from Apollo, could still benefit from being on the board, but he resigned in
April.1026 One source described Apollo’s status at the end of the bankruptcy as follows:
“Apollo had not only been defeated but also humiliated. In virtually no other
bankruptcy had a company’s private equity owners been on the brink of
billions of dollars of personal liability. And no bankruptcy judge had ever
ordered private equity titans to turn over their personal bank account details
to show their ability to pay up.”1027
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Nonetheless, Apollo proceeded to “raise a $25 billion private equity fund” in 2017, while
institutional investors everywhere took note of Sambur and Rowan’s tenacity.1028
TPG was not as active or successful as Apollo following the Caesars case, but they did
invest in companies like Airbnb and Uber, so called “tech unicorns.”1029 David Bonderman,
founding partner of TPG, had to resign from the board of Uber after making an alleged sexist
comment to another director, Arianna Huffington.1030 Ken Liang, one of the second-lien holders
who spearheaded the effort to fend off Caesars’ potential cramdown attempt, retired from Oaktree
in 2018, and Oaktree was acquired for “nearly $5 billion in 2019 by the Canadian asset
management giant, Brookfield.”1031 All in all the best description of the Caesars case is summed
up by one of the key bankers involved in the case, referring to other chapter 11 cases going on at
the time: “‘All these current situations are “little league.” Caesars was the seventh game of the
World Series.’”1032
Nowadays, Caesars has returned to the forefront of the gaming industry unmarred by its
bankruptcy. In 2021, CEC “generated a personal-best in $9.6 billion in revenue, [and according to
one article is poised] for an even better 2022.”1033 However, whether Caesars learned its lesson
from its long, eventful stint in chapter 11 is debatable. After all, despite its record-year, CEC
“posted a net loss of $434 million [in] the fourth quarter” of 2021.1034 This was largely due to the
company’s major investment in “its launch of digital sports betting apps and digital casinos
offerings[.]”1035 CEC will be competing against numerous others in this space, including
“DraftKings and FanDuel[,] . . . the most widely recognized sportsbook names [who] together
comprise[d] roughly 80% of the U.S. market [at the beginning of 2021].”1036 Moreover, as of
February 2022, CEC is “expected to sell one of [its] Las Vegas Strip Properties[,]” most likely
Planet Hollywood, which “would help . . . [CEC] pay down its debt.”1037 The parent company of
our Caesars in this paper, thus, is still dealing with the same issues that have plagued the company
since Apollo and TPG acquired it in 2008. At the same time, it is spending heavily on a new,
competitive industry in online gambling, “focus[ing] its efforts on capturing a 21% market
share.”1038 Remember, one of the reasons Caesars gave for its entering chapter 11 was the changing
1028
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tastes of its consumers.1039 Will CEC’s bet that online gambling is the future, and that it can possess
a sizeable market share of that future, pay off? Will Planet Hollywood be the last property sold off
to help address the company’s debt? Only time will tell. For what it is worth, though, the authors
of this paper have a hard time imagining this gaming giant is going anywhere anytime soon.

Epilogue – It Still Isn’t Over
Remarkably, matters related to Caesars’ bankruptcy are still being heard by Judge Goldgar
today. On February 14, 2022, a hearing was held to address various matters, including one of the
motions Caesars filed to reject an executory contract and the payment of administrative
expenses.1040 Moreover, on April 18th of this year, an omnibus hearing was held.1041 Judge
Goldgar had ordered Caesars’ counsel to “appear and [to] be prepared to report in detail on the
status of . . . litigation pending in . . . Nevada[.]”1042 The litigation referred to is Desert Palace,
Inc., et al. v. Seibel, et al., No. A-17-760537-B (Dist. Ct., Clark Cty., Nev.).1043 The lawsuit
concerns Rowen Seibel who, “[s]tarting in the late 2000s, . . . conceptualized numerous extremely
profitable restaurants for Caesars.”1044 After Caesars entered into several Development
Agreements with entities “owned, directly or indirectly, by Seibel to develop, fund, and/or operate
restaurants at various Caesars’ properties[,]” Caesars’ top executives “began to dislike [him]
personally.”1045 Then, “[i]n 2016, Seibel formed The Seibel Family 2016 Trust, an irrevocable
trust[.]”1046 Shortly thereafter, some of the entities owned by Seibel “assigned their rights and
interests . . . under their respective Development Agreements with Caesars to newly-formed . . .
[e]ntities, which were owned, directly or indirectly, by the Trust.”1047 Caesars alleged Seibel had
defrauded it by not disclosing that he “would indirectly benefit from” those restaurants being
assigned to the Trust due to his wife being “one of the Trust’s beneficiaries.”1048
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Thus, as you can see, matters related to and affected by Caesars’ reorganization continue
to create legal messes. Unsurprisingly, this issue involved another unscrupulous individual. Rowan
Seibel, who worked with celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay on several of his Caesars projects, has
been called “inept” and “fraudulent” by his former colleague.1049 Chef Ramsay sued Seibel in “a
$10 million legal war” that alleged “‘Seibel [had] stole[n] from the restaurant account’ and used
his connection with Ramsay to secure other deals, as he ‘traveled throughout the world blatantly
mischaracterizing his rights under agreements governing restaurant ventures involving Mr.
Ramsay.’”1050 Seibel was also convicted of, and sentenced to prison for, tax evasion in 2016.1051
Ian Fleming, the author of the famed James Bond spy novels, wrote the following in Casino
Royale: “At gambling, the deadly sin is to mistake bad play for bad luck.”1052 The gaming industry
has a rich history of attracting shady characters,1053 and the fact that Caesars both found itself in
chapter 11 and still finds itself in court today—more than seven years later—on related matters is
likely a byproduct of that attraction still existing. After all, as the subtitle of a book we have cited
frequently throughout this paper says, Caesars’ bankruptcy was “a billionaire brawl . . . [that]
exposed the power and greed of Wall Street[.]”1054 Hopefully, from here on, Caesars can avoid
those who wish to use the gaming giant as a vehicle for personal gain and thereby achieve a
prosperous, not-so-newsworthy (at least in the negative sense) future. We are confident the
company’s creditors, executives, shareholders, and employees hope for the same.
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